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Abstract of Heidegger and East Asia: Continuing the Dialogue, a thesis submitted by 
Edward McDougall for the degree of Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Durham, 2012
This thesis explores and extends the dialogue between Martin Heidegger and East Asia. It asks 
whether East Asian thought, particularly philosophical Daoism, can adequately address the problem 
of  modern  nihilism  as  conceived  by  Heidegger.  It  aims  to  clarify  the  vague  prospect:  which 
Heidegger  termed the  'new beginning'  by showing how East  Asian thought  offers  a  distinctive 
model of the sacred that can antidote  modern nihilism.
Chapter One grounds the overall thesis by outlining the basic phenomenological principles 
of Heidegger's thought, particularly his notions of Being (Sein) and world. This basis is extended by 
Chapter Two which examines the Later Heidegger's notions of earth and Seyn. Chapter Three sets 
out modern nihilism as it is understood in Heidegger's philosophy. Chapter Four looks at the basic 
hermeneutical difficulties of Heidegger's dialogue with East Asia.  Building on this introduction to 
Heidegger’s  thought,  Chapter  Five  discusses  Daoism and  Shintoism as  models  for  the  sacred, 
comparing them with Heidegger’s notion of dwelling. Chapter Six examines what it means for the 
Dao  to  be  ineffable,  comparing  the  Dao  with  Seyn and  showing how the  poetic  mysticism of 
Heidegger  and the Daoist  thinkers differs  from both esoteric  knowledge and quietism.  Chapter 
Seven considers the interplay between yin and yang in relation to Heidegger's thought, comparing 
the dichotomy with Heidegger's earth and world and looks at the history of Western metaphysics in 
the light of this comparison. Then, moving away from ontology to applied philosophy, Chapter 
Nine discusses the Daoist ethos of wu wei and to what extent this can provide Heideggerian thought 
with a model for living in the modern Western world. The final section brings the other chapters 
together, arguing that Heidegger's later thought sets out a non-doctrinal-religious ethos in response 
to modern Western nihilism.
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Introduction  
Heidegger's later thought is often presented as being deeply pessimistic and negative in that 
it is held to recommend an attitude of bleak, passive resignation towards the nihilism of the modern 
world. This commonly held view of Heidegger sees him as holding that technocratic nihilism is a 
fixed law determined by the modern epoch which cannot be altered or even affected by the actions 
of any particular individual. This way of reading Heidegger's thought thereby presents it as being 
even more pessimistic than that of Schopenhauer in that it does not even allow for the possibility 
that the individual might obtain a kind of salvation through personal ascetic renunciation. From the 
point of view of such a reading, modern humanity is trapped in a nihilistic state, with nothing to 
hope for. This view of Heidegger's work is presented by several writers, including Herman Philipse, 
in Heidegger's Philosophy of Being. 
According to this interpretation of Heidegger's later thought, the only positive point outside 
the bleakness of modern nihilism would be  a nostalgic longing for an idealised view of pre-Socratic 
or Homeric Greece, which Heidegger held as both the beginning of Western thought and a model 
towards which all Western thought ought to aspire and, if possible, seek to restore. This would make 
Heidegger's thought appear simply as a continuation of Hölderlin's Romantic Hellenism, viewing 
Ancient Greece as a means through which to show how the modern Western world has declined. 
Such a view of Heidegger's work is advanced by John D Caputo, who states in his later writings that 
Heidegger aims to construct a 'myth of the Great Greek Beginning' and that Western thought has 
fallen from the state of this 'Great Greek Beginning'. 1 The aim of Western thought, therefore, ought 
to be to return to this pre-Socratic ancient Greek state. Such Greco-centrism appears to implicitly 
exclude any alternative traditions  of  thought.  According to  Caputo,  it  is  not  only the case that 
Heidegger’s thought has no room for any input from other traditions of thought external to Greece, 
1  J. D Caputo  Demythologizing Heidegger:  Indiana University Press: Bloomington Indianapolis 1993  Page 184
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such as Jewish, Persian,  Indian or Far Eastern thought:  the very aim of Heidegger's thought is 
precisely to purify Western thought by eliminating all non-Greek influences.  
At the same time, the practical possibility of a return to the Greek  Polis, such as Athens 
before Socrates, seems deeply unlikely in that the only realistic role for the  ancient Greek World in 
Heidegger appears to be to stand in contrast to  the modern western world, thus highlighting the 
latter’s shortcomings. Heidegger himself would certainly acknowledge that it is no longer possible 
to live, for example, as a Homeric hero in the modern world; and while a Greek temple existing as a 
ruin may still provide a sense of the divine outside of the dominant doctrinal understanding of 
religion in modern and medieval Europe, in order to restore such a sense of the sacred, it appears 
necessary  to  have  a  return  of  the  Greek  gods.  As  such,  ancient  Greece,  from a  Heideggerian 
perspective, can only appear as  a faint trace of light on the horizon from a past golden age, to 
which it is impossible to return and which can be only sensed in contrast to the gathering gloom of 
the modern world. 
According to such a reading, therefore, since the decline of ancient Greece, humanity has 
effectively  been  trapped  in  unalterable  and  progressively  increasing  nihilism.  This  makes 
Heidegger's  later thought appear  as distanced from any practical application within the modern 
world.  It also makes Heidegger's thought appear potentially self-defeating since, by adopting this 
resigned approach to the modern world, the later Heidegger would only be reinforcing the modern 
nihilism  and  thereby  would  seem  to  undermine  the  purpose  of  any  critique.   Such  readings,  
therefore,  appear  to  be counter  productive to  Heidegger's  own purpose in writing.  In so far  as 
technocratic nihilism is ordained as the fate of modern humanity to the extent that no human action 
can make any difference to it, Heidegger's personal endeavour is futile.  
However, such a position, although widespread, represents a fundamentally one-sided and 
thus  misguided  reading  of  Heidegger's  thought  in  that  it  focuses  on  his  critique  of  modernity 
combined with his reading of the history of Western thought, but disregards the positive aspect of 
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his writing as an effort to rediscover that which is lost or suppressed within modern technocratic 
nihilism. 
 This thesis will challenge such a pessimistic reading of Heidegger's philosophy by focusing 
on his  thought  as  a  response to  the  crisis  in  Western modernity.  I  will  argue that  the view of 
Heidegger as simply nihilistic is one-sided because it fails to take into account Heidegger's work as 
a response to nihilism. Although Heidegger’s interest in ancient Greece obviously cannot be denied, 
the exclusively Greco-centric reading of Heidegger is too narrow in that it fails to take into account 
its potential for dialogue with other traditions to develop a response to Western nihilism. This thesis 
will show how it is possible to understand the 'new beginning' as something more than merely a 
vague or nebulous prospect and that it is rather a response to the modern Western world. The central 
question of this thesis is, therefore, “What does such a response entail?” Thus, overall, the main 
endeavour is to show how it is possible to create a Heideggerian alternative to modern nihilism. 
 In order to do this, it is necessary to explore further the possibility of a new beginning. 
Such a notion in Heidegger's writings, described in Contributions to Philosophy as 'Crossing to the 
Other Beginning',2 can easily appear vague or messianic. This is because it is hard to see in practice 
what such a transformation would entail. The ‘Other Beginning’ in itself, therefore, does not appear 
to offer a practical response to the modern world. The apparently messianic nature of the Other 
Beginning has  often  led to  its  neglect  in  studies  of  Heidegger's  thought  which  have  tended to 
concentrate  on  either  a  reading  of  the  history  of  Western  philosophy  or  the  interpretation  of 
technology and nihilism. Thus, even sympathetic readings of Heidegger's thought have tended to 
avoid discussion of his conception of a new beginning, almost seeing it as an embarrassment, while 
unsympathetic readings have tended to hold it up as an alleged example of mystical obscurantism. 
However, in order to assess the implications of the later Heidegger's thought as a response to the 
modern world, and thereby clarify the notion of what an 'other beginning' could mean, this thesis 
2  M. Heidegger Contributions to Philosophy (from Enowning ). Translated by Pravis Emad and Kenneth Maly, 
Indiana Press Bloomington Indianapolis 1999 p 124.
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will  look at  Heidegger's  dialogue with the East  Asian world as one possible  route to  this  new 
beginning. 
What is the East Asian World?
The East Asian world in the 'Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and An Inquirer' 
designates a region marked out by a particular tradition of thought and religion. While the dialogue 
itself does not directly define the East Asian world, roughly speaking it might be said to encompass 
China, Old Korea, Japan and Vietnam, though it is not possible to draw strict boundaries.  East Asia  
in this context should therefore not be equated with a broad notion of Eastern or Oriental regions as 
simply  encompassing  everything  that  is  not  Western  or  European.   Such  a  position  remains 
ambiguous and risks the grouping together of traditions that have little or nothing in common. For 
example, as will be shown in the section 'The Basis of Heidegger's Dialogue', the Islamic world has 
more in common with the Western world than with the East Asian world.  The East Asian world 
therefore remains  distinct  from other  traditions,  such as  European,  Islamic or  Indian traditions, 
which will be discussed in more detail later on in this section. The delineated region is understood 
here in a specific Heideggerian sense, which gives priority to thought and religion in defining the 
nature of East Asia as a distinct area, while aspects such as social or political customs are given 
secondary importance.
 By  focusing  in  this  way  on  the  centrality  of  religion  and  thought,  the  Heideggerian 
understanding of the distinction between East Asia and the West thus implicitly rejects a commonly 
held position that Asian values are collectivist, whereas western values are individualist, primarily 
on  the  grounds  that  such  an  interpretation  focuses  heavily  on  social  relationships  while  being 
neglectful of underlying religious and philosophical differences. In any case, this view can clearly 
be shown to be one-sided and flawed when comparing the organic notions of state and society 
found in Plato or Hobbes with the individualist anti-institutionalism expressed in the writings of 
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Zhuangzi, or the Japanese Zen monk, Ikkyū. This thesis will, therefore, reject such superficial and 
simplistic  explanations  of  the  contrast  between  the  East  Asian  World  and  the  Western  world. 
Instead, the focus will be on various philosophical and religious traditions that will be referred to 
collectively as the East Asian world.  It will seek to show the various ways and instances in which 
these traditions differ from ways of thinking and religion found in the West. 
 While  it  is  clear  that  this  tradition  of  religious  and  philosophical  thought  has  been 
influenced by traditions external to East Asia, in particular India, it still remains a distinct tradition. 
This differentiation can be observed, for example, in certain strands of Hindu thought, which come 
close to a notion of the divine that is absolute, personal and completely transcendent along the lines 
of the role of Vishnu in Vaishnavism, in a way that appears alien to analysing classical indigenous 
East  Asian  philosophical  and  religious  traditions.  Indeed,  it  seems  difficult,  for  example,   to 
translate the notion of ‘God’, as it is widely understood within the western Christian tradition, into 
classical Chinese.  Historically, Western missionaries have used Shen, rendered ‘benevolent spirit’, 
or  Tian  meaning  heaven,  both  as  attempts  to  present  the  Christian  notion  of  God in  Chinese. 
However, in both cases, such terms already have strong nuances within Chinese religion and thus do 
not appear adequate for conveying a sense of a singular absolute,  transcendent and omnipotent 
divinity.
  A further point of distinction might be the emphasis put on the relationship with landscape 
that is found in traditions such as Chinese Daoism and Chan Buddhism as well as the importance of 
natural phenomena to Japanese Shrine-Shintoism, but this is not paralleled by other mystical or 
religious traditions,  including the Indian Vedānta.  Hence,  while  the East  Asian tradition clearly 
should not be taken as completely isolated or unique, it is still fair to say that it does represent a 
distinctive area of thought. While, as indicated, the area influenced by East Asian tradition is much 
wider, in practice, the Chinese and Japanese traditions both exemplify what Heidegger means when 
he refers to the East Asian world.  Hence, these traditions will be focused on in this thesis. 
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This tradition of East Asian thought or religion itself covers a wide variety of different areas, 
including Daoism, both religious and philosophical, Confucianism, alongside other ancient schools 
of Chinese thought, such as Mohism (Mo Jia) and Legalism (Fa Jia), as well as different schools of 
Mahāyāna Buddhism, Chinese folk religion,  Korean Shamanism and various forms of Japanese 
Shintoism. These traditions themselves passed through various historical developments, including 
the rise of Neo-Confucianism as a syncretic movement in later Chinese history, particularly the 
Ming Dynasty as well as in Japan during the early Edo Period. The East Asian tradition of thought 
should,  thus,  not  be  thought  of  as  a  philosophically  or  religiously  homogeneous  entity.  These 
different religions and philosophies, however, are in themselves interconnected and have influenced 
each other through a history of interaction and dialogue. For example, the way that Buddhism and 
Confucianism  have  both  developed  in  East  Asia  has  been  deeply  influenced  through  their 
interaction with each other: they would not have become as they are without such encounters.  The 
same  might  also  be  said  of  Daoism and  indeed  Shintoism,  which  also  had  to  respond  to  the 
influence of Buddhism as well as Confucianism. Thus, it is possible to refer broadly to an East 
Asian tradition of thought and religion in the same way that it is possible to refer to a Western 
tradition  of  philosophy:  While  the  latter  encompasses  a  wide  variety  of  schools  of  thought, 
including Existentialism, post-modernism, Romanticism, Positivism, Marxism, seventeenth-century 
Empiricism, Catholic scholasticism, Greco-Roman Stoicism or Neo-Platonism, it should be noted 
that it  can also be said to include thinkers from outside of what might more conventionally be  
referred to as 'the West', such as the Islamic scholar Avicenna or the Jewish Rabbi Maimonides in 
Islamic  Spain  and  later  Egypt.   Both  thinkers  were  influenced  by  Greek  thought,  particularly 
Aristotle, and had a deep influence over medieval European philosophers, notably Aquinas, while 
Islamic thought has played a more ubiquitous role in the history and development of the Western 
tradition. At times, therefore, in both Western and East Asian thought, different schools may appear 
to take seemingly mutually opposed positions, as in Rationalism and Empiricism in Europe during 
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the seventeenth century or, at certain times in Chinese history, Daoism and Confucianism. However, 
what links these diverse strands of thought both in East Asia and the West is a history of  mutual 
influence and interaction. Yet, although there has been a degree of interaction between East Asia 
and the West  for  many centuries,  such as,  for  example,  when Nestorian Christian missionaries 
arrived in China during the early Tang dynasty, or when Leibniz became interested in the  Yijing 
during the seventeenth century, the East Asian and Western worlds have remained largely distinct in 
terms of their underlying traditions.
Commencing  with  the  basic  question  as  to  whether  Heidegger  was  aware  of  various 
elements of East Asian traditions, Petzet states: 'anyone who knows a little about Heidegger's life 
will have to respond positively'.3 While Heidegger's awareness of references to Far Eastern sources 
may not always have been made obvious or direct in his writings, it  is clearly present, and his  
interest in aspects of East Asian thought and traditions, such as Zen, Daoism or Bushido is already 
well attested to in the work of Reinhard May and Graham Parkes, among others. Heidegger clearly 
was aware of a number of classical works of East Asian philosophy, such as Zhuangzi and the Dao 
De Jing  (indeed, at one point he attempted to make a translation of Laozi's writings) as well as, 
possibly, the more modern works of writers including Kakuzo Okakura and D.T. Suzuki.  However, 
the main focus in this work will be on continuing Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world. 
The aim is not, therefore, to answer the biographical or textual question as to which aspects of the 
East Asian World may have directly influenced Heidegger, and at which point, during his work. 
Instead  of looking backwards biographically over Heidegger's work to see what elements may have 
been influenced by the East Asian world, this thesis will look at how aspects of East Asian thought 
and religion can provide an alternative to  Western nihilism in Heidegger’s view,  by presenting 
different ways of relating to beings in the world.  As such, this thesis will look further at those 
possibilities that are only hinted at in his work. Based on the potential alluded to in the work of 
Heidegger, this thesis will seek to show how the East Asian world can provide a way of living in the 
3 H. W. Petzet  Encounters and Dialogues With Martin Heidegger  University of Chicago London 1993, p 166  
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modern Western world that Heidegger was searching for. This requires finding a way of living in 
the  modern  world  that  remains  open to  a  sense  of  mystery  and which  does  not  endeavour  to 
reinforce the reduction of all that is to resources.
  A large body of  work already exists  on Heidegger  and Zen Buddhism, while  Korean 
Shamanism, although it may have had no direct impact on Heidegger's thought, can potentially be 
understood in Heideggerian terms.  It will not, however, be possible to look at all these areas within 
this thesis. The main focus of this work will be on philosophical Daoism, Dao jia, as exemplified by 
the writings of Laozi and Zhuangzi, as well as aspects of Shrine Shintoism by way of comparison 
and contrast.   It is important to note here that philosophical Daoism,  Dao jia, will be treated as 
separate and distinct from religious Daoism, Dao Jiao, or Chinese folk Daoism, in that, while these 
traditions  may  have  influenced  each  other,  they  differ  on  important  points,  particularly  the 
significance of gaining personal immortality.  From this point onwards, “Daoism” will  therefore 
refer to Dao Jia, unless otherwise specified.
 The old Chinese language and the Dao De Jing in particular are notoriously difficult to 
translate,  resulting  in  a  wide range of  different  translations.  For  this  reason,  there is  no single 
accepted version. However, the Jonathan Starr rendering has been found useful for its clarity, as 
well as its commentary and provision of the original Chinese text. When referring to the classic 
Daoist text, the Dao De Jing, this thesis will generally use Jonathan Starr's translation, but at points, 
when there is a clearly an important ambiguity, it will also turn to Richard Wilhelm's translation. In 
cases of  ambivalent translation, it has also been necessary to consult the original Chinese text. 
While the main focus of this thesis is on Daoism, I will also look at Shintoism, an area 
which appears to have had no direct impact on Heidegger and which he may well not have been 
acquainted with. However, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that both Daoism and Shintoism are 
relevant to the aim of exploring further the possibilities of responding to Western nihilism presented 
by East Asian traditions. By continuing the dialogue with the East Asian world in this way, this 
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thesis  endeavours to fulfil Heidegger's own view of his work, particularly his reading of the history 
of Western philosophy as preparation for a future 'dialogue with the East Asian World'.4 
East Asia and Western Nihilism
The notion that the East Asian tradition might provide a resolution to the crisis of modern 
nihilism in Western thought was proposed by Heidegger's Japanese contemporary Nishitani Keiji. 
This redemption through the East Asian tradition was described by Nishitani in messianic tones, 
stating  that  'the  tradition  must  be  rediscovered  from the  ultimate  point  where  it  is  grasped  in 
advance as “the end” (or eschaton) of our westernisation and of Western Civilisation itself'.5  This 
reading presents traditional East Asian thought as a future possibility for both East Asia and the 
West. Nishitani Keiji suggests that the East Asian tradition of thought can offer a new beginning or 
radical  transformation  that  appears  similar  to  Heidegger's  'Other  Beginning'  by  looking  at  an 
alternative way of understanding Western nihilism that is non-technocratic. For Nishitani, the crisis 
of nihilism in the modern Western world, as exemplified by Nietzsche's famous 'death of God',6 
represents, therefore, an opportunity to look again at previously neglected aspects of the East Asian 
world. 
 Central to this rediscovering of the East Asian tradition is Nishitani’s notion of looking 
again at  its  understanding of the sacred.  This is  because East Asian traditions, such as Zen for 
Nishitani, but also Daoism and Shintoism as will be discussed in this thesis, appear to offer notions 
of religion that are not understood as a theistic doctrine, which was central to the tradition which 
Nietzsche was responding to. Hence, what both Nietzsche and Heidegger saw as the decline of 
traditional  Western  religious  metaphysics  provides  the  opportunity  to  re-examine  previously 
neglected aspects of East Asian tradition, which can show alternative ways of understanding the 
4  M. Heidegger  “Science and Reflection” in Question Concerning Technology. Translated by William Lovitt.: Harper 
and Row New York 1977, p 158 .
5  N. Keiji  Self Overcoming of Nihilism  Translated by Graham Parkes. State University of New York New York 1990
    p 179.
6  E.M Ciroran  The Temptation to Exist: Translated by Richard Howard  University of Chicago ,Chicago 1956  p 37 .
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nature of religion., This provides the capacity for moving beyond the nihilism that developed from 
what  Nietzsche  and Heidegger  saw as  the  failure  of  Western  metaphysics.  It  is  this  decline  of 
Western religious  metaphysics,  based on the  absolute  transcendental  notion  of  God as  held  by 
thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas,  who for both Nietzsche and Heidegger is  understood as the 
defining feature of modern nihilism.  Accordingly, in order to provide an alternative to modern 
Western nihilism, East Asia must provide an alternative understanding of the religious or the sacred. 
The fundamental question therefore is: Can any East Asian tradition present an understanding of the 
sacred that is a viable alternative to the previous western understanding of religion?
While the main focus of Nishitani's work was on Zen Buddhism, his approach could be 
applied  to  other  aspects  of  East  Asian  thought  and  religion.  However,  the  danger  of  such  an 
approach is that it could lead to a simple and direct appropriation of East Asian tradition by the 
modern Western world. This raises immediate practical questions, such as how it would be possible 
to live as a Daoist sage in the modern Western world. This project of looking to East Asian thought, 
or any other kind of Eastern tradition as a response to Western nihilism has already been challenged 
by another of Heidegger's contemporaries, Emil Cioran. He, like Heidegger, was concerned with 
modern Western nihilism, but declared instead: 
What recourse to China or India will heal us? There are certain forms of wisdom and 
deliverance which  we can neither grasp from within nor transform into our daily
substance, nor even frame in a theory. Deliverance if we insist upon it must proceed 
from ourselves: no use seeking it elsewhere, in a ready- made system or in some 
Oriental doctrine.7 
Cioran  sees  the  modern  Western  world  as  completely  trapped  in  its  own  historic 
7  E.M Ciroran  The Temptation to Exist: Translated by Richard Howard. University of Chicago, Chicago 1956  p 37 . 
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development,  and as  such beyond the reach of any alternative tradition.  East  Asian thought  is, 
therefore, in effect rendered completely alien and beyond the comprehension of the West. hence it 
would be completely irrelevant to the problem of Western nihilism. In Cioran's view, therefore, even 
if East Asian thought was completely exempt from the crisis of modern Western nihilism, it could 
still provide no help to the Western world
 For Cioran, if there can be any answer to the crisis that both Heidegger and Nishtani see 
within the modern world, it must come from the Western tradition itself. In this thesis, I will seek to  
counter Cioran's point from a Heideggerian position. In order to do this, I will extend Heidegger's  
dialogue with the East Asian thought by presenting such dialogue as means to challenge modern 
Western nihilism, thereby showing how aspects of East Asian thought and religion are relevant to 
the condition of the modern Western world. However, at the same time, I will look at issues of 
distance and interpretation of East Asian thought as they are raised in Heidegger's writings.  Thus, 
this thesis will present Heidegger's approach to the East Asian world as mid-way between Cioran 
and Nishitani, in the sense that he sees the East Asian tradition as offering an alternative to modern 
Western nihilism while at the same time remaining in itself  distant.  This means that Heidegger 
would reject any wholesale appropriation or syncretism of East Asian and Western thought. Such a 
wholesale  appropriation  of  East  Asian  thought  would  lead,  in  Heidegger’s  view,  to 
misinterpretations, due to imposing Western notions onto traditions from East Asia. Hence, it is not 
possible standing within the modern Western world to gain direct access to the East Asian world.  In 
this respect, Heidegger's project differs from others’ such as that of Schopenhauer, a contrast which 
will be looked at directly in the section, 'The Basis of Heidegger's Dialogue'. However, this thesis 
will seek to show that, while Heidegger would reject a direct cultural appropriation, the East Asian 
world  and  East  Asian  thought  can  still  provide  a  paradigm to  the  modern  Western  world.  In 
particular, it will be shown that East Asian traditions can provide ways of responding to the modern 
world  for  Heidegger,  and  a  sense  of  the  sacred  that  is  outside  of  the  technocratic  way  of 
19
understanding.  This tension between distance and dialogue is something that underlies Heidegger's 
approach to the East Asian world, which is exemplified by the Japanese principle of  iki (いき ),  
which will be explained further in the thesis. 
Hence, the thesis will show how Heidegger attempts to avoid a simple appropriation of East 
Asian  traditions  by  the  West,  such  as  the  method  that  may  be  associated  with  the  work  of 
Schopenhauer. However, at the same time, his position still allows for East Asian traditions to be 
relevant to living in the modern Western world, in that they can be helpful in responding to modern 
technological nihilism. 
In  Chapters  One  and  Two  of  the  thesis,  I  will  firstly  set  out  the  later  Heidegger's 
fundamental principles. Of crucial importance here is to distinguish the phenomenological notions 
of  Sein and World, which will be dealt with in Chapter One, from the more mysterious  Seyn and 
Earth that will be looked at in Chapter Two. In Chapter One, therefore, I will begin by looking at 
Heidegger's basic phenomenology, starting with the distinction that the early Heidegger makes in 
Being  and  Time,  between  beings-present-at  hand  (Vorhanden)  and  beings-ready-to-hand 
(Zuhanden). 
Crucial to this distinction is that, for Heidegger, beings are given their ontological status 
(become what they are), through their overall relationships with each other and that this framework 
of underlying relations provides the basis for the notion of World. From this, I will go on to show 
how the later Heidegger extends the notion of World as a background framework in the ‘Origin of 
the Work of Art’ to include the complete historical order. Then, in Chapter Two, I will go on to look 
at the limits of the phenomenology of world, starting with the role of Earth as the mysterious and 
organic grounding that provides a limit to the openness and intelligibility of the world. From this, 
the chapter will go on to discuss Seyn as the more mysterious and fundamental element of Being in 
Heidegger, underlying the phenomenological Sein as the way that beings are disclosed.
Moving on from those basic  principles,  in Chapter  Three I  will  look at  the problem of 
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modern nihilism in Heidegger's thought. In particular, I  will show how this condition is thought to 
emerge from the historical development of Western thought since Plato, culminating in Nietzsche's 
'will to power' (der Wille zur Macht), and how this has led, in Heidegger’s interpretation, to the 
reduction of beings in the world to simply standing as resources in reserve. This is tied to the loss of 
the sense of Seyn.
After  this  relatively  brief  outline  of  Heidegger's  philosophical  critique  of  the history of 
Western  metaphysics,  Chapter  Four  of  the  thesis  will  then  look  at  and  outline  the  basis  of 
Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world. It will begin by tracing how the East Asian world 
potentially presents an alternative for Heidegger to modern nihilism, developed from the history of 
Western metaphysics. The next part of the chapter focuses on 'The Dialogue Between a Japanese 
and an Inquirer', which is a fundamental text in laying down the foundations for a Heideggerian 
approach for a dialogue between East Asia and the West. The chapter will look at the different ways 
in which the “Inquirer” figured in the dialogue seeks to gain entrance to the East Asian world, 
particularly and most crucially through the Japanese notion of iki, as well as a comparison between 
the film Rashomon and No-drama (Nogaku). This part of the thesis will show the basic ambiguity 
between distance and nearness that underlies Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world. The 
last part of the chapter features a brief introduction to Heidegger and Daoism.
  With the basic foundations of a Heideggerian approach to encountering the East Asian world 
laid out, Chapter Five will then extend this dialogue further by looking into how the East Asian 
world can offer alternative understandings of the sacred. Central to this section will be issues such 
as transcendence and immanence in Daoism and Heidegger. I will begin by looking at the Dao in 
the world and then contrast it with Plato's Forms. I will then compare the immanence of the Dao 
with the organic notion of the sacred. This will be looked at via Heidegger's notion of the four-fold 
(gods, earth, sky and mortals) as shown particularly in essays such as  The Thing, contrasting this 
emphasis  on  particularity  and  experience  of  the  sacred  with  the  uniform  presence  of  Dao in 
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Daoism. Based on this discussion, the chapter will continue by looking at the Shrine in Shintoism as 
an alternative understanding of the sacred, which more closely parallels Heidegger's four-fold.
Moving on from the sacred, the topic of Chapter Six is the sense of ineffability in both 
Heidegger and Daoism. Key to this chapter will be the role of language and mystery in both Daoism 
and Heidegger. I will seek to answer whether, for Heidegger, Daoism can provide a sense of the 
ineffable  which  is  lost  in  modern Western nihilism.  I  will  first  look at  language and the  Dao, 
followed by the role of language in Heidegger, particularly with regard to the importance of poetry 
as conveying a sense of what is beyond direct communication. From this, I will draw a distinction 
between three kinds of mysticism: first, the esoteric doctrine that seeks to express the nature of 
existence directly through language, even though its use of language is only intelligible to a select 
few:  secondly,  quietism,  which  completely  denies  the  validity  of  language  for  expressing  the 
mystery of existence: and, thirdly, poetic mysticism, which seeks to convey through language a 
sense  of  something that  is  thought  to  be  in  some sense  beyond words.  I  will  argue  that  both  
Heidegger and Daoism fall into this third grouping. The chapter will also look at some problems 
arising from such a relationship to language, assessing whether it can be meaningful to speak of the 
ineffable in this way.
 In Chapter Seven, I will show how Heidegger's thought can be understood in terms of yin 
and yang.  In order to do this, the first section of the chapter provides an introduction to the nature 
of  yin and  yang in  Chinese  thought.  Based  on  this,  the  next  part  of  the  chapter  will  look 
comparatively at Heidegger's earth and world, or the concealment/unconcealment dichotomy. It will 
show that Heidegger's interpretation of the dominance of modern technology is in effect based on 
the loss of the yin in Western modernity and that Heidegger's thought can therefore be understood as 
an effort to rebalance the yin and yang, rather than as simply being Luddite in the sense of seeking 
to abolish modern technology. 
Chapter Eight will discuss whether Daoism can present Heidegger with a model for living 
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within the modern Western world, by looking at the notion of wu wei in Daoism and Gelassenheit in 
Heidegger. From this, I will seek to show parallels between wu wei as practised by Daoist sages in 
the Warring States period of China and Heidegger’s model for life in the modern Western world. 
Through such a  comparison it  will  be  illustrated  how this  Daoist  approach can  be  relevant  to 
providing  a  Heideggerian  way  of  living  in  the  modern  world.  Of  central  importance  to  this 
discussion is the role of fate in both Heidegger and Daoism. The chapter will begin by looking at  
wu wei in Daoist thought, contrasting Laozi's principles of government with the more individualist 
approach to wu wei in Zhuangzi. This will show the link between wu wei and ziran (naturalness) in 
Zhuangzi. Following that, I will focus on the problem of human action and fate in the later writings  
of Heidegger I will seek to show how Daoist  wu wei, as exemplified by Zhuangzi's ideal of the 
sage, can present a Heideggerian way of responding to the modern world that is not simply fatalist, 
as Heidegger's thought is sometimes understood.
Chapter Nine will consider non-doctrinal religion and how the East Asian philosophy of 
Daoism and the religion of Shintoism can be understood as non-doctrinal religious ethos and how, 
as such, they can provide a model for a recognisably Heideggerian religious way of life. I will begin 
by outlining the nature of Heidegger's religious thought, starting with his interpretation of Pauline 
Christianity  in  his  early  pre-Being and  Time writings,  subsequently  looking  at  his  later,  more 
radical, understanding of religion, particularly his rejection of religious doctrine. The chapter will 
then  look  at  the  nature  of  religious  doctrine  itself,  seeking  to  show  that  not  all  religions  are 
necessarily doctrinal. In this context, I will then present Zhuangzi's Daoism and Shrine-Shintoism 
as both being, although dissimilar, models of non-doctrinal religion. Finally, the chapter will seek to 
show how Zhuangzi's Daoism and Shintoism can in different ways provide a non-doctrinal ethos, 
which avoids both the modern secularism and over-arching dogma. In this way, such traditions will 
be shown to provide an overall understanding of what it means to take a Heideggerian approach to 
religion. Such a non-doctrinal approach will be shown to provide an alternative to both modern 
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secularism and nihilism, as well as to traditional church dogma. The final chapter brings together 
underlying central issues of the thesis concerning the nature of East Asian religion as exemplified 
by philosophical Daoism and Shintoism, through showing how they differ from Western traditions 
of religious belief, such as Aquinas' theology or the Platonic style of esoteric doctrine.  It will be 
shown from a Heideggerian perspective how this religious approach can help to resolve the problem 
of life in the modern Western world 
Thus, by adopting a multi-angled analysis, I aim to move beyond the crisis of nihilism in 
Western thought, as understood by Heidegger, by exploring the possibilities for dialogue with the 
East Asian world set out in Heidegger's philosophy, thereby continuing the project from the point at 
which Heidegger’s account breaks off. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Being (  Sein  ) in Heidegger's Thought  
The Different Ways of Being in Heidegger's Thought
Heidegger’s  philosophy  is  often  said  to  begin  with  the  ‘question  of  Being’,  and  it  is 
generally held that Heidegger continued to ask this question throughout his philosophical career. 
What, however, does Being in such a sense mean?  It is clear that at different stages in his writing, 
Heidegger  uses  the  word  Being  in  different  ways,  which  has  often  led  to  misunderstandings 
regarding the nature of his philosophical project. 
Ready to Hand – Everyday Disclosure of beings in Heidegger's Early Writings
In order to begin to understand Heidegger's thought, it is first necessary to look briefly at the 
ordinary or ontic attitude towards beings as it is discussed in his early writings. The example that 
will be taken is that of ‘a hammer’ as referred to in Being and Time.  The question is, “What does it 
mean to be a hammer?” At the most basic level, a hammer must be seen as an instrument that is  
used  in  a  particular  way.  For  someone  to  understand  the  nature  of  a  hammer  is  therefore  to 
understand it through a practical involvement with it, by using it. Without the possibility of such 
practical application, the designation of something as a hammer means it lacks specific significance. 
Hence a world with nothing to hit would therefore have no notion of a hammer and were hammer to 
be brought into such a world, it would only be a long piece of wood, with a lump of metal attached 
to it, lacking all function as a hammer. Put more basically, this kind of understanding is exhibited by 
the person who picks up the hammer and uses it towards an appropriate task, such as knocking a 
nail into wood.  It is further exemplified by the skilled craftsman who applies the force of the  
hammer in a meticulous way for a specific purpose such as building a table, while the unskilled 
person who visits the craftsman's workshop may look at, touch, or even pick up the craftsman's 
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hammer, but still does not have the same understanding of the hammer. An unskilled person can 
appreciate  the  hammer's  use  and  know what  the  hammer's  function  is.  However,  they  cannot 
understand what it is like being able to apply a hammer in a specific way. 
For Heidegger, this practical and functional way of relating to a being, defined as ‘ready-to-
hand’ (Zuhanden),  is  disclosed in  terms of its  use or application in relation to everything else. 
Heidegger thus refers to items that stand out in such a way, through their use, as equipment (Zeug). 
As Hubert Dreyfus states, 'a piece of equipment like a chair [or a hammer] is defined by what it is 
used for'8 and as such this use is always directed towards something else. This means that there is no 
‘such thing  as  ‘an  equipment’.9  Thus,  equipment  can  never  be  equipment  outside  a  particular 
relationship of purpose towards which it is directed. Hence, the hammer as a hammer is defined by 
its  relation to a  nail  that  it  knocks into a piece of wood, the nail  in  its  turn also appearing as 
equipment used to hold the wood together in a table. Taken in isolation from each other, each of  
these items loses its significance of use. Thus, beings, in the same way as the hammer and nail, are 
defined through their relationship with each other, creating a general structure of equipment.
 Within this structure, aspects such as the metal in the hammer or colour of the wood do not 
particularly stand out in themselves in so far as they are incidental to the main significance of the 
hammer as a hammer. This means that while the craftsman may still be aware of details such as the 
colour of the wood in his hammer, when he is focused on using the hammer to hit metal, the colour 
of its  wood cannot  be his  primary concern.  A replica of a  hammer,  which had the outward of 
appearance of wood and metal, but which broke each time it was used to hit a nail would be useless 
to  the  craftsmen  and  would  thus  have  in  effect  failed  to  be  a  hammer.  While  a  colour-blind 
craftsman may have a completely distorted view of his hammer, he could still have, in Heidegger's 
sense,  an effective,  skilled ready-to-hand understanding of how the hammer works.  Hence,  the 
8 H. Dreyfus  Being In The World: Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time Division 1 MIT Press Cambridge 
Massachusetts London 1991 p 64 . 
9 M. Heidegger  Being and Time Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Blackwell Publishers Oxford 
1962  p 105. 
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hammer  could  lose  its  colour  over  time,  but  its  ontological  status  as  a  hammer  would  not  be 
changed.  This is because the hammer instead reveals itself  by,  and is defined as,  its  function. 
Equipment,  when it is functioning correctly,  does not stand out in the sense of requiring direct 
attention. For example, someone cooking a  meal is not required to pay attention to the frying pan 
unless something happens to the frying pan that makes it unfit for purpose. In such a project, the 
frying pan exists as ready-to-hand.
Given, therefore, that items of equipment when ready-to-hand are defined by their use in 
relation to other beings, in a different setting, a piece of equipment such as a hammer might disclose 
itself as something completely different: for example as the symbol of a god. All beings that are 
ready-to-hand thus exist in relation to the projects and purposes of Dasein (being there),10 by which 
Heidegger means a being who is capable of asking the ‘question of being’. This provides the central 
focus of Heidegger’s early work and in particular,  Being and Time. Beings that are ready-to-hand 
should not be thought of as objects in the sense that a Cartesian dualist would view them: that is, as  
existing completely independently of Dasein which would act as the subject in Descartes' sense. 
Rather, Dasein and beings ready-to-hand should be thought of as symbiotic. This means that Dasein 
becomes a being through those possibilities given by beings that are ready-to-hand. Put simply, the 
artist can only become an artist when there are paints and brushes available; the craftsman can only 
become a craftsman with a workshop of tools available. As will be shown later, Heidegger always 
sees  human life  as  being defined by a  wider  relationship  to  beings  and,  crucially,  to  Being in 
general.
In Heidegger's thought, 'ready to hand' is not the only way in which beings can stand out. 
Throughout his writings he draws distinctions between different ways that beings can relate to each 
other.  In  Being and Time, he distinguishes those beings  that  are  present-at-hand,  in  contrast  to 
ready-to-hand,  to  denote  items  independent  from their  use.  This  means  that  a  hammer  that  is 
10  Dasein in Heidegger loosely means the being who has the ability to ask questions- generally it might be said to be 
an entity with an awareness of itself.
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present-at-hand stands out from other pieces of wood by having a certain length and shape with a 
lump of metal attached to it. Its status as a functional hammer is in effect put to one side: it may 
even be forgotten about. Under some circumstances, it may indeed be the case that investigating 
something as present-at-hand makes it no longer fit for purpose, such as dissecting the wood of the 
hammer so as to analyse its chemical structure. Hence, while relating to beings in a ready-to-hand 
way entails an involvement with their practical application, letting something stand as present-at-
hand involves moving away from such immediate involvement to a more detached stance.  The 
being that is 'present at hand' therefore becomes an object of contemplation; for example, a hammer 
viewed as present-at-hand appears essentially as metal and wood, so a scientist carrying out an 
investigation,  though  he  may  be  aware  of  the  hammer's  original  functional  significance,  has 
removed it from its usual context of application. It is even possible for an archaeologist to have a 
detailed  'present  at  hand'  knowledge  of  a  primitive  artefact,  having  observed  all  its  particular 
properties and chemical composition, while not  knowing what its original 'ready to hand function' 
was.
Beings, when they are 'present at hand', thus have a radically altered significance from when 
they are 'ready to hand'.  For the early Heidegger, 'present at hand' is understood as a secondary and 
derivative kind of disclosure. This is fundamental, since such a relationship cuts beings off from 
their usual significance and interaction with other beings. This can be shown by the scientist who 
analyses the wood from the hammer in his laboratory. It might even be said that a hammer looked at 
in a way that ignores its function is no longer a hammer, at least in so far as the word “hammer” is 
normally  understood.  Hence,  a  being  that  stands  ‘present  at  hand’ is  therefore  effectively  in 
Heidegger's  terms  ‘deprived  of  its  world-hood’,11 while  the  scientist  who  carries  out  the 
investigation of the hammer still remains embedded within a framework of equipment that is 'ready-
to-hand'.  Present-at-hand analyses of beings are, therefore, valid within certain projects. However, 
11  M. Heidegger Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson Blackwell Publishers Oxford 
1962  p.117
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in Being and Time, Heidegger does not hold it possible for Dasein to stand in a relation to beings 
that are completely 'present at hand', as detached from any involvement or practical concern. While 
in his later writings he may have moved away from 'ready to hand' and 'present at hand' as the  
primary  categories  through  which  beings  are  understood,  Heidegger,  continues  to  hold  that 
existence is at a basic level a matter of involvement in the world.
What, however, is the nature of the framework that underlies particular beings such as the 
craftsman's hammer? This question can be rephrased as, ‘What makes it possible for the hammer to 
be a hammer at all?’
Beings and World/  Sein  
This leads on to some important distinctions in Heidegger's thought. Firstly, there are beings 
in the world, by which Heidegger means ordinary items that might be encountered in the world.  
Secondly, there is Being (Sein):  this sense of Being for Heidegger is always present within the 
ordinary  everyday  involvement  (the  ontic in  Heidegger's  terms),  but  is  overlooked  by  such 
involvement.  It is in effect the way that ordinary beings are able to stand out. As will be noted later,  
Heidegger also has a third and final sense of Being that will be referred to as Seyn, which occupies a 
more mysterious position in his thought.  This more mystical notion of Being will be looked at in 
the next section. 
In order to begin to understand Heidegger's notion of  Sein  it is first necessary to note the 
significance  of  the  shift,  which,  in  Heideggerian  terms,  is  from an ontic  (ordinary concern for 
beings in the world), to the ontological attitude that looks at the question of what Being is as a 
whole. This ontological question for Heidegger always underlies everyday practice, although it is 
often overlooked and taken for granted by the ordinary ontic attitude. Individuals going about their 
daily lives generally do not call into question the nature of their existence. However, the fact that 
they live their lives in a particular way presupposes a particular setting and relationship to other 
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beings. Hence, for example, the craftsman in his workshop is not likely to question the nature of his 
relationship to the wood he works on; however, his actions already presuppose that he has a certain 
relationship to the wood. What is therefore at the basis of such a relationship?
  At a basic level, in Heidegger's thought, thinking ontologically means seeking to understand 
that which forms the basis of beings that are themselves existing in relationship to other beings. 
This is central to how Being as  Sein is understood in Heidegger's early writings.  Sein acts as a 
general structure that interlinks beings and with which Dasein is always involved, but at the same 
time, it affects the way that Dasein relates to itself and to beings in the world.  
It is this understanding of Being (Sein) that is generally held to form the central focus of the 
period  of  Heidegger’s  writings  between  Being and Time and 'The Origin  of  the  Work of  Art', 
commonly known as the Early Heidegger. Expressed in more Heideggerian terms, Being in this 
sense  might  be  understood  as  “disclosure”,  as  the  way  that  beings  are  given  over  either  to 
individuals (Dasein in Being and Time) or a community (in 'Origin of the Work of Art').  Overall, it 
is the way that beings are presented. In more simple terms, it might be thought of as a background 
to daily life, which acts like a stage-set in a theatre that is always present in the performance and 
which allows the possibilities of acting to take place.
  Julian Young makes a comparison of this understanding of ‘Being’ in Heidegger with what 
Ernst Junger termed the ‘visual field’, since Being ‘transcends beings, is above the physical, in the 
way  which  the  visual  field  transcends  the  appearance  of  objects.'12  As  such,  Being  might  be 
understood as a frame of reference within which everything can be understood: “The ever non 
objective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death keep us transported”.13 It 
might therefore be said that Being in Heidegger is always prior to any notion of individual beings; 
and it is only because of this disclosure of ‘being’ that beings are revealed to the understanding of 
12  J. Young  Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p 11 .
13  M. Heidegger  “Origin of the Work of Art” in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002 p 23 .
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Dasein. In this way, Being is the basis against which Dasein lives out its daily life. Therefore, Being 
in this sense may be associated with the phenomenological notions of the ‘Life World’ (Lebenswelt) 
found in  Husserl’s  phenomenology,  in  that,  at  least  at  first  sight,  it  is  an  essentially  everyday 
background that might easily be ignored because it  is assumed to be understood, yet makes all 
experience possible and it is not possible to experience anything beyond it. Like Husserl’s ‘world 
horizon’,  Heidegger’s Being as disclosure marks out the limits  of what is disclosed (in general 
terms, what can be experienced). For Heidegger, however, it is important that there are different 
senses  of  Being depending on how beings  are  disclosed:  for  example,  in  Being and Time, the 
ordinary way that equipment is disclosed is as ready-to-hand, but in other contexts it can be present-
at-hand. 
This leads on to the crucial notion of world (Welt) in Heidegger, which means a referential 
totality in which beings stand out: For example, the ritual mask of an African tribe is given its  
significance by its context within the world of the tribe in which it is disclosed. Once the mask is 
taken out of this context, its significance is lost: and the same could be said of the hammer which 
has nothing to hit. These principles of world are found in Being and Time as the background to 
which Dasein organises his or her projects, as exemplified by the craftsman's workshop where the 
structures  of  equipment  (e.g.  hammer,  nail,  wood  etc.)  are  all  linked  together  and  are  given 
significance through the craftsman's projects. 
  However, in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger extends the world's scope from a 
basic structure of inter-related items, such as the equipment in a workshop, to a complete historical  
understanding of beings. Hence, the classic example Heidegger used when talking about a world 
was the Greek world which had a unique way of understanding things and remains radically distinct 
from other worlds, such as the medieval European world. There are a wide variety of different 
historical  worlds,  including  the  Inca  world,  the  pre-Islamic  Persian  world  or  the  aboriginal 
Australian world. It is even possible that there are alien worlds disclosed to Dasein of other species 
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on  other  planets.  What  matters  is  that  each  of  these  worlds  acts  as  a  complete  basis  for  an 
interpretation  of  what  it  means  for  beings  to  be.   In  non-Heideggerian  terms,  they  provide  a 
grounding for culture and way of life in a particular geographical and historical setting. Dasein's 
membership of a particular world therefore does more than act as a background for various projects 
and  possibilities:  rather,  it  fundamentally  affects  Dasein's  understanding  of  his  or  herself  and 
surrounding beings.  As will be shown in greater detail subsequently, each world for Heidegger 
represents a unique historical insight into the nature of existence, and as such carries with it its own 
way of living.
It is this notion of world that is central to much of Heidegger's work, with each particular 
world in his philosophy representing a unique disclosure, meaning a particular way in which all 
beings  are  presented.   World in Heidegger's  later  writings  is  therefore effectively equivalent  to 
Being as Sein: it is the way in which beings are disclosed.  Put more simply, the world is a basic  
way in which everything at a particular time and place is given its significance and structure. 
Heidegger  associates  the  notion  of  world  in  the  ‘Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art’  with  his 
interpretation of the pre-Socratic Greek understanding of truth as aletheia, uncovering, the nature of 
which will be looked into further on in the thesis. The world is primarily that which is uncovered or 
made  open  to  experience.  For  Heidegger,  human  beings  always  live  within  the  context  of  a 
particular  world;  and,  also,  the  world  as  disclosure  can  only  occur  when  there  is  someone  to 
disclose it to. If the last Dasein were to die out, then, in effect, there would no longer be any world 
in the sense that Heidegger understands it. Hence, ‘presence needs an open clearing and remains as 
such through this dependence given over to human being’.14  The ‘world’ is something unique to 
Dasein: hence 'the stone is worldless’15 …. ‘while plant and animal likewise have no world, but 
belong to the covert throng of a surrounding in which they are linked’.16  
14  M. Heidegger  Identity and Difference. Translated Joan Stambaugh. University of Chicago, Chicago1969  p 16 .
15  M. Heidegger  “Origin of the Work of Art” in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.22 .
16 Ibid  p 23.  However, elsewhere Heidegger refers to animals in a more ambiguous way, stating that animals ‘are not 
suspended  worldlessly in their environment’, they are also the ‘poor of world’ in that they do not have a complete 
world in the human sense.
32
However,  leaving  the  question  of  animals  to  one  side,  it  is  important  to  note  that,  for 
Heidegger, the world is central to all human existence and that in order for the individual to exist,  
he or she must necessarily exist within a world. Julian Young states that, in Heideggerian language, 
the  world  and  human  Dasein are  ‘equiprimordial’,17 meaning  that  human  Dasein  comes  into 
existence  together  with  the  world,  and  the  two  cannot  exist  separately  without  each  other. 
Heidegger,  therefore,  rejects  the subject-object  dichotomy of  thinkers  such as  Locke,  Kant  and 
Descartes, who see the perceiving subject looking out from itself over the world that may or may 
not exist as it is perceived. For Heidegger, asking such a question rests on the false assumption that 
individual and world are separable: whereas, in his understanding, a Dasein cut off from his or her  
environment, like Descartes'  Res Cogitans, would no longer be Dasein in any meaningful sense, 
literally in that it would no longer be, ‘being there’, because it would have no context to be set in.  It 
is only possible to make sense of Dasein within the broader structure of meanings and practices 
within the world that is disclosed to Dasein. It is, therefore, not possible, for example, to make sense 
of Dasein’s project to build a table without reference to the existence and significance of a wider 
context of purposes in the world. Dasein, although it may hold a particularly privileged role in the 
world in Being and Time, still remains like all other beings, in that it can only be truly understood 
within its world.
Individual and Community in the World
It is clear, therefore, that there must always be a  ‘who’ in Heidegger's understanding of 
world that acts as the one to whom the world is disclosed. The question remains, however, to whom 
is the world disclosed? In Being and Time, it would appear that the main focus is on the individual 
Dasein: ‘the ‘being’ of any such entity is in each case our own’. 18  It might, therefore, seem that the 
world is something disclosed privately to each Dasein, once they have an authentic understanding 
17 J. Young  Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p 12 .
18  M. Heidegger  Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson .Blackwell, Oxford 1962  
      p. 67
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of their situation. However, even the authentic Dasein experiencing death as its own most uniquely 
individual possibility, still remains within Mitsein (literally “being with”, as in being together with 
others). Furthermore, authentic Dasein must remain historical, acting within a given set of historical 
possibilities. Being authentic therefore means having an adjusted understanding of how one stands 
in  relation  to  history  based  on  one's  own  possibilities.  Authentic  Dasein  cannot  completely 
dissociate itself from its relationship with others: it still must exist within a community that affects 
its life possibilities. Hence, while, at least according to the early Heidegger in  Being and Time, it 
appears possible for anyone existing at any point in history to achieve authenticity, the way this is 
done in practice is always determined by historical settings. This means that, for example, a eunuch 
at the court of King Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon, a knight errant in twelfth century France, or a 
Buddhist monk in Japan during the Nara period,  all may be able to attain authenticity. However, in 
each case, the ways they could attain authenticity as well as act authentically, would always be 
radically affected by how they stood in relation to others and their world in general. Hence, while 
the focus is generally on the individual and individuation, as well as on how aspects of individual 
moods such as angst can affect the way the world presents itself, world in Being and Time is still 
never a completely private matter. 
 This notion of a communal world, however, is taken further in ‘The Origin of the Work of 
Art’. In this work, the world is no longer treated simply as the structure of concernful or practical  
involvement given over to each individual Dasein. The world is rather seen as a gathering of:
those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory 
and disgrace, endurance and decline, acquire the shape of destiny for human being. 
The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this 
historical people.19
19 M. Heidegger  “Origin of the Work of Art” in Off the Beaten Track:  translated by :Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p. 26
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 The world in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ still  remains a structure of concern and 
meaning. However,  the ‘world’ in this  work is a social  and historical disclosure to a particular 
people, and it is against this backdrop that the life of each individual within the ‘people’ takes place: 
‘being’ in  ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ might be said to  have been enriched from the still 
practical concerns (that are always based around ordinary life activities) of Being and Time.  It is 
extended to contain within it an essentially natural background, which is not particularly mentioned 
in  Being and Time.   Hence,  ‘tree  and grass,  eagle  and bull,  snake  and cricket  first  enter  their 
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as they are.’20  This means that the way such things 
appear is governed by their relationship to the world that acts as a background.  However, this 
interpretation of the ‘world’ also includes primarily moral concerns, such as ‘blessing and curse’;21 
each world therefore carries with it what in non-Heideggerian terms is a system of values.
 The notion of world might therefore be seen as a complete understanding of life. Julian 
Young  interprets  the  notion  of  world  in  Heidegger  as  'a  metaphysical  map’22 adopting  a 
geographical  metaphor  which  is  to  a  certain  extent  in  keeping  with  Heidegger's  own style  of 
referring to the world in terms of regions. Such a map might be thought of as similar to the World  
Tree in Norse or Central Asian mythology. Thus, the world in Heidegger's thought acts by laying 
out the different regions of reality. In the case of the Norse Yggdrasill (World Tree), there are nine 
regions, including the midgard, the place of humans, and Vanaheim and Asgard, the region of the 
gods.  Each of these different regions of reality is given its significance through its relation to the 
other regions on the tree. Truly existing within a world, therefore, means having a deep grasp of 
such a map as well as being part of interrelationships with one’s own self and one’s place in the  
world. Hence, being a part of the Viking world, for example, would mean having a knowledge of 
various  traditions,  cosmology and sagas,  as well  as  standing within a  particular  relationship to 
20    Ibid  p. 21 
21 Ibid   p.23 
22 J. Young Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2001 p. 24 . 
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certain beings such as the  Aesir and  Vanir gods. This relationship in turn affects the way that a 
Viking warrior lives his life by exemplifying certain virtues, such as strength and bravery, with the 
ultimate goal of seeking to die bravely to serve Odin. Thus, a world can be seen as both a particular  
ontology and way of life. Hence,
the world is not the mere collection of countable, or uncountable, familiar
and unfamiliar things that are at hand. But neither is it a merely imagined 
framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. 23
A world might be said to be a complete way of life based on a way that ‘being’ is disclosed 
at a particular point in space and time, being related both to its historical epoch and also to its 
geographical surroundings. The world of the ancient Greeks was not the same world as the world of 
medieval  Christianity  in  Europe,  and the  world  of  the  Incas  was different  again.  World  might 
therefore be seen as being similar to Foucault’s  epistemes in  The Order of Things,24 as differing 
historical grounds for truth. These different grounds of truth fundamentally affect what it means for 
different  beings  to  be,  by  giving  them their  meaning and significance.  For  example,  the  well-
preserved statue of the ancient  Egyptian Goddess Isis  being discovered by a modern European 
archaeologist may still have the same set of physical properties in terms of colour and material as it 
did in ancient Egypt, but it can never have the same ontological significance as it did then. The 
statue has shifted from having deep religious significance to being merely an item of historical 
curiosity and investigation. Such a radical ontological change in the status of the statue does not 
entail  that  anything  physical  (either  via  deliberate  iconoclastic  violence  or  natural  decay)  has 
happened to the statue (in Heideggerian terms such changes would only count as ontic). The cause 
of  the  ontological  change  for  the  statue  is  more  precisely,  the  historical  decay  of  the  Ancient 
23 M. Heidegger ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge  2002 p.23.
24 M. Foucault  The Order of Things An archaeology of the human sciences Routledge London New York 1989
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Egyptian world and rise of the modern Western world in its place.  Therefore, while the statue in 
terms of its physical properties (colour and shape) may seem identical, it is no longer understood as 
the presence of a god, but instead stands as a museum exhibit.  Thus, two beings might appear 
identical  in  terms  of  their  ontic  properties,  but  they  will  nonetheless  stand  out  in  different 
ontological ways, because what beings are ontologically speaking is given to them by their world.
 In  the ‘Origin  of  the  Work  of  Art’, however,  Heidegger  adds  an  important  historical 
dimension. In Iain D. Thomson's words, 'Heidegger rethinks “truth” ontologically as the historically 
dynamic disclosure of intelligibility in time'.25  As such, the world in Heidegger is something that is 
always tied to a particular historical setting and can therefore only present itself in a particular way 
in a particular time. Hence, there is a sense in which each particular world for Heidegger can only 
be thoroughly understood from inside.  This is central to the claim in the ‘Origin of the Work  Art’ 
that ‘the work belongs, as work uniquely within the realm that it has opened up’.26  In reality, it is 
not possible for us to completely understand a work of art, such as a Greek temple or a medieval 
cathedral, because they are cut off from their world.  Hence, ‘when for instance, we visit the temple 
in Paestum at its own site or the Bamberg Cathedral on its own square- the world of that work that 
stands there has perished’.27 A being such as a work of art situated in and existing as part of a 
particular world that is disclosed will appear differently when it is transferred to a distinct world in 
the same way that a hammer, when taken out of its normal frame of reference, might only appear as 
a lump of metal and wood. However, as noted, were the hammer to be transferred to a different 
‘world’, it might appear not as a mere tool of ordinary practical use, but as a symbol of a god, 
invested with deep meaning and power. Hence, what might stand out as a museum relic on display 
in  one  world,  would  be  the  manifestation  of  a  ‘god’ in  another.  It  therefore  seems  that  in 
Heidegger’s  view,  in  order  to  definitively  experience  a  great  work  of  art  as  it  was  originally 
25  I. D.Thomson  Heidegger, Art, and Post Modernity. Cambridge University Press Cambridge  2011 p.44  
26  M. Heidegger  “Origin of the Work of Art in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.40  .
27  Ibid   p. 41  
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intended, one must already be a part of the world in which it was constructed. Human practices and 
beliefs might therefore be said to relate inseparably to the world in which they exist.  Whether it can 
ever  be  possible  to  gain  entry  into  another  ‘world’ in  the  Heideggerian  sense  has  to  remain 
unresolved at this point.
In ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger lends particular significance to the act of 
founding a world. He sees this as central to the purpose of a truly great work, as being the setting up 
of a world in the sense of a foundation myth.  Hence, for example, the biblical Exodus provides a 
legendary epic account of how the ancient Israelite world came into existence, which at the same 
time was  foundational  to  the  Israelite  world's  own foundational  understanding of  itself  and its 
relationship to the divine. While in a comparable way, the temple at the Parthenon and Homer's epic 
poetry both make manifest the relationship between gods and mortals central to the ancient Greek, a 
similar claim may also be made of the Ziggurat of Ur together with the epic of Gilgamesh in ancient 
Sumeria or Babylon. These worlds are what they are by virtue of such works of art, to the extent  
that if, say, the Ziggurats were destroyed, the Sumerian world would no longer have been able to 
exist in the way that it did. What each of these great works of art does is to make manifest a world's  
basic understanding of itself, and in doing so, they are subsequently foundational to the world. 
  More generally, for Heidegger, history might be seen as the creation, transition and decay 
of  different  worlds,  each  of  which  holds  different  possibilities  for  human  existence.  What  is 
fundamental is that the world stands over and above any beings disclosed within the world, but that 
all beings can only be understood within this world, while each of the beings that exist within it 
makes manifest the world because it reflects the underlying order of being disclosed. However, the 
art work, more than anything in a particular world, shows the order of the world. In Thomson's 
words, the Heideggerian works of art thereby function as 'ontological paradigms'.28 For example, the 
Greek temple in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ might be said to make manifest the whole moral 
order of Greek society at the time when it was created, since, in gathering together mortals and 
28 I. D. Thomson  Heidegger, Art, and Post Modernity. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2011   p 44 .
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divinities, it makes manifest the relationship between them, while at the same time it reflects the 
underlying understanding of that relationship. 
However, Heidegger also extends this privileged significance in relation to the world to the 
apparently more everyday shoes of the peasant woman. This is because the shoes reflect the world 
of the peasant woman, particularly in terms of her work, and makes manifest her relationship to the 
earth: ‘the shoes are what they are when the peasant woman wears them in the field’.29  Such items 
as the temple and the shoes can only be thoroughly understood as part of the world where they are  
seen to belong. Each being within a world might be said not merely to belong to a particular world, 
but to reflect that world in its inter-relatedness to other beings within the world.
World, Language and Intelligibility 
In Heidegger's thought, language occupies a particularly privileged position in relation to the 
world.  There is a sense that human language is not merely part of a world, but also might be said to 
bring to light the way that the world is ordered. Why and how is this case?
 At a basic level, language only makes sense as part of a broader set of social practices, 
whilst those social practices are also only possible with the existence of language. Communication 
might be said to be only possible within a shared world. Therefore, from a Heideggerian point of 
view, creating a universal and artificial  language along the lines of Esperanto would neither be 
practically possible, nor desirable. This is because, if a language such as Esperanto were to gain 
wide acceptance in practice, it would need to be embedded within a community of speakers, and 
thus be tied to the practices of a particular world; thus, it would lose its claim to universality. Even 
were one single language ever to gain complete acceptance everywhere in the world, it would act to  
the exclusion of other historic forms of meaning; it would mean, basically, to create one absolute 
world.  From a  Heideggerian  perspective,  such  a  universalised  language,  particularly  if  it  was 
29 M. Heidegger  “Origin of the Work of Art in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.12  .
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artificially created without a heritage within a  particular world's  history,  would be semantically 
impoverished and function in a similar way to Orwell's Newspeak in the novel 1984, reducing the 
richness of meaning.
 Each language is therefore only possible within the ordered and structured revealing of 
‘world’ as it requires a common form of disclosure to make sense. Taking a basic example, the 
English word “chair” could have no equivalent in the language of a people in whose world everyone 
sat on the floor. If such a people were to come into contact with a chair through trade, the chair they  
encountered may take on a completely different significance, for example as an altar in a religious 
ceremony; therefore, whatever word they used for it (it may even be identical to the English word 
‘chair’)   would  in  fact  carry  a  different  meaning.  Taking  this  principle  a  stage  further,  the 
statements, 'an old man sits on a chair' and 'the king sits on his throne', may appear to be ways of 
picking out the same point of reference, which can both be correct. However, a statement such as 
'the king sits on his throne' would have no equivalent and lack any sense in a world that had never  
known a king. Were a traveller from such a world to see the king, he or she would have no way of  
translating the statement 'the king sits on his throne' directly into their own language. On the other 
hand,  in  an  absolute  monarchy,  a  statement  such as  'an  old  man sits  on  a  chair',  while  being 
perfectly intelligible, might be thought of as more than a straightforward statement of fact; it might 
appear instead as a statement of offence, subversion, or even outright revolution. Words such as 
chair and throne, man and king, all get their meaning through social practices associated with the 
worlds in which they are used. Hence, while these words may appear to pick out objective points of 
reference, they are in reality given their meaning through their prior usage within a social context, 
or practice and it would not be possible to use such words without an embedding within this world.
  Heidegger  therefore  fundamentally  rejects  the  seventeenth-century  empiricist  view  of 
language as  presented by John Locke,  where words  are  points of reference attached to  objects 
known through sense experience. Any language, as Heidegger sees it, must be dependent on, and 
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also presupposes, a particular historical disclosure of being.  Therefore, all words must carry the 
weight of their prior historical use as, without such nuances, words lose their meaning (this leads to  
the problem of translation in Heidegger, which will be looked at in more detail later on).
Language,  however,  has a  further  significance in  relation to  the world,  in  that,  while  it 
always requires the world for meaning, at the same time, the world as Heidegger understands it, is  
possible only with the structured ordering of language. Without such a relationship with language, 
world would not exist.  There can be no world without language and there can be no language 
without world. 
Without language, the world would not be intelligible to human Dasein, and as such, the 
way in which the world is structured is crucial in Heidegger's thought. The world is what grants  
intelligibility, and whatever is brought into the world is made intelligible by the world.  Heidegger 
therefore associates world with light (Lichtung - clearing: light - Licht), in that it is in light that 
beings stand out as part of the world. Hence, Heidegger takes up the metaphor for ‘world’ as a 
clearing in a forest to denote the world as that region which is open to the light. The nature of 
Heidegger's understanding of clearing will be looked at further at the end of the section.
Dasein Centeredness?
 In Heidegger’s understanding, the world is always made accessible to Dasein,  and it  is 
furthermore  given  significance  through  Dasein's  practice.   In  so  far  as  Heidegger's  thought  is 
focused around world, he must remain focused on the phenomenology of Dasein as it relates to 
beings in the world.  Sein as disclosure therefore requires a Dasein to disclose to. Hence, while for 
example a Dasein could theoretically be an alien species with awareness and the capacity to ask the 
question of a Being, still the illustrations that Heidegger takes for ‘world’, both in Being and Time 
and ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, are always based on human experience, though Heidegger 
himself would reject the use of such terminology as tied to a notion of the human subject. This is 
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because at a basic level, anything Dasein refers to must be a definition of part of its experience, in 
non-Heideggerian terms. This applies even if a human thinks about the rocks on the surface of 
Saturn's moon, Titan, a place which he or she has not been to and which is uninhabitable to human 
life. In trying to conceive of its surface, the human being has brought thoughts or images of Titan 
within the framework of experience as part of their own imagination. The problem that such an 
approach presents, however, is that it leaves open the question of what, if anything, stands outside 
the  phenomenological  horizon.  Hence  while  Heidegger  would  reject  the  extreme  position  of 
Berkeley's subjective idealism he still  states that 'if no Dasein exists, no world is there either'30, 
indicating that the existence of the world and Dasein are mutually dependent. Therefore, what there 
is, when there is no Dasein, is not considered worthy of question in  Being and Time. The early 
Heidegger is in effect agnostic about the existence of any entity beyond that which is disclosed to 
Dasein. Such an approach leaves no room for mystery, because there is no sense of anything that 
may be inaccessible to intelligibility.  Hence, in the Heidegger's early writings, through its central 
focus on Dasein, there appears to be a residual degree of anthropocentrism.
There is, however, a fundamental shift in Heidegger's thought from the “Origin of the Work 
of  Art” (OWA) onwards,  in  the  sense  that  Heidegger  starts  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of 
something beyond that which is disclosed within the phenomenological horizon. This means he 
abandons the centrality of Being as Sein in his thought. While world still remains prominent in the 
later writings, after OWA, it is crucially only a part of the ontological account. This is because, for 
the later Heidegger, there is more to ontology than that which is disclosed to Dasein. This notion of 
something more than that which is disclosed leads onto the later Heidegger's deeper sense of Being 
as that which grants disclosure. As an illustration of this sense of Being, Heidegger's metaphor for 
the world of Dasein as a clearing may be taken. In using the term ‘clearing’, denoting the region in 
a wood that is cut away and opened up, there is an awareness  that there is also a forest beyond. 
Thus, Heidegger is pointing to something that is beyond disclosure. It is this sense of that which 
30M. Heidegger  Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson .Blackwell, Oxford 1962 p417
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underlies, but is beyond complete disclosure, that is vital to Heidegger’s later conception of Being 
i.e. Seyn. It is this more mysterious notion of Being that will be introduced in the following section 
and which will be pivotal to the rest of the thesis.
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Chapter 2 Being –  Seyn  
In  order  to  understand  'Being'  in  this  sense,  it  is  necessary  first  to  look  in  detail  at 
Heidegger's ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ (OWA). This work is generally held to mark a transition in 
Heidegger’s philosophy between these two different understandings of Being, from Sein to  Seyn, 
with its distinction between earth and world.
The Earth as the Limit of Disclosure
The earth, as a limit on the disclosure of world in Heidegger, is first introduced in OWA. 
Within the presence of the world, therefore, there is a sense of something that is beyond world.  In 
OWA, Heidegger  always  treats  this  sense  of  the  ‘earth’ as  manifest  in  the  world,  but  never 
completely graspable within it.  The earth takes the role of the ground upon which the world is 
founded31 and therefore on which the work of art, rests. This means the work of art should not be 
considered apart from the earth.  Thus, the example of the Greek temple that Heidegger refers to, 
must be understood as part of the landscape that surrounds it. It may appear that Heidegger’s main 
concern in the essay is still  the ‘world’, rather than the earth, as he treats disclosure as a main 
function of the work of art. Heidegger, however, attributes a key role to the relationship of art work 
to the earth, since, ‘in setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth.’32 The nature of Heidegger's 
understanding of setting forth will be discussed in greater depth in a later section.  At this point, it is 
sufficient to say that Heidegger holds that the work of art sets forth the non-transparent nature of 
earth into the openness of the world. Thus, the ‘earth’ is manifest in the world, but never completely 
graspable within it.  Heidegger uses the example of the stone; in this illustration, the inner part of 
the stone always resists opening up:
31  See the previous section Individual and Community in World for further details on this
32 M. Heidegger ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in Off the Beaten Track.  Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Hayes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.24 .
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if we attempt a penetration by smashing the rock, it still does not 
display in its fragments anything inward that has been opened up.  
The stone has instantly withdrawn again into the same dull press and
bulk of its fragments.33  
The sense of the stone’s “dull heaviness” appears always mysterious: although its effect is 
manifest in its force pressing outwards, there is an element of the stone which always remains 
beyond one’s grasp. It cannot be completely disclosed to Dasein in the same way that beings within 
the world,  as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, are.  The sculptor or the architect,  however,  can 
make manifest the bulk and weight of the stone within the work of art in the same way that a painter 
uses the pigment, ‘in such a way that colour is not used up but rather only now comes to shine 
forth’.34 According to Heidegger, analysing the colour of the stone as a wavelength, or measuring 
the mass of the stone in grams, will always fail to see what is essential to the stone.
 
Colour shines and wants only to shine. If we try to make it comprehensible 
            by analyzing it into numbers of oscillations35 …... if we attempt such a penetration
 by smashing the rock, it still does not display in its fragments anything inward 
 that has been opened up’. 36 
 Thus, attempting to disclose what might be inside of the earth makes it no longer earth. This 
may, therefore, to a certain extent break with Heidegger’s earlier phenomenological method, since it 
involves  an  area  of  investigation  that  cannot,  by  definition  be  brought  within  the  horizon  of 
phenomenological  disclosure.  Moving away from being centred on the human world,  the earth 
33 .M. Heidegger ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Hayes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002 p 25 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid  
36 Ibid pp. 24-25 
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might be seen as being set beyond the boundary of what is ordinarily considered intelligible.  
How, therefore, might the earth be understood? The earth at first appears as an inherent limit 
on the disclosure of the world, and along such lines Heidegger calls it the 'the limit of all limits’. 37 
This  is  because it  is  opaque and impenetrable  as opposed to the transparency of the world.  In 
Heideggerian terms, earth can never be completely given over to disclosure; therefore, there cannot 
be any such thing as a complete phenomenology of earth. The earth, so long as it remains, always 
avoids the grasp of Dasein. It cannot therefore be described within Being and Time’s categories of 
‘present to hand’ or ‘ready to hand’ because earth is never disclosed to Dasein, thus being basically 
set apart from the linguistic ordered structuring of the World. It is from this opaqueness that the 
earth derives its mystery, which could be called its power or enchantment.  
However, while it stands beyond the horizon of disclosure, the earth provides a foundation 
on which the world rests: ‘upon the earth and in it,  historical man grounds his dwelling in the  
world’.38  Thus the presence of the earth, while it cannot be completely disclosed to world, still adds 
an element to world.  This is because the self seclusion of earth is not uniformly staying under 
cover,  but  unfolds  itself  in  an inexhaustible  variety of  modes and shapes.  Heidegger  takes  the 
principle of  physis  as the earth springing up into the world, describing it  as ‘the coming-forth-
concealing’.39 Heidegger refers to the setting forth of the earth into the world “as it sets itself back 
into the earth”, this means that, although the earth may impact on the world, it still always returns  
back to itself. The presence of earth in the world should therefore be thought of as something that  
can be felt, but not completely grasped.
It might be said that Heidegger introduces the earth in order to avoid falling into an idealist  
position  of  asserting  that  beings  only  come  into  existence  with  Dasein,  thus  neglecting  the 
possibility of there being anything outside of human experience. The introduction of the earth as a 
37 F. Schalow The Incarnality of Being. State University Press of New York, New York 2006   p. 63 . 
38 M. Heidegger ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ in  Off the Beaten Track. Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Hayes. 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.26 .
39 Ibid p. 24 
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non-Dasein-centred element thus represents a fundamental change in Heidegger’s understanding of 
Being,  away  from a  residual  anthropocentrism in  this  early  work,  and  introducing  a  sense  of 
otherness into his philosophy. Hence, in the ‘OWA’, Heidegger uses the natural images of stone and 
soil as opposed to man-made images of temple and shoes to represent the earth. 
 This notion of the earth as standing beyond disclosure and intelligibility to Dasein leads on 
to the understanding of a more mystical sense of Being which will be referred to by the archaic 
German term Seyn, rather than the ordinary modern German  Sein. This use of the word  Seyn for 
Being in Heidegger's  later writings denotes an ontology set beyond the world as a presence of 
disclosure,  which makes it  much harder to understand satisfactorily.  Seyn,  unlike  Sein,  is never 
completely disclosed to Dasein. It is by its very nature ineffable.  The following discussion will 
focus on the nature of Seyn as Being in Heidegger’s later philosophy, and how it differs from Sein in 
his early philosophy.
.
Introduction to Being (  Seyn  ) 
Being in the later Heidegger’s thought underlies both earth and world. Thus in Heideggerian 
terms it should be thought of as the grounding for the horizon of disclosure. However, Being for the 
later Heidegger is more than simply a framework in which beings stand out. Such a sense of Being, 
unlike Sein, cannot simply be equated with world; more specifically, it is something that underlies 
and  grants  the  world,  but  which  can  never  be  completely  disclosed  within  the  world.   In  the 
“Dialogue  on  a  Country  Path”,  Being  in  this  sense  is  referred  to  cryptically  as  “that  which 
regions”.40 Returning to the image of the World Tree or Yggdrasil, world and Sein in Heidegger's 
early philosophy would refer to the outer surface of the tree which is present in the different regions 
of existence, whereas Being in its later sense would refer to the core of the trunk on which all the  
different points rest. 
40  M. Heidegger   “Conversation on a Country Path” in Discourse on Thinking. Translated by John M. Anderson. 
Harper Row, London 1966   p. 67 
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Heidegger equates his later sense of Being with ‘the origin’. He rejects the idea of beings 
having their ultimate origin in other beings in the same way that he rejects the position that beings 
only derive their ‘being’ from the human subject. This means he rejects in his later writings any 
view that beings derive their existence through an interaction with Dasein. Thus, in order to attempt 
to grasp the ground that lets beings be what they are, he must search for something wholly other. To 
find  such  a  ground,  Heidegger  is  therefore  required  to  go  beyond  the  normal  representational 
thinking within the horizon of disclosure, meaning he seeks to go beyond the thought of beings that 
can be grasped by Dasein.  To do this, however, is a profoundly difficult task
Naming Being as  Seyn   in the Later Heidegger's Thought 
By its very nature, such a sense of Being is difficult to define. It is always removed from the 
human grasp and is therefore effectively beyond language.  This problem is brought to light by the 
difficulty that Heidegger himself has in attaching a name to this. In the dialogue, Heidegger directly 
states that attempting to represent Being “would reify it”.41  This resistance to any kind of reification 
of “Being” is in some sense vital to the way in which Heidegger understands “Being”, but it is also 
problematic because it defies any attempt at description. Along such lines, Heidegger at times refers 
to  ‘Being’ in  this  nuance  with a  crossing-out  sign over  it.   This  might  be said to  indicate  the 
concealment and refusal of Being to disclose itself.  Hence, as  Julian Young states, 'the radically 
disruptive device (of crossing out) is needed to remind us that “Being” does not function like a 
common or garden noun, that Being is not a being'.42  It is to make this clarification that Heidegger 
more often refers to this sense of Being by taking the archaic German word Seyn, rather than Sein. 
Julian  Young further  remarks  that  the  use  of  the  antique  “y”  suggests  'something  solemn and 
forgotten'.43  A more revealing comment as to the way that an understanding of ‘Being’ is thought 
41 M.  Heidegger  “Conversation on a Country Path” in  Discourse on Thinking. Translated by John M. Anderson. 
Harper Row London 1966   p. 67
42 J. Young  Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002   p. 16 
43 Ibid   
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out  in  Heidegger’s  later  philosophy is  when  he  refers  to  this  sense  of  “Being”  as  that  which 
discloses.  
However, attaching any name to “Being” will always be problematic.  This is because such a 
sense of “Being” as  Seyn must always remain beyond language. Hence, on one important level, 
Being as Seyn in the later Heidegger can never be truly named because it can never be completely 
disclosed. This is something that will be looked at further in the section on “Heidegger, Daoism and 
Ineffability”.  At the same time, Heidegger is always aware that any name he uses for Being in his 
later philosophy must still carry the weight of its prior usage within the language and tradition of 
thought. As stated in “The Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer”, the word 
“Being” belongs to the 'patrimony' (tradition) of metaphysics by which is meant that “Being” is 
already  weighted  down  by  its  previous  usage  in  western  philosophy.  This  is  a  problem  that 
Heidegger cannot easily evade and therefore he employs a variety of names to hint at such a sense 
of Being as Seyn. It is not possible at this point in the thesis to look further into the nature of such 
terms.   However, for the rest of this work, Being in the sense that Heidegger uses it in Being and 
Time will be referred to as Sein, or disclosure, while Being in the sense of underlying the world of 
disclosure in Heidegger's later work will be referred to as Seyn.
The Problem of Seyn
Julian Young links Seyn in Heidegger with the traditional notion of the sublime, since Seyn's 
‘awesomeness that lies in its concealment’ is similar to eighteenth and nineteenth-century notions of 
the  ‘magnitude  so  vast  as  baffles  conceptual  comprehension’.44 This  means  that  an  important 
element of Seyn evoking a certain attitude is its concealment. When experienced fully, it creates a 
breakdown in the normal conceptual framework, meaning that it cannot be fitted into normal forms 
of understanding.  Young uses the example of a sublime person to show that such a feeling is lost if 
one ‘has plucked out the heart of another’s mystery, that one has a complete conceptual mastery of 
44 .J. Young  Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2001  p. 43  
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what makes her ‘tick’- that she has become, as Heidegger would say, completely calculable- then 
she cannot command awe’.45 It is the same with Seyn, in that such a sense of Being involves the 
breaking apart of normal categories of thought, which leads to an uplifting in its sense of awe. If 
Sein as world is the clearing,  Seyn is the depths and mystery of the forest that makes the clearing 
itself possible. A person standing in the clearing will be aware of the depths of the forest, but will 
not be able to see far into the woods; and it is this impenetrability combined with the openness of 
the clearing that makes the sense of the woods complete.
 The awareness of this ungraspable element adds something to the disclosure, although it 
can never be pinned down and described completely. This is an essential aspect of such awareness. 
It is an awareness that brings thought to the edge of ‘horizon’, in that it takes it to the limits of 
possible  understanding  and  brings  a  sense  of  something  that  lies  beyond  it.  The  question  is, 
however, how this can be possible without falling back into the trap which Heidegger is trying to 
escape from, that is, of reifying Seyn and betraying the nature of what it is. In a similar way to the 
stone in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ that loses its sense of  mystery once it is smashed up to be 
examined, Seyn for Heidegger is lost if Seyn is completely disclosed.  Heidegger is therefore left in 
the position of both trying to make people aware of  Seyn while allowing it to be concealed, and 
trying to illuminate Seyn while allowing it to keep its mystery. 
A  discussion  of  Seyn therefore  presents  one  of  the  single  greatest  problems  that  is 
encountered in Heidegger’s later philosophy. This is because Heidegger wishes both to avoid laying 
out a fixed conceptualisation of Seyn, while at the same time trying to avoid conceding that Seyn is 
merely consigned to oblivion. This is a problem that Heidegger himself was aware of and is often 
seen as a central weakness by critics of his later thought, particularly those who take a positivistic 
standpoint.  Along such lines, Herman Philipse accuses Heidegger of ‘“an empty play with words” 
since nothing is offered by way of meaningful descriptions’. 46 
45 .J. Young  Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art. Cambridge university Press Cambridge 2001  p. 43  .
46 H.  Philipse  Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being. Princeton University Press,Princeton New Jersey 1998   p. 302 . 
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Central to Heidegger's later thought, therefore, is this cultivation of a sense of Seyn, while at 
the same time resisting the construction of a fixed conception of  Seyn that would take away its 
essential mystery. It is on this basis that particular significance is given to poetry in Heidegger’s 
thought, as well as to the distinction between calculative, meditative and poetic thinking. The exact 
nature of these different kinds of thinking will be looked at in more detail in a subsequent section. It 
should be noted here, however, that the general challenge that the later Heidegger faces is precisely 
to  cultivate  awareness in human thinking of both its  own limitation as well  as  Seyn remaining 
ungraspable. Along such lines, in “The Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer”, 
he depicts human existence as standing on the 'boundary of the boundless’.47 David Cooper refers to 
this  as  ‘comportment’ (attunement  towards  this  awareness),  that  ‘is  not  simply  some  form of 
behaviour, but involves a way of seeing, revealing and experiencing things’.48
How Heidegger carries out this project of the cultivation of a 'comportment',  as well  as 
contend  with  the  problems  that  such  cultivation  may  face,  is  one  of  the  crucial  concerns  of 
Heidegger's later thought thought. It will be central in various ways to much of this thesis. The next 
section will seek to lay out what Heidegger understands as the gradual impoverishment of Western 
life.
47 M. Heidegger  “ Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer”, in: On the Way into Language. 
Translated by Peter D. Hertz. Harper and Row .San Francisco 1971   p. 41. 
48 D.E. Cooper  Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery. Oxford University Press Oxford 2002  p. 294 . 
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Chapter 3 Heidegger and Nihilism
It  is  in  relation  to  this  later  sense  of  “Being”  that  Heidegger  observes  a  certain 
impoverishment in Western modernity.  In effect, the modern disclosure of Being lacks something 
in the sense that it cannot allow those who live within its context to truly experience the mystery of 
Being.   Heidegger  borrows  the  term  “nihilism”,  already  in  use  by  previous  philosophers, 
particularly  Nietzsche,  to  describe  this  condition.  Here,  Heidegger  might  be  seen  as  making a 
transition from a description of Being and human life to an evaluation of a particular mode of 
living.  Heidegger thereby also switches the central  direction of his  later philosophy away from 
focusing  on  questions  of  the  authenticity  of  individual  Dasein  that  provides  the  nucleus  of 
Heidegger’s early philosophy, to looking at a form of life within a civilisation as a whole.  Julian 
Young takes up Nietzsche’s metaphor of the philosopher as the “physician of culture” to describe 
Heidegger’s role in this,49 by which he means that Heidegger’s later philosophy seeks to question 
the nature of modernity in the West and to evaluate its particular disclosure of ‘being’ relative to 
other disclosures.
Central to Heidegger’s evaluation of the modern condition is the loss of the gods, by which 
he does not mean a complete triumph of atheism. Rather, “the loss of the gods is the situation of 
indecision regarding God and the gods”.50 This can be interpreted as an indifference to the sacred 
within the modern world, whereby the sacred ceases to be anything special. This can roughly be 
described as a state of disenchantment, a loss of “divine radiance” within the world. There is loss of  
the previously mentioned feeling of the “sublime” in “Being”.  The modern world, therefore, lacks a 
sense or a place for the sacred.  Julian Young states that,  unlike the ancient  Greek,  Polynesian, 
49  J. Young  Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002   p. 31.
50  M. Heidegger  'Age of the World Picture', in: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.  Harper 
Torch Books Harper Row New York 1977    p. 117   
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Aboriginal  or  Mbuto  cultures,  “our  culture  no  longer  responds  to  nature  as  a  sacred  place”.51 
Without this relation to the sacred as that feeling of awe and wonder, modernity for Heidegger 
becomes  fixed  in  its  own ordinariness.  It  is  under  such conditions  no  longer  possible  to  truly 
experience the unfathomable depth of “Being”.
Underlying this modern condition of the “loss of the gods” is for Heidegger the dominance 
of  modern  technology.  By  technology,  Heidegger  does  not  merely  understand  a  network  of 
machines, but rather a particular way in which the modern world is produced, in the sense of the 
ground’s  being laid out  for  the modern mode of disclosure:  “modern technology is  an ordered 
revealing”.52  Therefore, all that exists within the modern world has to be understood within the 
context of this disclosure. The modern world for Heidegger, like the ancient Greek world and any 
other world, still has its own particular form of disclosure, and it is this that governs the way in  
which beings are interpreted within the context of modern technology.  What is most central to the 
disclosure  of  the  world  within  modern  technology  is  that  it  reveals  beings  fundamentally  as 
resources standing in reserve, which, in turn reveals nature, above all, “as the chief storehouse of 
the energy standing in reserve”.53  This central aspect of modern technology means that within the 
modern world, a forest, for example, will be revealed primarily as a supply of wood.  A cultivated 
plantation  forest  is  in  practice  grown  entirely  for  this  purpose.  It  is  therefore  essentially  the 
character of the way that beings are disclosed within the framework of modern technology, that they 
are there as resources. Julian Young refers to this, stating that, ‘as a hammer is not violated, not  
abused, by hammering that takes it to its limits, so a river is not violated by its unconditional use as 
a hydro-electric power source’,54 in that from the standpoint of modern technology, it is the function 
of such things  to be used up as resources.  Violation here can be understood as a thing that  is  
prevented from standing out as the thing that it is, and for modern technology, a thing is precisely a 
51 M. Heidegger 'Age of the World Picture', in: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.  Harper Torch 
Books, Harper Row New York 1977 p. 117  
52 M. Heidegger 'Question Concerning Technology', in: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 
Harper Torch Books, Harper Row New York 1977   p. 19   
53 Ibid  p. 21
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resource to be used up. There is thus an implicit violence in modern technology, from the standpoint 
of Heidegger, that is essential rather than accidental towards the beings that are disclosed in this 
form of disclosure, in that it leads to their subjection to exploitation as part of the character of their 
being:  ‘it  makes  violation  inevitable  because,  fundamentally,  it  takes  away  the  concept  of 
violation’.55 In the same way that Marx held that the alienation and exploitation of labour was built 
into the capitalist system, not in the sense of evil actions of particular capitalists but within the flow 
of domination of capital itself; so, too, Heidegger holds the violation of beings to be built into the  
system of modern technology.  The resources have merely fulfilled their purpose as being used up in 
the flow of technology. 
 It  is  this  mode of  revealing in  modern technology that  Heidegger  refers  to  as  Gestell. 
Gestell is translated by William Lovitt as ‘enframing’. It is derived from the ordinary German word 
for  'frame,  rack,  shelf,  or  stand'.56  The  term stands  for  the  ordering  of  beings  to  make  them 
available for use (standing in reserve), by which is meant that technology sees beings as always 
there to be used.  Julian Young, however,  rejects  this  translation of disclosure from  Gestell that 
renders it as a verb, which would suggest that  Gestell is an action with an agent.  Instead Young 
takes a position that views technology as an impersonal system. It would appear natural to view 
technology as something inherently anthropocentric, by which is meant that it is centred on nature 
undergoing a transformation for human use, as a resource for human consumption. This would be 
the classical modernist, or humanist, view of technology that holds that modern technology exists 
for the functions and purposes of human kind.  Reflecting this view of technology, Heidegger states 
that, ‘in this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar 
as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man 
everywhere  and always encounters  only himself’.57 Therefore,  within modern technology,  there 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid p.44.
57 M. Heidegger 'The Question Concerning Technology', in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. 
Harper Torch Books, Harper Row New York 1977   p. 27 
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persists the illusion of the central human subject who commands everything, which represents the 
process  of human progress in  the sense of the ideal  of eighteenth-century Enlightenment.  This 
notion of the gradual empowerment of humanity over and against the forces of nature is one on 
which,  to a certain extent,  Hegel’s philosophy would appear to rest.  Heidegger rejects  such an 
interpretation as an illusion, instead seeing technology as a destiny and framework that grounds 
human action.  For Heidegger, modern technology, based on Gestell, is a system that involves and 
controls  everything within  the  modern  world  by virtue  of  its  existence  within  that  world.  The 
illusion  of  human  mastery  over  technology  is  maintained,  since  ‘as  organised  mass  and  as 
individual member of such organisation, man is thus simultaneously always the powerful and the 
indifferent, the leader and melted down’.58 Ultimately, therefore, despite appearances, humans only 
perform another function within this flow. In the final analysis, the aim of modern technology, in so  
far as it is an aim, is to make all beings function correctly within this flow.
Julian Young comments that “Human being has lost its apartness, has itself become part of 
the resources to be exploited”,59  just as the mountains show up as a supply of minerals, and forests 
show up as  a  supply  of  wood or  cellulose.  He even goes  further,  seeing  this  principle  of  the 
reduction of beings to resources as extending into every aspect of modern life, including humans, 
stating  that  “the  current  talk  about  human  resources  gives  evidence  of  this”.60 Hence,  humans 
become a  supply  of  labour  or  consumption  in  the  same way that  a  hammer  in  a  blacksmith’s 
workshop primarily shows up as an implement to be used.  Gestell is a background against which 
the modern world stands out and which governs the way that all that is within the modern world 
appears “disclosed” in Heidegger’s terminology.  It is therefore comparable with the Greek world, 
which for Heidegger is symbolised by the temple, in that they are both ways that a particular world 
is revealed in a particular way. For Heidegger, however, there is a fundamental difference between 
58 M. Heidegger  Mindfulness Translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary  Continuum London 2006   p. 22 .
59 J. Young  Heidegger’s Later Philosophy. Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p. 46 .
60 M. Heidegger  'The Question Concerning Technology' Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Harper 
Row New York 1977   p..18.
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the Gestell of modernity and the temple of ancient Greece, since, while the Greek temple allows the 
‘beings’ in the world which, in Heideggerian terms, the work allows to stand out in themselves as 
they are,  Gestell  only allows beings to stand out in terms of their utility as resources within the 
overall  functioning  of  technology.  A part  of  the  way that  this  affects  the  way that  beings  are 
disclosed is making them appear as standing in reserve and thus making them disposable:  “the 
ontological determination of standing reserve (of the being as material supply) is not permanence 
(the steady persistence), but rather orderability, the constant possibility of being summoned and 
ordered.   In orderability,  the particular being is  posited from the ground up and exclusively as 
disposable.61 Technology, therefore, leads not merely to a forgetfulness of ‘Being’, but implicitly to 
a destructiveness towards beings, by making them disposable within a larger network of technology. 
Heidegger takes the destruction caused by the atomic bomb as a symbol of the ultimate completion 
of this process. However, ‘the bomb’s explosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of 
the long-since-accomplished annihilation of the thing: the confirmation of that thing as a thing 
remains nil.’ 62
What is wrong with this particular kind of disclosure for Heidegger? At one level, it may 
appear just as a particular kind of disclosure of “being”, among other possible historical disclosures, 
that  happens  to  have  gained  dominance  in  the  modern  world,  “in  consumption  the  current 
countenance of ‘being’”.63 The essential pathology for Heidegger in this disclosure of beings is, as 
Young notes, that “It deprives us of the ability to stand in a gentle careful, as opposed to violent, 
relation to things, if one cannot see the forest as anything more than a supply of cellulose, the river 
as anything more than a power source”.64 The technological disclosure of beings deprives them of 
any other “being”, meaning that beings within technology cannot be disclosed in any other way. 
61 M. Heidegger  Four Seminars, Translated by Andrew Mitchell and Francois Raffoul. Indiana University Press 
Bloomington Indianapolis 2003  p. 63 .
62  M. Heidegger  'The Thing' in Poetry Language and Thought.  Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Harper Row New 
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‘Above all, Gestell conceals that revealing, which in the sense of poeisis lets presences come forth 
into appearance’.65 The dominance of technology therefore stops the poetic  mystery of ‘Being’ 
coming into the world.  In making beings into resources, Heidegger considers that modern man 
loses a certain awareness and respect for beings.  It becomes harder to experience certain relations 
and awareness towards beings, such as thankfulness or awe; rather, they become merely tools in a 
similar  way to beings  that  are  ready-to-hand in  Being and Time.  The fundamental  damage of 
Gestell in modern technology is that it does not allow the possibility of another disclosure of Being: 
it reduces all disclosures of Being to their values based upon their use as resources. This reduction 
of beings to resources is extended in the modern world to include things such as art. Therefore, the 
technological world of Gestell in practice, in Heideggerian terms, will shut off anything beyond its 
own horizon. This can particularly be seen in Heidegger’s writing about art in the modern world. 
For  Heidegger,  in  the  epoch of  the  completion  of  modernity,  ‘art  becomes  a  manner  in  which 
machination completes itself in a thorough construction of beings unto the unconditioned, secure 
disposability of the organised’.66 Even art, therefore, has its function within the over-arching system 
of technology. Heidegger thus rejects the romantic ideal of art as a sphere separated from everyday 
life in the modern world. The dominance of modern technology in effect renders such a sphere no 
longer possible. Hence, ‘kitsch is not the inferior art but the very best skill that is devoted to what is 
empty and is not fundamental, which in order still to secure itself a significance seeks support in the 
public advertising of its symbolic character’.67 Art assumes a function of its own within modern 
technology, it has become part of the ‘art industry’,68 in that ‘word, sound and image are means for 
structuring, stirring, rousing and assembling the masses, in short they are means of organising’.69 
Art,  therefore,  has  its  ‘cash  value’ within  modern  society  in  terms  of  its  ability  to  order  and 
manipulate people as part of the system of technology. Heidegger builds on Nietzsche’s conception 
65 M. Heidegger ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ in The Question concerning Technology and Other Essays 
Harper Row New York 1977    p. 27.
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67 Ibid p 24.
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‘of art as a stimulant to life’,70 which he interprets as art’s ability in the modern world based on 
power.  The significance of art within the modern world, therefore, is primarily based around its  
possibility of fulfilling this function.
While Heidegger sees Gestell as coming to dominance in Western modernity, for him, it also 
represents the ultimate conclusion of the prior history of Western ‘metaphysics’. (It should be noted 
here that what follows should be read as brief outline of Heidegger’s commentary on the history of 
Western metaphysics, focusing on Plato as the start and Nietzsche as the end of metaphysics, rather 
than  as  a  complete  account  or  exhaustive  critical  analysis).  He  states  that  the  ‘completion  of 
modernity is simultaneously completion of the metaphysical history of the Occident - the history 
which explicitly or implicitly is sustained by metaphysics’.71 Metaphysics for Heidegger represents 
a particular type of understanding of beings that he sees as having come to dominance in Western 
thinking. Heidegger’s interpretation of the term “metaphysics” is in this respect by no means a 
standard  interpretation  of  the  term.  For  Heidegger,  metaphysics  is  always  an  analysis  of  the 
transcendent Being of beings, in terms of their universals that all beings have.  This means the 
interpretation of ‘Being’ in terms of categories.
Heidegger considers this condition of Western modernity to be already based on a tendency 
in Western thought that goes back much further, as far as Plato, who, for Heidegger, represents the 
foundational metaphysics from which all other Western metaphysics develops and so subsequently 
sets the course for the process later developed through Western history. Heidegger states directly 
that ‘all metaphysics is Platonism.’72  He notes ‘the rule of modern technology, which is thoroughly 
foreign  to  the  ancient  world,  yet  nevertheless  has  in  the  latter  [the  ancient  world]  its  essential 
origin’.73 The  history  and  development  of  Western  thinking  is  in  Heidegger’s  interpretation  a 
working out  of  the principles  laid down at  its  origins.  For  Heidegger,  ‘whatever  happens with 
70  M. Heidegger  Mindfulness Translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary Continuum., London 2006, p.  2.
71  Ibid p. 19.
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historical human beings always derives from a decision about the essence of truth that was taken 
long ago’,74 by which he means that human actions are always performed within the context of an 
underlying assumption about the nature of truth. This means that Heidegger interprets the history of 
Western thought and civilisation as remaining based on Plato’s thought. For Heidegger, the point 
that  is  fundamentally  damaging  in  Plato’s  thinking  is  the  interpretation  of  the  truth  of  beings 
according to ideas, meaning that for Plato, what is truly real in beings is the idea as the absolute 
form. Heidegger states ‘that which is first of all decisive’ in Plato’s thinking and Western thinking 
stemming from it, ‘is not which ideas and which values are posited, but rather the fact that the real 
is interpreted according to ideas at all and that the world is interpreted according to values at all’.75 
The centrality of the idea within Plato marks the crucial and defining break in Heidegger’s 
reading  of  the  history  of  Western  philosophy.  This  means  that  Plato’s  thought  moves  towards 
abstraction: it moves away from a basic sense of the Being of beings. This Heidegger sees as a 
crucial shift away from prior thinking that is ultimately played out in the rest of Western thought. 
This central aim of Plato’s philosophy, of laying beings bare through abstraction within ‘ideas’, 
means that Heidegger sees Plato’s theory of truth as moving away from the earlier model of truth 
based on concealment and unconcealment. This can be read as losing the balance between light and 
dark in Plato. Plato instead favours the idea as ‘the shining (self showing)’76: ideas by definition 
have to be made intelligible to the intellect, even the idea of the good that is for Plato the ultimate 
goal. For Plato, beings are given reality by the participation in the world of ideas, while in a similar  
way, in medieval thinking, all beings in the world are given their reality through God resulting in a 
continual  shift  away from the beings  themselves.  For  Heidegger,  this  interpretation  of  the  true 
nature of reality in terms of ideas, in the end leads on to the interpretation of the modern world in 
terms  of  values.  Heidegger  states  that,  ‘taking  the  essence  of  truth  as  the  correctness  of 
74  M. Heidegger  'Plato’s Doctrine of Truth', in Pathmarks. Edited and translated by William McNeil. Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1998  p. 182 .
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representation, one thinks of all beings according to “ideas” and evaluates all reality according to 
“values”’.77 In  this  respect,  therefore,  Heidegger  sees  Plato’s  thought  as  leading directly  on  to 
Nietzsche.  
Heidegger  regards  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  as  representing  the  metaphysic  of  “will  to 
power”, where everything that exists is disclosed in terms of its force, by which is meant its ability  
to affirm itself and thereby hold power over other beings. It should be noted that such a reading of 
Nietzsche  is  highly  controversial,  with  many  scholars  advocating  less  destructive  and  more 
potentially spiritual reading of Nietzsche's thought, along the lines of Joan Stambaugh's 'Nietzsche 
the poetic mystic'78 comparable with Laozi or Zhuangzi. It is not however the aim of this thesis to 
evaluate Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche against such alternative readings, but rather to present 
Heidegger's reading of Nietschean thought as a model for how he understood western nihilism. 
This should not be read as implicit endorsement of such a reading of Nietzsche, but rather that such 
a reading whether or not it is correct, is in itself important to understanding Heidegger's thought on 
the world.
Hence,  in  the  Heideggerian  understanding  of  the  modern  world,  ‘according  to  the 
conventional estimation, what in the highest sense “is”, is a being as actual. What supremely counts 
is “actuality”, in the sense of extantness of the effective; effectiveness and nothing else’.79 This 
means that, within the metaphysics of modern technology, what it means for a being to be is for it to 
be  ‘effective’.  ‘The completion of  modernity  is  “actuality” the  completion  of  the metaphysical 
history  of  “the  Occident”’,80 meaning  that  all  preceding  metaphysical  interpretations  of  beings 
ultimately lead to this interpretation. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s philosophy represents the most 
transparent moment in Western thought; it reveals the underlying foundations of Western thought by 
77 M. Heidegger 'Plato’s Doctrine of Truth', in: Pathmarks. Edited and translated by William McNeil. Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 1998  p. 182. .
78'Joan Stambaugh 'The Other Nietzsche' in Nietzsche and Asian Thought. edited by Graham Parkes . The University of  
Chicago press 1991 Page 20 
79 M. Heidegger Mindfulness Translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary Continuum.London,2006  p. 165.
80  Ibid  p. 30.
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taking it to its ultimate extreme. This may appear an odd reading of Nietzsche, given the apparent 
radicalism of Nietzsche’s thought with its  apparent  notion of the inversion of Plato.  Heidegger 
states that the ‘ultimate blow in the killing of God is perpetrated by metaphysics, which as the  
metaphysics  of  the  will  to  power,  accomplishes  thinking  in  the  sense  of  value  thinking’.81 As 
Heidegger states, ‘the ultimate blow against God and against the supersensory world consists in the 
fact that God, the first  of beings is degraded as to the highest value’.82 What is first damaging 
towards the sacred is not the ‘death of god’ in Nietzsche’s philosophy, but the prior equation of god 
as the highest value. What is wrong with this thinking in terms of values? For Heidegger, it  is  
because this interpretation of Being in terms of values seeks to represent Being in terms of what is 
objective quantification.  Hence, ‘this blow comes precisely not from those who are standing about, 
who do not believe in God, but from the believers and their theologians who discourse on the being 
that is of all beings most in being, without ever letting it occur to them to think on Being itself’.83 
It might therefore be said that, already within the interpretation and implicit reduction of 
Being into value, there is a loss of Being. How is this? It might be held that the valuation of Being 
is  fundamentally  a  pinning  down  of  Being.  It  reduces  the  Being  of  beings  into  a  matter  of 
evaluation,  or  quantification,  and so the question of Being is  no longer  open. It  closes  off  the 
fundamental disclosure of Being, which might be interpreted as its sense of existence.84 What is 
fundamentally damaging to the Being of Beings, by interpreting being in terms of value, is that it 
implicitly  means  that  b/Being must  be  made  into  some thing  that  can  grasped and quantified. 
Hence, ‘Being is interpreted as pure presence.’85 There is in effect no space for an unquantifiable 
Being within beings.  It is the absolute uncovering of Beings. Heidegger treats this valuation as a 
form of objectifying and control over beings by quantifying them, and Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
essentially the ultimate expression of this, because it represents all beings in the most basic terms of 
81  Ibid  p 109.
82  Ibid  p.105.
83 M. Heidegger  Mindfulness. .Translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary Continuum. London 2006  p.105.  
84 M. Heidegger 'Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Enquirer'  in Way into Language. Translated Peter 
D Hertz Harper Rowe  San Francisco 1971  p .10.
85    M. Heidegger  Nietzsche Volume 3 Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins San Francisco, 1991 p. 60.   
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the ‘will to power’. Central to the whole system of valuation that Heidegger sees as represented in 
Nietzsche’s metaphysics, and as having gained dominance in the modern world, is the will to power. 
Nietzsche’s philosophy replaces the prior system of values based on transcendental values, in favour 
of a system of valuation based on the will to power, and is thus the ultimate stripping away of the 
prior foundation of Western metaphysics; but for Heidegger, it also represents the clearest and most 
transparent  form of  Western  metaphysics.  This  transition  in  Western  philosophy from Plato  to 
Nietzsche represents for Heidegger the transition from ‘Being’ interpreted as an idea that is fixed, to 
‘Being’ interpreted as a value that is continually becoming.  However, ultimately, both Nietzsche 
and Plato might be seen as part of the same tradition. 
Nietzsche’s  ‘will  to  power’ is,  within  Heidegger’s  reading  of  the  history  of  Western 
metaphysics,  the  final  culmination  of  Western  metaphysical  thinking  in  which  all  that  is  is 
understood as a representation of will to power. In prior epochs, ‘the Being of beings’, what it  
means for beings to be, has been interpreted in various ways.  For example, in the Middle Ages, the 
‘Being of Beings’ would be interpreted as a being created by God. For Nietzsche, in the same sense, 
the ‘Being of beings’ exists as part of the ‘will to power’, which Heidegger understands as the very 
heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Heidegger claims that ‘the essence of power is will to power’, 86 by 
which he understands that, in Nietzsche, will and power are inseparable because, ‘power is power 
only if it and as long as it is enhancement of power, taking command over the increase in power’.87 
The  effect  of  will  to  power  is  the  continual  assertion  and  enhancement  of  itself;  ‘therefore, 
enhancement of power is at the same time in itself the preservation of power’.88 To resist the will to 
power is, therefore, essentially to become part of the will to power; and so that state effectively 
closes off all other possibilities of a disclosure of Being. Furthermore, the will to power, by its very 
nature, represents continual overpowering and enhancement of itself, with Heidegger asserting that 
86 M. Heidegger  Nietzsche.Volume 3 Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins San Fransisco   1991 p.195.
87 Ibid  
88 Ibid p.197.
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‘any kind of power can maintain itself only in overpowering.’89 
This is how Heidegger understands the notion of becoming within Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
He interprets Nietzsche’s doctrine of becoming as representing the continual overpowering of the 
will  to  power  by  itself.   Hence,  ‘in  reckoning  with  values  and in  estimating  according to  the 
relations of value, will to power reckons with itself’.90  The will to power itself can be compared to 
the Form of the Good in Plato, as that which enables the act of valuation itself to take place. As 
such, within Nietzsche’s system, the will  to power,  in order to be the will  to power,  has to be 
effectively locked into a continual “arms race” with itself. The will to power is thereby seen as 
practically inescapable for modern humanity, because even fighting against the will to power would 
simply lead to another  expression of the will  to  power,  another  affirmation through force,  in a 
similar way to Hegel’s interpretation of the absolute spirit as encompassing even that which is, on 
the surface, in opposition. The will to power is therefore both treated as absolute and as dynamic. In 
order to be the will to power, it has to grow in power. The system of modern technology, as based  
around the metaphysics of the will to power, can therefore not be a static system. Nietzsche’s aim 
was to posit new values through the will to power, by which Nietzsche claimed to have overcome 
nihilism. Within this framework, all that is becomes simply another manifestation of the will to 
power,  and,  therefore,  another  extension  of  nihilism.   Heidegger  sees  nihilism operating  at  an 
effectively deeper and more profound level than Nietzsche.  In his understanding, nihilism is not 
simply the “devaluation of the highest value”, but rather holds that “nihilism proper first proclaims 
that  there  is  nothing  to  ‘Being’ itself,  which  has  now become a  value”.91 It  is  effectively  the 
interpretation of the Being of beings in terms of values.  Attached to this valuation of Beings, there 
is  an  implicit  loss  of  the  sense of  the  Being of  beings.  It  is  effectively  an  objectification  and 
quantification of the “Being” of beings. 
Nietzsche’s interpretation of the Being of Beings as will to power might thereby be seen as 
89 M. Heidegger  Mindfulness. .Translated Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary Continuum London 2006   p. 20.
90 M. Heidegger  Nietzsche.Volume 3Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins San Fransisco1991 p. 200.
91  M. Heidegger  Nietzsche.Volume 3 Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper ,Collins San Francisco 1991   p. 200.
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the conclusion of this tradition of thought, representing the ultimate disenchantment and as such the 
ultimate revealing of the objectification for what it is. This naturally appears as a deviation away 
from both a traditional understanding of the history of Western philosophy and of Nietzsche’s place 
within  it.   It  would appear  natural  to  read  Nietzsche’s  philosophy as  representing  the  ultimate 
overturning of  Platonism by emphasizing  ‘becoming’ as  opposed to  the  eternal  ideas  of  Plato. 
However, as has been stated, Heidegger interprets the history of Western philosophy as a generally 
linear process of development from Plato through to Nietzsche. Throughout its history, Western 
metaphysics continuously seeks to represent the ‘being of beings’ in terms of a being or underlying 
form.  Hence, as John C. Maraldo states, for Heidegger,
 metaphysics is ontological in concerning itself with being as being, but in a
 two-fold manner: it represents “the totality of being as such with an eye to its 
most universal traits”, but at the same time also “in the sense of the highest 
and therefore divine being”.92 
In Heidegger’s view, it is irrelevant whether the highest being is Plato’s Form of the Good, 
the Christian God, or Nietzsche’s will to power; all metaphysical systems share this same basic 
hierarchical  trait  of ontologically subordinating beings  to a being.  This metaphysically  superior 
being is thus given the status of really real, while other beings gain their reality in relation to it. 
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  represents  the  ultimate  development  of  Western  philosophy,  where 
philosophy itself destroys itself as a separate entity to become another manifestation of the will to 
power.  It is for Heidegger the philosophy of the modern epoch, but
‘this does not mean that the struggle for unlimited exploitation of the earth
92 J. C. Maraldo   'Rethinking God', in:  Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics. Edited by Jeffrey Bloechi 
.Indiana University Press: Bloomington Indianapolis 2003   p. 33.
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 as the sphere of raw materials and for the utilization of “human material,” in 
 the service of the unconditional empowering of the will to power in its essence. 
 On the contrary, it is to be conjectured that philosophy as the doctrine and
 image of culture will disappear; for insofar as it has been genuine it has already
 brought the reality of the real to utterance and in that way has brought that 
 which is as such into the history of Being’.93 
The dominance of modern technology is the expression of Nietzsche’s metaphysics of will 
to power.  It is in this way that the ‘will to power from the start dictates the arrangement of all  
things.’94 Modern technology is thus the ordering of things as resources in accordance with the 
continual enhancement of the will to power, and that is why Heidegger’s later philosophy takes 
among its central concerns, the work of Nietzsche.
The essential nature of modern nihilism for Heidegger, rather than simply a matter of the 
loss of previously established transcendental values as understood by thinkers such as Nietzsche or 
Turgenev,  is  deeply rooted in  the complete  prior evaluation as set  out in  Western metaphysics. 
Hence, ‘the securing of supreme and absolute self-development of all the capacities of mankind for 
absolute dominion over the entire earth is the secret goad that prods modern man again and again to 
new resurgences, a goad that forces him into commitments that secure for him the surety of his 
actions and the certainty of his aims.’95 This for Heidegger is the underlying dynamic of Western 
metaphysics,  and  Nietzsche  represents  the  ultimate  expression  of  this.  Heidegger’s  aim  in  his 
thinking  is  to  reopen  the  sense  of  Being,  but  he  is  faced  with  the  weight  of  prior  Western 
metaphysical  thinking  pressing  down on  him.  For  Heidegger,  the  fundamental  failing  of  prior 
Western philosophers since Plato is to question and get beyond the underlying tradition of Western 
93 M. Heidegger ’The Word of Nietzsche, in:   The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays Harper Torch 
Books Harper Row New York 1977 p .101.
94 M. Heidegger  Nietzsche Volume 3 Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins San Francisco 1991   p. 232.
95 M. Heidegger  Nietzsche Volume 4 Translated by David Farrell Krell. Harper Collins San Francisco 1991  p.  99.
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thinking. The aim of Heidegger is thus to reopen the basic questions of philosophy, such as the 
‘question of Being’, and thereby hold out the possibility of a new beginning.
Looking at  traditions  of  thought  outside  of  the Western  tradition  from Plato  through to 
Nietzsche,  can  provide  a  possible  way  to  make  sense  of  Heidegger’s  conception  of  'the  New 
Beginning', or 'turning'. The rest of the thesis will focus on Heidegger's relation to the East Asian 
world. 
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Chapter 4 The Basis of Heidegger’s Dialogue with the East Asian World
Heidegger’s interest in philosophical traditions outside of Western philosophy is driven by 
his project of going beyond the nihilism that he sees as inherent within that tradition, culminating in 
the Nieztschean will to power. For Heidegger, each philosophical tradition and world in which it is 
grounded is  the  product  of  a  previous  historical  development.  This  means  that,  for  Heidegger, 
modern Western philosophy still remains tied to its foundations in ancient Greek thought, to the 
extent that it would not be possible to adequately understand events such as the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment in Western thought without having understood the thought of Plato and Aristotle. In 
Heidegger’s  understanding,  even  something  similar  to  the  radical  doubt  of  Descartes  or  the 
Copernican revolution, both of which were traditionally claimed as marking a radical break with 
what went before, still remain grounded within the thought of ancient Greece. As Heidegger states, 
‘origin always comes to meet us from the future’.96 Thus,  for Heidegger,  the modern world in 
general follows directly from the post-Platonic Greek world.  Hence, the ultimate destination of 
Western philosophy is  set  out  from Socrates  and Plato.  Tradition  for  Heidegger  functions  in  a 
similar  way to a  railway line,  setting a  developmental  line of  thought  from its  beginning.  The 
answers that people will give to questions, such as ‘what it means for a thing to be’ in any world, 
are  therefore  always  understood  within  the  context  of  the  way  that  people  have  previously 
interpreted  ‘Being’ in  history.   Emphasising  this,  Heidegger  states  that  "Each  man  is  in  each 
instance in dialogue with his forebears”.97
Therefore, at different stages in Western history, there have been different interpretations of 
‘Being’.  However, they each lead on to the succeeding stage, and this is the development of the 
world throughout history. Consequently, as has been shown, the modern Western world is based 
upon the development of Western metaphysics since Plato. It is this understanding of ‘Being’ and 
96 M. Heidegger ‘Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in On the way into Language Harper 
Row San Francisco 1971  p. 10.
97 Ibid p.19.
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thought based upon that understanding, which,  for Heidegger,  is the primary foundation of any 
world rather than its politics or economic relations, although such aspects are always founded in 
relation to the basic understanding of ‘Being’. Therefore, the history of a world in Heidegger’s 
definition is chiefly a progression of different understandings of ‘Being’. It is, however, possible for 
other worlds in Heidegger’s sense to stand outside the Western world and to represent other possible 
understandings of ‘Being’.  A world for Heidegger is marked out by history, and is often linked to a 
particular place, although it is, in effect, possible, in Heidegger’s thought, for completely different 
worlds to exist alongside each other. These other worlds, following Heidegger’s interpretation, can 
fit into his project of reopening the question of ‘Being’ and stepping outside of the modern Western 
world.   Turning to a  different  tradition of thought  may thus make sense of the crucial  idea in 
Heidegger’s philosophy of a ‘new beginning’, by showing what it means to think in a non-Gestell 
way. 
The  central  concern  here  is  with  Heidegger’s  dialogue  with  the  East  Asian  world,  as 
Heidegger appears to display a particular philosophical interest in this region. Reinhard May states 
that ‘neither Heidegger’s interest, nor his contacts’ with East Asia, ‘have been contested’98, while 
Heidegger himself states that ‘such an engagement (with East Asian thinking) could help with the 
task of saving the essential nature of human being from the threat of an extreme technological 
reduction and manipulation of human  Dasein’.99 Why, in particular, does Heidegger choose this 
specific historical tradition rather than any other?  
Heidegger makes the fundamental assumption that there is a radically separate East Asian 
world, or at least that there is separate East Asian tradition grounded in a different understanding of 
Being. The question then arises what it is that is distinctive about the East Asian style of thinking 
according to  Heidegger,  and what  it  is  in  this  distinctive  discrepancy between East  Asian  and 
Western philosophy that attracts Heidegger to East Asian philosophy.  It has already been noted that, 
98  R. May Heidegger’s Hidden Sources. Routledge,London New York 1996   p. 1. 
99  M. Heidegger   Japanese forward to Zur Frage nach der Bestimmung der Sache des Denkens,  ‘Koza-Zen’ 
Tokyo.1968
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for Heidegger, it is this ontological understanding that is primary to the foundation of any world, as 
each world is founded on a particular understanding of Being. It is possible to say in the sense of 
ontology, for example, that the Christian and Islamic worlds remain relatively close together.  Both 
are essentially based on the principle of beings coming into existence through an act of divine 
creation, so that, ultimately, all beings owe their existence to God as Supreme Being.  Furthermore, 
the Islamic tradition of philosophy draws on the same Greek (particularly Aristotelian)  way of 
thinking and, to a certain extent, on Judaic heritage. In terms of the metaphor of the ‘House of 
Being’, the Western and Islamic worlds might be said to occupy different rooms of the same house. 
Heidegger’s interest in East Asian philosophy appears as a search for a different house of 
Being. By its very nature, the East Asian world might be able to offer a different understanding of 
Being for Heidegger. The implicit hope for Heidegger is that this different East Asian understanding 
of  Being  might  not  produce  the  same  errors  and  dangers  that  Heidegger  finds  in  Western 
philosophy, particularly regarding onto-theology and nihilism, which Heidegger sees as finding its 
ultimate expression in the modern technological Western world.
A Different “House of Being”?
Heidegger is faced with a deep ambiguity. He finds that there is a resonance in East Asian 
thought  with  his  own philosophy,  while  at  the  same time viewing this  East  Asian  tradition  as 
radically separated from the Western tradition of which he is aware that his thinking is a product, 
although Heidegger’s thought is taking a critical step back from this Western tradition. Heidegger’s 
interest  in  East  Asian  philosophy  always  maintains  this  degree  of  ambiguity  of  both  looking 
towards the East, but always holding its distance from the tradition of philosophy that preceded him 
and from which his own thought still  cannot completely separate itself.  The dialogue with East 
Asian philosophy thus appears attractive to Heidegger, but also difficult and problematic.
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Heidegger would appear not to wish for a direct appropriation of East Asian thought by the 
West,  or  a  direct  form of  syncretism between Eastern thought  and Western philosophy.  In this 
respect, Heidegger’s philosophy differs from other philosophies, such as Schopenhauer’s. In his 
writing, Schopenhauer takes elements of Eastern philosophies, including Vedānta and Buddhism, 
but integrates them within a Western metaphysical system that is based heavily on Plato and Kant. 
Schopenhauer’s system uses the notion from Advaita Vedānta of the ultimate unreality of everyday 
experience,  particularly  the  illusion  of  individuation,  together  with  the  Buddhist  connection  of 
desire with suffering.  These are combined with the Kantian distinction between appearance and the 
thing in itself, while also incorporating Plato’s conception of true reality. Heidegger does not wish 
for such a simple reframing of East Asian philosophy within a Western metaphysical context, since 
for  Heidegger,  such a synthesis  would lose the particular  distinction of  East  Asian philosophy. 
Heidegger does not, for example, seek to include Chinese Daoism within a system of Husserlian 
phenomenology. Rather than seeking to fit East Asian philosophy into a Hegelian style overarching 
metaphysical system aimed at combining both the Western and East Asian philosophical traditions 
within one single understanding, Heidegger sees the East Asian world as radically separate from the 
West.  Heidegger’s  interest  in the East  Asian World,  that  clearly and indisputably shown in the 
‘Dialogue Between A Japanese and an Inquirer’, stems precisely from this view of the East Asian 
World as a radically separate tradition. 
This overt resistance to a direct syncretism at times has led some to call into doubt the extent 
of  Heidegger's  connection  to  East  Asian  philosophy.  However,  rather  than  simply  limiting  the 
possibilities for a dialogue with the East Asian world, Heidegger's rejection of syncretism means 
that he is anxious to allow the East Asian world to speak for itself and in its own terms.  It is for this  
reason that Heidegger chooses the method of dialogue and hermeneutic interpretation as his primary 
approach.  
This is a central concern of Heidegger’s ‘Dialogue between the Japanese and an Inquirer’ 100 
100  M. Heidegger ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in On the way into Language 
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the work by Heidegger that can be said to constitute his most direct analysis of East Asian thought.  
The  dialogue  itself,  as  Heidegger  writes  it,  may  not  directly  correspond  to  any  conversation. 
However,  it  loosely  relates  to  an  encounter  in  1955 between  Heidegger  and Tezuka  Tomio,  a 
Japanese Germanist  academic of the Imperial  University in Tokyo, an encounter which Tezuka 
reproduced  in  an  article,  ‘An  Hour  with  Heidegger’,  that  to  a  certain  extent,  but  not  exactly, 
parallels the conversation in the ‘Dialogue’. While the Japanese interlocutor in the dialogue may not 
be  said  to  correspond exactly  with  Tezuka,  the  former  might  be said  to  represent  Heidegger’s 
various  encounters  with  East  Asian  thought  and East  Asian  thinkers,  in  particular  Count  Kuki 
Shuzo, a Japanese art critic, who, according to Graham Parkes,101 had met Heidegger in 1927. As 
Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht states, 'if there is a counterpart in the text the Inquirer/Heidegger finds 
intellectually worthy and challenging, it is not the Japanese/Tezuka, but Count Kuki Shuzo whose 
figure (perhaps we should rather say: whose shadow) dominates - by direct and detailed reference - 
the opening sequence of the conversation'.102
What matters, however, is that Heidegger's ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and 
an Inquirer’ was not so much an accurate account of any one particular encounter as it happened, 
but rather that it offered the East Asian world the opportunity to speak for itself through various 
different encounters, and this is  a central aspect of the ‘dialogue’ itself. He turns to this method as a 
way of avoiding the danger of simply imposing a Western conceptual system upon East  Asian 
thought,  essentially  by allowing the East  Asian tradition to  express itself  through the dialogue. 
However, Lin Ma and Jaap Brakel doubt the possibility of true dialogue for Heidegger between the 
East Asian and Western worlds, in that they hold that 'a true dialogue could possibly happen only 
between Being and Dasein or man, or between Being and Heidegger'.103 From this, Lin Ma goes on 
to argue that such a position automatically excludes the East Asian world, apart from when 'the East 
Translated by Peter D. Hertz Harper Row San Francisco ,1971  p .19.
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engages itself in the project of retrieving Being from within the One House of Being, as elaborated 
by Heidegger's thinking'.104 Such a position basically holds that the only role for the East Asian 
world, or any other non-Western world in Heidegger's thought, is as an adjunct to the Western-
centred project  of reclaiming the notion of Being from pre-Socratic philosophy.  This,  however, 
overlooks, in Iain D. Thomson's words, the 'ontological pluralism'105 of Heidegger's thought, in that, 
for  Heidegger,  Being  discloses  multiple  different  understandings  and  possibilities.   It  is  thus 
legitimate for one understanding of Being to be in dialogue with another, and this is essentially what 
Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world involves.
 Heidegger, however, still sees an inherent danger in the dialogue itself. There remains a 
concern that,  at  some level in the dialogue,  the East Asian world should be allowed to remain 
distant. Heidegger refers to the danger of ‘distancelessness’; that, ‘distant sites of the most ancient 
cultures are shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today’s street traffic’.106  In 
Heidegger’s view, such an appropriation of East Asian and other cultures by the Western world is 
both  destructive  and  superficial.  As  Otto  Pöggeler  notes,  Heidegger  ‘considered  the  dialogue 
between Europe and the Far East to be as necessary as it was difficult; he did not want to overlook 
the element of foreignness that remained in every encounter’.107 There is a sense, however, that the 
‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ is already biased in so far as it takes 
place in German rather than Japanese.  Heidegger states that ‘the languages of the dialogue shifted 
everything into European’.108 The Japanese in the dialogue further comments that, ‘Count Kuki had 
uncommonly good command of German and of French and English’.109 Count Kuki had lived in 
Germany and France, and had visited Heidegger in the 1920s. Graham Parkes further comments 
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that, ‘among the Japanese thinkers who visited Heidegger in the 1920s it was Kuki who made the 
most forceful impression.’110 However, perhaps precisely because of Kuki’s languages abilities, the 
dialogue itself, by being based around German terminology, has been “Europeanised”.
Heidegger is very aware of the metaphysical baggage carried by any language and that, in so 
far  as  he  continues  to  work within a  specific  language,  he cannot  completely  escape the prior 
accumulation  of  metaphysical  meaning  in  any  particular  word,  or  philosophical  usage.  Any 
reference to East Asian philosophy in a Western language is therefore automatically coloured by the 
tradition  of  Western  metaphysics.  Particular  words  in  philosophy  will  therefore  inevitably  be 
affected in the way that they understood by the prior usage of such words in that specific language. 
This  creates  the  difficult  problem of  translation  between  languages.   For  example,  as  will  be 
discussed later on, the Dao from Chinese might literally be translated as ‘way’.  However, such a 
translation, although it could be claimed to be literally correct and may convey some of the meaning 
of the Chinese word, would be in danger of losing at least some of the sense of the original Chinese 
word, particularly as to how it is used in the Dao De Jing. 
An underlying question Heidegger investigates in his work ‘The Dialogue on Language, 
between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ is whether dialogue itself is possible and whether it is possible 
to gain entry into the East Asian world.  The dialogue investigates various possible ways in which 
the ‘Inquirer’ who appears to represent Heidegger, can cross the divide into the East Asian world. 
Heidegger is faced with the possibility that it may never be possible to be truly part of the East 
Asian world. Clearly, it cannot be possible, for example, to read the Dao De Jing as it would have 
been read in ancient China. In this sense, it is obviously impossible for someone from the modern 
Western world to ever literally ‘be’ in the world of ancient China or Edo-period Japan. Without 
being able in this way to enter such worlds, can it ever be possible to thoroughly understand the 
framework of thought of such worlds? From a Heideggerian point of view, this would not appear to 
110 G. Parkes  'Rising Sun Over the Black Forest: in Heidegger’s Hidden Sources Routledge London New York 1996 
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be possible since, ‘great thinking always understands itself best of all’;111 therefore, any attempt to 
understand it from the outside will always be inadequate. Heidegger would thus radically dismiss 
any Hegelian claim of having a historically privileged access into other worlds.
 However,  such  a  position  would  be  in  danger  of  leading  Heidegger  into  absolute 
resignation, in that it would appear to entail that it is never possible to gain a true understanding of 
anything that is outside the modern technological world. Heidegger’s concern about gaining entry 
into the East Asian world might in some sense be said to run parallel with his already established 
concern about gaining entry into the pre-Socratic Greek world. However,  the East Asian world 
might be said to be still further away from the modern world than the pre-Socratic Greek World. 
This is the case because as Heidegger, along with many other western theorists, holds that Greek 
philosophy, although radically altered from the original pre-Socratic basis, went on to have a deep 
influence over the later history of Western civilisation.  By contrast, Heidegger considered that East 
Asian philosophy has always been radically removed from Western philosophy.
 As  referred  to  previously,  while  his  thought  is  an  acknowledged  part  of  the  Western 
tradition of philosophy, Heidegger stands in an ambiguous relationship to the tradition that preceded 
him, since through his work, he continually aimed at the project of undermining the dominance of 
Western metaphysics. Heidegger’s dialogue with East Asian philosophy can be read as part of this 
project and must be seen within this context. Heidegger acknowledges that, ‘Nobody can in just one 
single leap take distance from the predominant circle of ideas’.112 Were Heidegger to completely 
deny the possibility of ever being able to go beyond Western philosophy, however, it would appear 
to undermine what can be said to be the central project of his thought; and he would seem to be left 
with no choice other than pessimistic resignation. Heidegger, however, does not appear ready to 
completely settle with this apparently bleak prospect. He, therefore, continues a dialogue with East 
Asian philosophy, but at the same time is always aware of the inherent difficulties in the dialogue.
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‘The Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ explores several different 
possible ways by which Heidegger as the Inquirer may enter into the East Asian world. Firstly, and 
most centrally in the dialogue, Heidegger looks to  iki as a way into the East Asian world. He is 
concerned with  how  iki might  be  expressed  and understood within  Western  languages  without 
imposing onto it Western metaphysics or concepts and thereby losing its original sense. The central 
question of the dialogue appears to revolve around whether it is possible for the Inquirer to truly 
understand the Japanese word iki. 
Looking further into Heidegger’s engagement with iki and its relationship with East Asian 
philosophy,  it  is  possible  to  say  that  iki represents  a  particular  Japanese  sensibility  associated 
heavily with the Edo period in Japan (1603-1868).  Its exact nature is difficult to define. Kuki 
Shuzo, a Japanese philosopher, appears to have been the first to introduce Heidegger to the notion 
of  iki. Heidegger mentions him directly in the dialogue and states that, ‘from my dialogue with 
Kuki, I never had more than a distant inkling of what that word (‘iki’) says’.113 Kuki later on, after 
meeting Heidegger, went on to publish his own work on iki in 1930, where he stated that ‘words’ 
carrying  a meaning similar to that of ‘iki’ can be found in European languages, but none has the 
same semantic value of ‘iki’’.114   A correct literal translation of iki into any western language is, in 
Kuki Shuzo’s interpretation (that seems to be accepted by Heidegger),  impossible.  It  should be 
noted here that ‘An Hour with Heidegger’ by Tezuka Tezuka,115 the conversation that Heidegger’s 
‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ was originally based on, makes no 
direct reference to iki. Heidegger, however, sees it as important to include this within the dialogue, 
perhaps because it easily presents an example of the aims and dangers within the dialogue. When 
Heidegger is writing about iki, he is probably thinking back to his earlier conversations with Kuki 
Shuzo. Heidegger presents the aim of the dialogue to reveal the underlying meaning of iki, but the 
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danger persists that, in interpreting iki within a Western language, it will lose the original Japanese 
meaning and ultimately make iki fall into the clutches of aesthetic ideation’.116 
Why does Heidegger object to reading iki as aesthetic? It may appear natural to assume that 
iki is, by definition, a Japanese word, making Heidegger's rejection of an aesthetic interpretation of 
iki seem incongruous and controversial.  He goes on to make the more apparently extreme and 
revealing claim that, 
the name aesthetics and what it names grow out of European thinking, out of 
philosophy.  Consequently, aesthetics must ultimately remain alien to East 
Asian thinking,117 
Along such lines, Heidegger, therefore, would hold that any attempt to use ‘aesthetics’ to 
understand  the  ‘East  Asian’  world  is,  by  definition,  inappropriate  because  such  a  category 
necessarily imposes a European metaphysical concept  and, as a result, must fail to fully understand 
the East Asian world.  This may appear a surprising claim, especially since Japanese thought in 
particular appears to make a lot of use of aesthetics. However, for Heidegger, aesthetics represents a 
particular  development  in  Western  philosophy  after  Plato,  where  art  becomes  associated  with 
matters of personal taste and is seen as removed from the deeper philosophical basis of the world. 
This is because, in Thomson's words, 'art works become objects for human subjects to experience in 
an especially intense, vital, or meaningful way'118  thus satisfying their aesthetic desires. Heidegger 
views such a distinction of subject and object, as well as the Platonic based metaphysical division 
between sensuous and super-sensual, as not being appropriate to East Asian art. This shows the 
hermeneutic sensitivity that Heidegger has towards certain vocabulary that carries a prior tradition 
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of  use  in  the  Western  tradition  when  interpreting  the  East  Asian  world.  Heidegger  holds  that 
language  may  block,  as  well  as  enable,  dialogue  by  creating  such  misunderstandings.  For 
Heidegger, it is not possible to use words such as ‘aesthetics’ without retaining the tradition of its 
prior use in the Western tradition of thought. Using the word 'aesthetic' to describe art therefore 
implies a certain Western metaphysical understanding of the nature of art. He regards the usage of 
such words as inappropriate for an understanding of East Asian thought. This, therefore, leaves the 
residual  problem in Heidegger  as  to  whether  it  can ever  be possible  to  understand East  Asian 
thought  in  Western  languages  without  altering  the  underlying  meaning  and  imposing  Western 
metaphysics, since it seems that any vocabulary used within that language, combined with the prior 
philosophical tradition, must carry with it some Western metaphysical concepts.
There is the further danger that an aesthetic interpretation of iki might lead to a phenomenon 
similar to that of  Japonism in nineteenth-century France, and to a certain extent Western Europe 
more generally, where Western artists appropriated superficial aspects of Japanese style into their 
own work. This was done particularly with ukiyo-e in paintings, but also parts of Japanese music in 
works such as Puccini's Madam Butterfly. Such aesthetic appropriation has the danger of presenting 
the East Asian world as an exotic curiosity for the Western world. Heidegger is therefore concerned 
to avoid  iki becoming understood in the West as simply another kind of aesthetic taste. Thus, as 
Young states,  for  Heidegger,  the  reason ‘aesthetic  art  fails  to  be  great  art  -  becomes in  fact  a 
triviality - is that even in the lives of those who ‘take it up’ it represents, in a double way, an option 
rather than a ‘need’.119  In Heideggerian terms, aesthetics takes away art's true significance in world 
gathering and disclosure: 
 Aesthetics, or shall we say experience within the sphere in which it sets the 
standard, from the very start turns the art work into an object for our feelings 
and ideas. Only when the artwork has become an object, only then is it fit
119  J. Young  Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2001 p. 12
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 for exhibitions and museums120. 
The  danger  of  applying  Western  thought  to  Japanese  principles  of  iki is  that  its  true 
significance within the Japanese world of the Edo period might be lost, and that iki is simply made 
into an object of Western appreciation in a similar way as the statue of the Greek goddess on display 
in a modern museum that Heidegger refers to in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’.121 Hence, when the 
Japanese in the dialogue proposes a translation of  iki as ‘the gracious’122, Heidegger is critical, 
stating that, ‘as soon as you say this, we are at once in the midst of aesthetics - think of Schiller’s 
treatise’.123  Words  such  as  “gracious”  already  have  a  prior  history  and  meaning  in  Western 
aesthetics. This is similar to Kuki Shuzo’s own rejection of the conventional translation of  iki as 
‘chic’.124 Accordingly a mistranslation of terms such as iki is for Heidegger more than a matter of 
simple misunderstanding or misinterpretation; rather, it threatens the loss of the whole nature of iki 
by submerging it under European aesthetics. 
Eventually,  in  the  dialogue,  the  translation  and  interpretation  that  Heidegger  appears  to 
accept is of iki as 
the pure delight of beckoning stillness. The breath of stillness that makes this 
beckoning delight come into its own, is the reign under which that delight is 
made come125. 
This  interpretation  of  iki  focuses  on  the  coquettish  aspect  of  iki that  draws  people  in. 
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Heidegger  states  ‘delight  literally,  then,  as  what  ensnares,  carries away -  into stillness’.126 This 
resonates strongly with Kuki Shuzo’s association of iki with coquetry, which he understands as ‘a 
dualistic attitude; that it puts a person of the opposite sex in opposition to the monistic self; that it  
posits a possible relationship between that person and the self’.127   Parkes states that ‘the paradigm 
for this moment is to be found in the relationship between the geisha and her patron in the gay 
quarter of the Yoshirwara in eighteenth-century Tokyo’.128 
This  is  a  relationship  and  environment  that  may  appear  deeply  alien  to  Heidegger’s 
concerns,  begging  the  question  as  to  why Heidegger  should  particularly  focus  on  iki,  with  its 
association with the relative hedonism of the Ukiyo, the  ‘floating world’ of the Edo period in Japan. 
It  is  notable  that  Kuki  Shuzo,  himself  a  cosmopolitan  and  a  somewhat  hedonistic  Japanese 
aristocrat, appears very different from the more rustic Heidegger. It is true that Heidegger does not 
go into as detailed a discussion of  iki as Kuki Shuzo does in his work. For example, he does not 
mention the dichotomy between iki and yabo, its opposite within Japanese culture, nor does he refer 
to the different expressions of  iki that Kuki examines, such as colours associated with its style. 
However, while it may be that some of these aspects of  iki are superfluous to Heidegger’s main 
concerns within the dialogue, there is one particular part of iki that he does not discuss directly, and 
which may be crucial. This is akirame (resignation). Kuki, in his study of iki, links the coquetry of 
iki with this resignation, which he associates strongly with Buddhism: ‘iki arises from the world of 
suffering’.129 This relationship of  iki to Buddhism is outlined by Botz-Bornstein who states that, 'to 
quit everyday life not in order to enter Nivana but in order to live everyday life in another way is  
one of the principles of Zen Buddhism and in this we recognise Kuki's main suggestions concerning 
iki'.130 Hence,  iki, starts from the awareness of the passing nature of existence, which ultimately 
126 Ibid p. 44
127  H. Nara. The Structure of Detachment: The Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shuzo: With a Translation of Iki no kozo  
Translated by Hiroshi Nara. University of Hawaii Press 2004  p. 19
128  G. Parkes   'Rising Sun Over the Black Forest' in Heidegger’s Hidden Sources  Routledge London New York 1996 
p. 94
129 H. Nara  The Structure of Detachment: The Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shuzo: With a Translation of Iki no kozo  
Translated by Hiroshi Nara. University of Hawaii Press 2004 p. 23
130  T Botz-Bornstein ‘“Iki”, Style, Trace: Shuzo Kuki and the Spirit of Hermeneutics’  in Philosophy East and West 
79
means that desire and enticement of coquetry cannot be truly fulfilled; but this does not mean that 
coquetry itself should be abandoned. In this respect, the coquetry of  iki differs radically from the 
Western conception of romantic love, in that it has no aim or completion. Kuki Shuzo writes:
 Seriousness and attachment to love go counter to the being of iki, because in such
 a case, love has been actualised and is no longer a possibility. Iki must transcend 
 the bonds of love to maintain a free and flirtatious spirit.131
While this element of iki is not directly mentioned in Heidegger’s dialogue, it is alluded to 
in his reference to the role of ‘enticement’: the enticement of iki is always tied to this idea of the 
impossibility of a complete union. As Parkes states, for Heidegger, ‘the only feature of this moment 
that  might  have  appealed  to  him  is  Kuki’s  emphasis  on  coquetry  (of  iki)  as  embodying  the 
possibility of sexual union and his insistence that the phenomenon is destroyed if this possibility is 
allowed to become an actuality’.132 ‘The main concern of coquetry - and the essence of pleasure - is 
maintaining a dualistic relationship, that is to say, protecting the possibility as a possibility’. 133  The 
ambiguity between intimacy and distance is clearly central to Kuki’s reading of the coquetry and 
resignation inherent to the notion of iki, and it may be that this is also central to Heidegger’s use of 
iki in the dialogue, in that it is precisely this tension between distance and nearness that in effect 
drives  the dialogue with the East Asian world in Heidegger’s paper.  This is  comparable to  the 
significance that Heidegger attributes to distance in his essay ‘The Thing’,  where he states that 
‘nearness  preserves  farness.  Preserving  farness,  nearness  presences  nearness  in  nearing  that 
farness.’134
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The  role  of  distance  and  nearness  in  Heidegger's  ‘Dialogue  on  Language  Between  a 
Japanese and an Inquirer’,  is  shown further by the part  of the dialogue that discusses the film 
Rashomon, which in some respects demonstrates the role of distance and enticement in Heidegger’s 
dialogue. The inquirer in the dialogue states at first, referring to Rashomon, that, ‘I believed I was 
experiencing the enchantment of the Japanese world, the enchantment that carries us away into the 
mysterious’.135  This  appears  to  directly  parallel  Heidegger’s  statement  about  iki as  that  which 
‘carries away’, and he appears to present  Rashomon as another way into the East Asian world. 
However, the Japanese in the dialogue is portrayed as a sceptic in relation to this possibility and 
even cites the film Rashomon as an example of sweeping ‘Europeanisation’. This resonates strongly 
with Tezuka Tezuka’s own statement about Rashomon in ‘An Hour with Heidegger’: 
I felt that the kind of indefiniteness conveyed by this film concerning our 
knowledge of reality may have intrigued Heidegger as an East Asian 
phenomenon. It is another question, of course, whether one can regard this 
work as pure exemplification of this East Asian characteristic.136  
 Young states that Kurosawa ‘never pretended otherwise than that his works were cultural 
hybrids’.137  It is certainly fair to say that in Heidegger’s time, Kurosawa’s films, in Japan, were 
regarded as more Western in style, with  the Japanese in Heidegger’s dialogue stating for example, 
‘we Japanese consider the film too realistic, for example in the duelling scenes’.138 The Japanese in 
the dialogue, however, appears to extend his criticism of the film further, stating that, ‘regardless of 
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what aesthetic quality of a Japanese film may turn out to be, the mere fact that our world is set forth 
in  the  frame of  the  film forces  the  world  into  the  sphere  of  what  you call  objectness’. 139 The 
criticism contained  here  seems  to  extend  to  the  medium  of  the  film  itself.  Along  such  lines, 
Heidegger states that ‘the East Asian world and the technical-aesthetic product of the film industry 
are incompatible’.140 Such an apparent change of position for Heidegger within the dialogue may 
appear oddly self-contradictory.  However, it may indicate that Heidegger at first saw Rashomon as 
an authentic example of the East Asian world, although he later rejected it  as being a film too 
inherently Europeanised. This rejection may have resulted from the fact that the film denies the 
possibility for distance and concealment in the East Asian world.  It makes the presentation too near 
and too immediate, and as such, effectively blocks off a real entry into the East Asian world. Young 
notes that, for Heidegger, the photography of Kurosawa’s film ‘block’s thematisation of anything 
other than beings, prevents objects becoming, as one might put it, windows into the Other. It is 
purely representational, metaphysical’.141 This might be understood as an indication that Rashomon 
is only capable of representing images of the East Asian world, but never enters into the underlying 
world.  The question is  whether,  for  Heidegger,  this  is  a characteristic  of  all  film as an artistic 
medium. Young again, asserts, ‘a reasonable acquaintance with the films of, say, Bergman, Visconti 
or  Wenders  reveals  as  clearly  absurd  the  claim that  the  film can  provide  nothing  but  densely 
naturalistic representation of the mundane world, that as such, the film cannot be poetic’.142  
In contrast to the realism still inherent in Kurosawa's film presentation of the East Asian 
world, the Japanese in Heidegger’s dialogue suggests an alternative form of art in the No-play. This 
he holds to be a truly Japanese form of art, stating that ‘the background world of Japan, or better the 
world itself, is what you experience in the No play’.143 What is it about No-drama in particular that 
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Heidegger finds to be fundamentally different from the representation in a film? The Japanese in the 
dialogue draws attention, firstly, to the minimalism of the stage in the No-drama, in contrast to the 
realism of the representation in the film.  Hence, in the No-play, ‘if a mountain landscape is to 
appear, the actor slowly raises his open hand and holds it quietly above his open hand and holds it 
quietly above his eyes at eyebrow level’.144 As such, the Japanese No-play does not have the realism 
in representation that film does.  However, what is special about the method of bringing a landscape 
on stage through a gesture? The Japanese in Heidegger’s dialogue, secondly, emphasises how the 
gestures in the No-play relate to the emptiness on stage. ‘In beholding that it is itself invisible, and 
that, so gathered, bears itself to encounter emptiness in such a way that in and through it mountains 
appear’.145 Young  maintains,  ‘the  play  allows  ‘the  nothing,  ‘the  empty’ to  presence  because 
emptiness is literally present: the stage is empty’.146 Emptiness/ nothingness appears to be central to 
Heidegger’s understanding of the East Asian world. The Japanese in the dialogue states that, ‘to us, 
emptiness is the loftiest name for what you mean to say with the word “Being”’. 147 The emptiness 
on the stage in the No-play would therefore appear to reveal directly how Heidegger understands 
the basis of the East Asian world, and as such, the No-play might be said to perform a similar  
function of world gathering as the temple in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’. Heidegger finds here a 
deep relationship with his own project of reopening the question of ‘Being’ and moving away from 
reified thinking of ‘Being’, to the extent that Heidegger’s own thought may be seen as closer to East 
Asian thought than to Western thought. For Heidegger, the No-play can be said to be an authentic 
East  Asian art  work,  reflecting the grounding of the East  Asian world.  As the Japanese in  the 
dialogue states, referring to Heidegger’s lecture “What is metaphysics?”, ‘we marvel to this day at 
how the Europeans could lapse into interpreting as nihilistic the nothingness of which you speak of 
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during the lecture’.148 This particular East Asian understanding of nothingness points deeply into the 
nature of East Asian thought, and particularly the nature of ‘Śūnyatā’ as emptiness in  Mahāyāna 
Buddhism, as well as the role of nothingness within Daoist thought; this will be looked at in more 
depth, later on. It should be noted here, however, that in the Heideggerian sense, ‘nothingness’ is 
central  to the East Asian understanding of Being, and as such central  to the East Asian world. 
Therefore, the No-play, centred on this ‘emptiness’ or nothingness in Heideggerian terms, can be 
seen as an art work foundational to the East Asian world in a way that is comparable with the 
temple or the tragedies of Aeschylus in the Greek world. 
However, in spite of this relationship between Heidegger’s thought and emptiness, there is 
still a sense in which the No-play remains too distant for Heidegger. The Japanese in the dialogue 
states that, 
you would need to attend such plays. But even that remains hard as long as you 
are unable to live within Japanese existence.149 
Such  works  of  art  can  therefore  only  be  completely  understood  and  authentically 
experienced from within the East Asian world and Heidegger cannot make such a radical transition. 
The dialogue,  besides the discussion of emptiness and gestures,  does not enter  further  into the 
themes of No-drama, in that the dialogue is only presented to the ‘inquirer’ by the ‘Japanese’, ‘from 
afar’.150 It remains like the temple in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in so far as it represents a 
world gathering that cannot truly be accessed from the modern Western world.
In contrast to the complexity and distance of the No-play, Heidegger mentions earlier in the 
dialogue that ‘Count Kuki occasionally brought his wife along who then wore festive Japanese 
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garments. They made the whole East Asian world more luminously present’.151 This may appear a 
casual remark.  However, it appears to link strongly with the idea of world gathering in ‘The Thing’, 
where Heidegger draws attention to the significance of ‘a wine jug’ as a thing within a particular  
world. Heidegger does not enter into further discussion of the festive Japanese garments, unlike the 
wine jug in ‘The Thing’. However, in some respects, the two are similar in that they are relatively 
simple in appearance on the surface and can be easily overlooked. They both have the quality of 
nearness and demonstrate the importance of such relatively ordinary things in world-gathering for 
Heidegger. In contrast to No-drama, the festive garments of Kuki’s wife may not appear to offer 
such deep insights into the East Asian world. It would appear hard to learn anything about the East 
Asian  understanding  of  Being  from  a  woman's  clothes. However,  in  Heidegger's  thought  the 
presence of  seemingly everyday items such as the jug of  wine in  his  essay  ‘The Thing’ often 
provide an ontological insight into the nature of a world. Hence the festive garments of a Japanese 
woman could provide a similar role in the ‘Dialogue’ and thus provide kind of disclosure of the East 
Asian  world  that  allows  it  to  be  near,  ‘luminously  present’,  but  does  not  seek  to  remove  the 
distance152.  In  this  respect,  it  might  be  said  to  be  an  example  of  the  ‘nearness  that  preserves 
farness’.153  What can be seen as a central part of Heidegger’s philosophy is that, in many ways, 
apparently simple things, such as festive garments or a wine jug, can be seen as windows providing 
a deeper insight into the disclosure of Being.
The Problem of Europeanisation 
There is, however, a sense of danger apparent in Heidegger’s dialogue with the East Asian 
world which is, as Heidegger refers to it in the dialogue, ‘a process which I would call the complete  
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Europeanization of the Earth and of man’.154 This would indeed represent a serious problem, in so 
far as it might be argued that the East Asian world with which Heidegger is seeking to pursue a 
dialogue might no longer exist. As such, any hope from Heidegger's point of view that the East 
Asian world might present new possibilities for the Western world, away from modern nihilism, 
might no longer be fulfilled. If this were true at the time when Heidegger wrote the ‘Dialogue on 
Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in 1959, it would appear to be even more true now, 
given the further post-war development of ‘East Asian countries’ along ways  that Heidegger would 
consider  to be ‘Western lines’.  It  would thus be harder for a follower of Heidegger  to find an 
authentic expression of the East Asian world, since the ‘Europeanisation of man and of the earth 
attacks at the source of everything of an essential nature. It seems that these sources dry up”.155 The 
issue  of  Europeanisation,  which  Heidegger  understands  as  the  dominance  of  modern  Western 
technocratic reasoning blocking other forms of thought, is an important background to Heidegger’s 
dialogue.156  Heidegger  was  aware  that  even  the  uptake  of  his  own philosophy  in  Japan  may 
contribute to this process of Europeanisation. The Japanese interlocutor in the dialogue states that, 
‘Professor Tanabe often came back to a question you once put to him: why it was that we Japanese 
do not call back to mind our own venerable beginnings of our own thinking, instead of chasing 
more  ever  more  greedily  after  the  latest  news  from  European  philosophy’.157 The  Japanese 
interlocutor  in  the  dialogue  refers  to  the  fact  that  many  people  consider  the  process  of 
Europeanization ‘the triumphal march of reason. At the end of the eighteenth century, in the French 
Revolution, was not reason proclaimed a goddess?158 Heidegger clearly regards such a Hegelian 
reading of history as the ‘triumphal march of reason’ as a threat. The interlocutor indicates a feeling 
154  M. Heidegger  ‘A Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’  in  On the way into Language 
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of being overwhelmed by it  within the East Asian world: ‘the incontestable dominance of your 
European reason is  thought  to  be  confirmed by the  success  of  that  rationality  which  technical 
advances set before us at every turn’159. He refers to the depth of this weakness: ‘since the encounter 
with European thinking, there has come to light a certain incapacity in our language’.160
 However, challenging this dominance of European thought based on a Hegelian ideal of 'the 
march of  reason'  is  central  to  Heidegger's  later  thought.  In  Heidegger’s  interpretation,  such an 
understanding of progress is linked heavily with modern technology and nihilism. However, he was 
clearly aware that he could not realistically reverse this process of Europeanisation, just as he could 
not abolish modern technology. Heidegger, therefore, was deeply conscious of the fact that he could 
not in reality return to the East Asian world as it was, just as it is not possible to truly enter into the 
pre-Socratic Greek world as it was. There is a danger that the East Asian world might become a  
museum piece in the way that the pre-Socratic Greek world has already become. However,  the 
dialogue itself presents the possibility that, as the Japanese interlocutor suggests in the dialogue, 
‘from the point of view of our East Asian world, the technical world which sweeps us along must 
confine itself to surface matters’.161  Whether it will be the case that the East Asian world will only 
take  up  the  modern  Western  technological  world  on  the  surface  while  maintaining  its  own 
disclosure, is a question that Heidegger leaves open within the dialogue. Heidegger cannot know the 
ultimate effect of technology. 
It may appear an over-optimistic assessment to claim that East Asian traditions have been 
preserved intact in the modern world. Clearly, Heidegger cannot hope simply to reverse with ease 
the process of Europeanisation. While it may be possible from a strongly Heideggerian point of 
view to hold a degree of sympathy for acts such as the Boxer Rebellion in nineteenth-century China 
or the Japanese isolationism of the Edo period before the Meiji restoration as resistance to rising 
technocratic power of Europe, these strategies in reality are no longer viable.  
159 Ibid  
160  Ibid p.  2
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 However, as Heidegger's Japanese contemporary, Nishitani Keiji, states, from an East Asian 
perspective 'European nihilism teaches us to return to our forgotten selves and to reflect on the 
tradition of oriental culture'.162 Along such lines Heidegger's thought, precisely by highlighting the 
crisis of the modern Western world, provides an opportunity for a renewal of East Asian thought.  In 
consideration of this, Blocker and Starling take a somewhat idiosyncratic metaphor, borrowed from 
H.G Wells' War of The Worlds  comparing, Westernisation to the Martian invasion of that novel, 
where 'the earthlings [East Asians] are invaded by a seemingly unstoppable foe, but the Martians 
[the westerners] are finally stricken where they stand by a microbe within [nihilism]’.163 In this way, 
Heidegger's thought, with its critique of Western philosophy, offers a unique historical chance for a 
far-reaching dialogue between East Asian and Western thinking.  This kind of dialogue would take 
place  at  a  deeper  level  than,  for  example,  the  interest  that  the  seventeenth-century  Jesuits  and 
Leibniz showed in Chinese thought, since, while they may have shown an admiration for certain 
Confucian virtues (ren) or concern for translating the Yijing, they would never have seriously called 
into question the important aspects of the ontological and metaphysical foundations of their own 
Western understanding (such as the belief in God).  The danger of Europeanisation, combined with 
the crisis of Western nihilism, can thus  also provide the hope ('saving power' in Heidegger's and 
Hölderlin's terms) for a global dialogue between traditions of thought that has the potential both to 
challenge the hegemony of Western metaphysics and to provide new possibilities for resisting the 
technocratic way of relating to beings.
Hence, there is a still a deep risk that Western technocratic reason may triumph globally and 
block  out  all  other  ways  of  thinking,  which  indeed  may  appear  the  more  likely  outcome  of 
Europeanisation. However, there is still a sense that the East Asian tradition of thought can provide 
alternatives to the system of the modern Western world, even if a distinct ‘East Asian world’ no 
longer exists as it once did. As such, Heidegger’s dialogue with the East Asian world is, as the 
162  N. Keiji  The Self Over-Coming of Nihilism Translated  by Graham Parks and Setsuko Aihara   State University of 
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Japanese  interlocutor  in  the  dialogue  states,  directed  ‘toward  a  transformation  of  thinking  -  a 
transformation which, however, cannot be established as readily as a ship can alter its course’.164  
Hence, rather than abolishing the process of Europeanisation or modern Western nihilism, 
what Heidegger offers is a continual transformation of thought through an ongoing dialogue with 
the East Asian world, a dialogue in which, in the words of Lin Ma and Jaap Van Brakel, the East 
Asian world, functions as 'an aid for Heidegger's path of thinking', while at the same time being 
'kept  at  an  enormous  distance'.165 At  the  same time Heidegger's  dialogue is  not  offering  direct 
hermeneutic  access  to  the  East  Asian  world  in  the  sense  of  Gadamer's  claim that  hermeneutic 
'understanding  is  always  the  fusion  of  … horizons  supposedly  existing  by  themselves'.166 For 
Heidegger,  such  a  fusion  would  deny  the  crucial  element  of  distance  that  is  exemplified,  as 
previously discussed, by iki. Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world is thus always based 
on this balance of distance and nearness. Hence, he both seeks to show the possibilities presented by 
the East Asian world, while at the same time allowing the East Asian tradition to remain radically 
separate and distinct from the Western world.
The written account in the ‘Dialogue On Language between a Japanese and Inquirer’ itself 
breaks off, somewhat ambiguously, with the statement: ‘it seems as if, though even we, even now, 
instead of speaking about language, had tried to take some steps along a course which entrusts itself 
to  the  nature  of  saying’.167 This  suggests  that  the  dialogue  is  incomplete,  thus  presenting  the 
possibility of a continued dialogue.  At the end of the dialogue, Heidegger, through the ‘Inquirer’, 
refers to the dialogue that ‘has been’ as ‘the gathering of what endures’.168  This phrase is difficult to 
interpret. However, it might be read as suggesting an ongoing dialogue with the East Asian world,  
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since  elsewhere,  Heidegger  refers  to  ‘the  inevitable  dialogue  with  the  East  Asian  world’.169 
Heidegger's ‘Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ can thus be read as a 
foundation for a further dialogue between the western and the East Asian world along the lines of 
the principles previously set out. Along such lines, the rest of this thesis will seek further to explore  
these possibilities of dialogue between Heidegger's thought and the East Asian world, particularly 
focusing on how aspects of East Asia can provide alternatives to the nihilism that Heidegger sees in 
the modern Western world.
Introduction to Heidegger and Daoism
Though  not  mentioned  directly  in  Heidegger's  ‘A Dialogue  on  Language  Between  a 
Japanese  and an Inquirer’ Heidegger’s  interest  in  Daoism can be seen as  a  part  of  his  overall 
dialogue with the East Asian world. It can be read as another part of his search for a different house 
of ‘Being’.  However, it is made less explicit than Heidegger’s relationship with Japanese thought in 
the  dialogue  between  the  Japanese  and  Inquirer.  There  is  no  work  in  which  Heidegger  talks 
extensively and explicitly about Daoist philosophy.  Ancient Chinese Daoism appears a more distant 
world to Heidegger than the Japanese world of the Edo period. 
However,  Daoism,  together  with  Confucianism,  is  one  of  the  most  ancient  schools  of 
Chinese philosophy, and it had a deep influence over the development of later schools, such as 
Zen/Chan Buddhism. Considering its ancient roots it could be equated with the ‘origin’ of the ‘East 
Asian  tradition’ in  the  way  that  Heidegger  understands  it  when  he  refers  to  the  ‘venerable 
beginnings’.170 As such, in Heidegger’s terms, the ancient Chinese thought of thinkers such as Laozi 
and Zhuangzi, might be read as providing the foundation for what Heidegger considers to be the 
East Asian world, in a similar way to the pre-Socratics or Plato in the West. Hence, in the dialogue, 
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when Heidegger discusses the emptiness in No-drama, he is in effect, and by his own standards,  
referring back to the understanding of emptiness set out in  Dao de Jing, although it is mediated 
through  the  development  of  Zen  Buddhism amongst  other  things.  In  Heidegger’s  own  terms, 
therefore, it is necessary to go back to the Daoist thinkers of ancient China to understand the East 
Asian world.  
It is definite that Heidegger clearly makes isolated references to the  Dao and the  Dao De 
Jing.  For example, in ‘The Thing’, Heidegger’s refers to the ‘jug’s void’ as being vital to the jug. 
This clearly parallels the Dao De Jing, Chapter 11, which states that in its nothingness consists the 
pot’s effectiveness;’171  and as such Heidegger appears to be alluding directly to Laozi, although he 
does  not  directly  acknowledges  it.  It  is  widely  accepted  that  Heidegger  often  makes  crucial 
influences appear less explicit in his writings. This can be observed in the role of Kierkegaard, 
whose  work  Heidegger  does  not  often  directly  mention,  but  in  Being  and  Time Kierkegaard's 
influence is clearly present in topics such as ‘the call’. Thus, it is possible to see that Heidegger 
often kept certain aspects of his work and influences concealed.
According  to  Otto  Pöggeler,  Heidegger’s  interest  in  Daoism  goes  back  at  least  to  the 
1930s.172  However, of central concern here is the relationship with Daoism of Heidegger’s post-war 
philosophy. It was during this period that Heidegger’s apparently most direct personal encounter 
with Chinese Daoist thought occurred: his meeting with Paul Xiao Shiyi (Hsiao Shih- I). Xiao Shiyi 
records that he and Heidegger had attempted to make a translation of the Dao de Jing into German 
in the summer of 1946.  However, they only translated eight of the chapters after working over the 
summer in 1946, of which none is still in existence. Yi Hsiao, however, states that ‘they exerted a 
significant influence on Heidegger’.173  Xiao Shiyi had first made his acquaintance with Heidegger 
in 1942. The former had previously translated the  Dao de Jing into Italian.  According to Shi Yi 
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Hsiao, Heidegger wished to translate the Dao De Jing, but admitted that, ‘as a European’, he found 
‘Lao  Tzu  in  many  ways  incomprehensible’.174  This  shows  the  previously  mentioned  residual 
problems of  distance  and translation  that  Heidegger  sees  as  inherent  in  any authentic  dialogue 
between the East Asian world and the West. 
 At the very heart of a Western understanding of Daoism must be the interpretation of Dao 
within a Western language and the question whether this can, in the final analysis, be possible. 
Heidegger acknowledges this when he directly discusses the translation of Dao in ‘On the Nature of 
Language’,  written  after  his  encounter  with  Xiao  Shiyi.   In  this  work,  Heidegger  suggests  an 
apparently literal translation of Dao as ‘way’, stating that, ‘The key word in Laotse’s [Laozi] poetic 
thinking is  [Dao],  which “properly speaking” means way. But  we are prone to  think of “way” 
superficially, as a stretch connecting two places. Our word “way” has all too rashly been considered 
unfit to name what [Dao] says’.175 The Dao in ordinary Chinese means ‘way’ or ‘road’.  However, 
the  use  of  Dao in  Laozi’s  writing  appears  radically  separated  from  ordinary  Chinese;  hence, 
translating Dao as ‘way’, while it may be literally correct, appears to fail to represent an important 
aspect of Laozi’s original meaning.  As such, it appeared an imprecise translation. He subsequently 
proceeded to reject what might be said to be the more revealing translations of the Dao as ‘reason, 
mind, raison, meaning, logos’.176  While such translations may reveal more about the nature of the 
Dao than  simply  “way”,  each  of  those  translations  is  deeply  weighted  by  its  prior  use  in  the 
tradition of Western philosophy, and in some sense still misses the full meaning of Dao in Chinese 
thought. It may therefore not be possible to truly translate the Chinese word Dao.  Hence, elsewhere 
in Heidegger’s Identity and Difference177, Heidegger lists the ‘Chinese [Dao]’ with the Greek ‘logos’ 
as words that cannot be decisively translated. This is consistent with Heidegger’s wish to leave part 
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of his relationship to Daoism concealed.  His understanding of the Dao will be looked at in greater 
detail subsequently.  However, it is significant to note here that Heidegger in his later works makes 
a number of notable references to ‘way’, not only in his title ‘On the Way into Language’, but also 
in his ‘Conversation on a Country Path’.178  Hence, it seems that the notion of ‘way’ means more to 
Heidegger than might commonly be understood, and for him can possibly be read as seeking to 
signify something akin to the Dao.
Hence, Heidegger is clearly aware of the Daoist tradition of thought and shows some degree 
of interest in the ‘Dao’ in his later writings. It would appear, too, that if Heidegger is to understand 
the ‘East Asian world’ from his own position, he would of necessity have to look into Daoism. 
Given these points, what is the relationship between Daoism and Heidegger’s thought?
Introduction to Daoism
The following sections of the thesis will examine Heidegger's thought primarily through the 
lens of Daoism. This will  be done in order to make sense of Heidegger's later thought,  and to 
furthermore show how East Asian thought and Daoism in particular can provide an alternative to 
the problem of technocratic Western nihilism.
The focus of the first three sections will be centred on the ontology of Daoism. The first two 
of these sections focus on the ontology of the Dao itself, in particular the nature of the Dao and its 
relation with Being as Seyn in Heidegger's thought. Starting with the immanence and transcendence 
of the Dao, this will be looked at in relation to the notion of the sacred in Heidegger. This section 
will seek to answer the central question: to what extent can Daoism provide a model for the sense of 
the sacred that the later Heidegger looked for as an alternative to traditional Western Platonism? 
The next section will look at ineffability in Daoism and Heidegger, focusing in particular on the role 
of language and poetic thought in. the two philosophies.
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Following on from this, but moving away from the Dao itself, the next section will interpret 
Heidegger's account of concealment and unconcealment through the yin-yang dichotomy.  I aim to 
show that Heidegger essentially sees the modern Western world as lacking a space for the yin, or the 
receptive.  As  such,  question  of  technology  within  Heidegger's  thought,  and  to  what  extent 
Heidegger's thought might be seen as Luddite, will also be considered.
The remaining sections of the thesis will move away from looking at Daoism chiefly as an 
ontology, to looking at Daoism as a way of living.  In this section, I aim to show how Daoism can 
present Heidegger with a model, or ethos, of how to live within the modern technocratic world. This 
will be done, firstly, through comparing Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit with Daoist notions of 
wu wei and ziran. The central questions that will be asked in that section are: to what extent is 
Heidegger's  thought fatalist  and what is a Heideggerian way to live in the modern world? Can 
Daoist  wu wei  provide a model of such a Heideggerian way to live within the modern Western 
world?
The  last  section  will  look  at  the  notion  of  non-doctrinal  religion  as  underlying  both 
Heidegger and Daoism. It will look at how Heidegger moves away from the traditional Western 
notion of religiosity, particularly that which is based around a fixed set of beliefs and scriptural  
authority; however, Heidegger still sought to preserve a sense of the sacred. I will explore whether 
or not Daoism can provide this alternative sense of non-doctrinal religion.
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Chapter 5 Heidegger, East Asia and the Sacred
Part 1: Daoism and Transcendence
Daoism and Plato's Forms
Traditionally, Daoism has often been seen as mystical in the sense that the Dao, as thinkers 
such as  Laozi  and Zhuangzi  understood it,  naturally  appears  as  something outside  of  ordinary 
understanding. This mysticism associated with the Chang Dao (eternal Dao) should not be thought 
of as equivalent to any kind of Platonic or Neo-Platonic mysticism which has tended to become 
associated with mystical thought in the West. 
Central to mysticism in the Platonic sense is the notion of transcendence by which is meant 
the rejection of the ordinary everyday world, associated with appearance and transitiveness to what 
is held to be really real, the world of the forms. These abstract ideas were held to be ontologically 
separated from the world as it appears, and as such, distinct from the transitory nature of the senses 
representing for the Platonists  the true reality.  Hence,  for example,  Plato would understand the 
Form of beauty as abstract, perfect beauty, divorced from any particular instance of beauty visible 
to the senses. Plato is therefore concerned to separate the eternal world of Forms, which, for Plato,  
is  the  ontologically  real  world,  from the  imperfection  and  decay  that  constitutes  the  world  of 
appearances.  For this reason Plato, through the  voice of the young Socrates in the Parmenides 
rejects that there are forms of ‘ hair and mud and dirt,  or anything else totally undignified and 
worthless’?179   This rejection of ‘mud’ and ‘dirt’ from the perfect world of forms would appear to 
be because 'mud and 'dirt' seem inseparable from the decay of the appearance. Therefore, Forms for 
Plato must be separated from the dirt of appearance.
Such a Platonic position is in clear contrast to when Zhuangzi is asked by Master Dong Go 
to give a specific example of where the  Dao is, to which he responds that it is ‘in this ant’.  In 
179  Plato  ‘Parmenides’  in The Complete Works of Plato  Edited by John M. Cooper  Translated by Mary Louise Gill 
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response to this, Master Dong Guo then asks, ‘is that the lowest point’? Zhuangzi continues to name 
several examples, culminating in ‘It’s [the Dao is] in shit and piss too’.180 Zhuangzi’s understanding 
of the  Dao, therefore,  is  radically removed from Plato’s  understanding of the transcendence of 
forms, in so far as Zhuangzi seeks to see the  Dao  precisely within that which Plato would have 
associated with the flux and decay of the world of the senses.  Hence while Zhuangzi states ‘you 
should not look for the Dao in anything specific’.181  The Dao should not be viewed in anyway as a 
separate higher world, ontologically divorced from the particulars. The Dao relates to the particular 
entities in the world in that it  'makes them full or empty, but is not defined by fullness or emptiness. 
It creates withering and decay, but it is not defined by withering or decay’182. In this way Dao is 
within each moment of the transitivity of the world.  The aim of the Daoist sage therefore is not to 
in any sense transcend to a world beyond the senses, but rather to see the  various changes and 
transformations of the world as Dao hence ‘the limitless arises out of the limited and the boundless 
arises out of the restricted’.183
The Dao and the World
Rejecting,  therefore,  the  notion of  the  Dao as  a  separate  higher  reality  that  is  radically 
distinct from the myriad of things in the world, what is the relationship between the Dao and each 
particular thing in the world that enables the sage to see the Dao in each of the myriad of things? 
How should the following passage in the Dao De Jing be read? 
Dao generates the One. The One generates the Two. The Two generates the
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 Three. The Three generates all things.184 
This may appear to suggest that  Dao, as understood in the  Dao De Jing, is similar to the 
causui sui or first cause, as a generative agent causing all things. This suggests that in some sense,  
the  Dao  is causally related to, but separate and ontologically distinct from, ‘all things’ which it 
causes, appearing more like Aquinas' understanding of God. The fundamental question, therefore, is 
whether such a view of the Dao as causally related to, but remaining ontologically distinct from, the 
world, is correct.
 While it is true that, at times, Dao does take on the role of the origin of all things, and as 
such may appear possibly similar to the first cause, as Cheng Hao clearly states, 'the  Dao has no 
opposite'.185 This means that for the Daoist, there is nothing that is separate from the Dao. A view of 
the Dao as  causui sui would thus appear to miss the point: the Dao as one, all-embracing, whole 
cannot be seen as a separate reality from the myriad of things, because for the Daoist,  there is  
nothing that is not Dao. Hence, a causal relationship between the Dao and the world as two distinct 
entities is not possible in Daoism. While it is true that the  Dao acts as the origin of all things, it 
should not be thought of as ‘a definite point, it can be seen as a constant beginning and that at the 
same time marks a continuous point of return’.186  David Cooper states, 'the Daoist' would reject the 
dualism of 'source and world',187 noting further that, 'not even notionally can the dao be imagined in 
the absence of the things it gives'.188 Hence, unlike the Christian God of Aquinas who is seen as an 
ontologically distinct agent, conceivable without having caused the world, the  Dao  can only be 
understood through the myriad of things. 
 Another possible way of understanding the Dao in relation to the world is as one over many, 
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a unity of all things, distinct from the multiplicity of everyday experience. Such an interpretation 
appears similar to the Indian tradition of Vedānta philosophy, where the aim of ‘spiritual practice’ is 
to achieve union with the true reality. Such a reading of the Dao as analogous to the Indian notion 
of Brahman, an undifferentiated unity, distinct from all particular things, has been popular in the 
West with writers such as Aldous Huxley. Wang Bi’s question, ‘those whose roots are more than 
one, can they be close to Dao?’189, appears to be consistent with this, suggesting that dwelling upon 
a multiplicity of things leads away from the oneness of the Dao.  Such a reading of Daoism seems 
to suggest that the more someone dwells upon the myriad of things, the further an individual moves 
away from the Dao. This would appear congruous with Richard Wilhelm’s interpretation of the Dao 
De Jing, in that ‘LaoZi is far from merely offering a theory for understanding the world. He wants 
to point a way out of the confusion of the phenomenal world, and into the eternal’.190 This suggests 
that, while the Dao is present in everything, the Dao is in truth the reality of things as a unity, and 
that their separation is an illusion. 
However, this presents a limited view of the Daoist tradition, emphasising the oneness of the 
Dao rather than the particularity of things. Such a reading of the  Dao would suggest that it is a 
whole that is more real than its parts. This view of the  Dao may appear to be supported by the 
following passage in the Dao De Jing, where the Dao is understood as
the one without opposite which is invisible, inaudible, unfathomable. It 
is the same One past and present; it embraces form and formless alike, being as 
well as none being. The One is therefore a unification of duality and multiplicity.
it is the One without opposite',191 
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This clearly suggests that  Dao is a unified whole underlying all particular things. From such a 
position,  it  may appear  natural  from this  to  assume that  the  Dao is  the  whole  rather  than  the 
particulars. It implies that Daoists favour the whole over the parts as the true Dao, in a way that is 
perhaps similar to the Vedantin that seeks union with Brahman.
This interpretation of the Dao, as one whole over many, is, however, a misrepresentation, as 
can be seen in a passage in Richard Wilhelm's translation of the Dao de Jing that reads, 
Heaven attained the One and became pure. Earth attained the One and became 
firm. The Gods attained the One and became powerful. The valley attained one 
and fulfilled itself.192  
This suggests that, rather than representing a loss of particularity, it is through the  Dao that each 
particular thing (gods, earth, etc.) gains its particularity. 
Concerning the  everyday world of  particulars,  Jonathan Star  has  translated  a  somewhat 
ambiguous passage in the first verse of the Dao De Jing, stating that ‘Dao and this world [the old 
Chinese word jiao in such a context meaning outer forms - manifestation] seem different, but the 
truth is they are one in the same’.193 Richard Wilhelm translates the same passage as 
‘therefore does the direction towards non existence lead to the sight of the 
miraculous essence, the direction towards existence to the sight of spatial limitations. 
Both are one in origin and differ only in name’.194 
This can be interpreted as follows: While from the position of  Dao De Jing, the  jiao may 
appear distinct from the Dao at first, with jiao as mere manifestation and the Dao as underlying it, 
192  Ibid  p. 44
193  Lao Zi  Dao De Jing  The Definitive Edition Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin New York 2001 p. 14 
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ultimately,  the two should be understood as the same thing.  Hence,  while the  Dao may appear 
initially  different  from  particular  things  in  the  world,  ultimately,  the  Dao and  the  world  are 
conceived of as the same. This means that while the Dao is understood as ‘really real’,195 the reality 
of the  Dao does not imply that particular things are less real. Rather each particular entity in the 
world gets its particularity through the Dao and thus it is not necessary to reject the particular to get 
to the Dao. Hence, it is incorrect to view the jiao (everyday) world as simply an unreal or dreamlike 
shadow of the Dao. The goal of Daoist practice is rather to ‘discover unity with the Dao within that 
very particularity, within the flux and flow of existence itself’.196 This means that the aim of Daoism 
is to see everyday things as the Dao; and thus, ‘our daily life gains its significance by being rooted 
in a deeper harmony, or underlying reality’.197 
It  is  in this  sense that  Daoist  philosophy might  be thought  to be both transcendent  and 
immanent, in that the Dao is both ‘limitless’ and in all things. This is what can be called ‘organic 
mysticism’, according to Joseph Needham,198 as distinct from Plato’s transcendental mysticism’. 
This ‘organic mysticism’ is concerned with cultivating a deeper disclosure of the everyday world, 
rather than transcending to a higher realm beyond it. 
The aim of Daoist thought and practice can thus be understood as learning to see the world 
in this way. This can be seen in the Guo Xiang commentary on Zhuangzi: 
The mind of the sage penetrates to the utmost the perfect union of yin and
 yang and understands most clearly the wonderful principle of the myriad of things. 
Therefore he can identify himself with changes and harmonize with transformations, 
and finds everything all right wherever he may go. He embraces all things.199.
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What marks the mind of the sage as apart from the mind of the ordinary person is therefore, 
the sage's identification of the Dao within each particular thing within the world; and he is thus able 
to 'embrace all things'.
 
Dao as Primordial Harmony 
Central  to  the  notion  of  understanding  Dao  as  manifest  within  the  everyday  world  is 
primordial harmony. It is this primordial harmony that rests upon the interconnectedness of the Dao. 
This interconnectedness in Daoism is based on the underlying unity of the Dao, while it is in each 
particular  thing  of  the  myriad  of  things.  Hence,  the  Daoist  views  each  particular  thing  as  a 
manifestation of the one single Dao.
 
In this unity everything breaks through the shell of itself and interfuses every 
other thing. Each identifies with every other. The one is many and the many
is one.200
 This does not mean that the significance of the particular thing in the world is in any sense 
denied or even observed as less real. It is rather understood as a present manifestation of  Dao, 
which remains a whole that is underlying all such particulars.  The Daoist sage does not  see the 
world as a collection of particulars, but as an interconnected whole, with the Dao both underlying it 
as a pre-established harmony and being manifest within each of the particulars in the world. 
 Such a way of seeing can also be perceived in the tradition of Chinese landscape painting.  
As Aldous Huxley stated, it is ‘only in the Far East that landscape painters consciously regarded 
their art as religious’.201  This is because landscape is understood not merely as the result of the 
200  Chang Chung-Yuan Creativity and Taoism: A Study of Chinese Philosophy, Art and Poetry   Julian Press. Inc   New 
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Dao, or as causally related to the Dao, but is essentially the  Dao itself. This clearly differs from 
Plato's views on the ontological status of art in The Republic, where art is a copy of a world that is 
itself only a copy of the higher world of Forms. Neither is the Daoist artist attempting to represent 
the landscape as a realist portrait of an actual landscape, seeking to show part of the landscape 
(rocks, trees etc.) exactly as it would appear to a passer by in everyday life. The aim of the Daoist 
artist is rather to present the landscape as the Dao. That is to show the Dao as present with each of 
the particulars of the landscape, precisely through the artistic sense of underlying harmony with the 
whole.
   The Dao, however, is not simply reducible to the landscape itself in a purely naturalistic 
way. This can be discerned in the element of ambiguity in Daoist writings. The Dao often appears 
enigmatic,  as  observed  in  the  statement,  'Dao  is  both  named  and  nameless'.202 This  could  be 
understood as the Dao being both nameless and beyond each particular thing, and as named in each 
particular thing (the ineffability and namelessness of the Dao will be looked at more deeply later 
on).
 It is in this sense that the Dao is both immanent and transcendent, and it is in this way that 
the  Dao and the  de (德 ) are related. The  de has variously been translated as 'virtue' or 'life' by 
Richard  Willhelm.  Virtue  appears  closer  to  the  Confucian  usage  of  de,  in  the  Daoist  sense. 
However, de can be read as the manifestation of the Dao in each particular thing. 
Katrin Froese states that,
De does not refer to a kind of consistent singularity suggested by the term
 Substance, for it is part of the dynamic flux of the Dao. Instead of insisting 
on one translation at the expense of others, I argue that all of them should be 
borne in mind. If one translates it as life, then we might lose sight of the emphasis
 that de intends to give to the particularity of things. If one translates it simply as 
202  Lao Tzu  Dao De Jing: the Definitive Edition Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcha Penguin New York 2001 p. 14 
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particularity, then one may ignore the word's reference to the overlapping 
processes of growth, which constitute the unity implied by the term “life”. 
De refers to a kind of specificity that emerges out of  process and therefore 
it cannot be understood without the corresponding notion of the Dao.203
As such, the  Dao, cannot be truly thought of without the  de, and the  de cannot be truly 
understood without the  Dao. This further helps to make sense of certain ambiguities. At various 
points, Daoist philosophers refer to each particular thing as having 'a  Dao'.  Hence, in Zhuangzi, 
there is the question, 'is there a  Dao for the thief?' the response being, ‘what profession is there 
without its dao?’204 In this context, the Dao can be understood as the way, or method, of each thing, 
what makes the thing itself.  This is because the thing is a manifestation of the Dao as an underlying 
ontological  reality.  It  is  in  this  way that  the  Dao is  both  manifest  and  immanent  within  each 
particular  thing,  yet  also remains  transcendent  and irreducible  to  anything particular  within the 
world.
Hence, the  Dao is both immanent and transcendent, in that it is both ‘one’ ‘transcendent 
reality’ and is present in each one of the myriad of things, including the apparently lowest things. In  
this way, Daoism rejects the notion of appeal to a higher reality that is distinct from, and even 
conceivable without, the everyday world, while at the same time it rejects a simple reductionist 
approach to things in the world,  which would view them simply as particulars with no greater 
significance.
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Part 2 Heidegger, Daoism, Shintoism and the Sacred
The preceding discussion raised the possibility that Daoism may provide an alternative to 
what Heidegger held to be the dominant tradition of Western metaphysics, by offering a different 
understanding of the sacred that would break away from both Platonism and Nietzschean nihilism. 
Heidegger is thus seeking to regain a notion of 'immanent transcendence', which he considers has 
been lost within the Western tradition. 
Can Daoism provide such an alternative understanding of the sacred based on 'immanent 
transcendence'?  Crucially,  as  stated  in  the previous  section,  the  Dao,  in  the writings  of  Daoist 
thinkers such as Laozi and Zhuangzi, is understood as not only present within 'the myriad of things'  
in the world, but also as transcendent. Daoism thus appears to provide a way of seeing the sacred as  
distinct from a traditional Western understanding of the higher realm of existence. It has already 
been suggested that such a reading of Daoism may provide a resolution for the perceived crisis of 
Western nihilism.
For Halls and Ames, the West's disenchantment with transcendence need not lead
 to nihilism and anguish, as it is often experienced, but rather as a liberating episode
 in Western thought which opens the possibility of bridging certain long-ignored or 
long-despised strands of Chinese philosophy into a new inter-cultural dialogue.205 
Can Daoism play a similar role for Heidegger? This section will focus on this question; 
firstly, by looking at a comparison between sections of Heidegger's later work, particularly his essay 
'The Thing', and the Daoist notion of the sacred. Subsequently, the question will be posed whether 
in fact Shintoism may provide a better model than philosophical Daoism for the sense of the sacred 
which the later Heidegger is searching. Through looking at these issues, the section will seek to 
205  J. J. Clarke The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought  Routledge London 2003 Page 160
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show what it means for Heidegger to regain a disclosure of the ineffable within the world. As such, 
in Heidegger's later thought, Daoism will need to provide an alternative understanding of ontology 
that is neither Platonic nor Nietzschean. 
 Being and beings: Dao and the Myriad of Things
There  is  a  proposal  put  forward  by  Katrin  Froese  in  Nietzsche,  Heidegger  and  Daoist  
Thought206, that the Dao can be understood as equivalent to 'Being' in Heidegger's philosophy.  This 
is a focal point that will be referred to again subsequently, posing the central question as to whether 
or not Froese is right in making such a claim. To answer this question it is necessary to look further 
into the relationship between 'Being and beings' in Heidegger's later philosophy.
In  his  later  philosophy,  Heidegger  clearly  does  not  reject  the  significance  of  particular 
beings. This is shown in essays such as 'The Thing' and 'Building Dwelling Thinking', which do not 
focus simply on creating an abstract ontology of 'Being' as either  Seyn or  Sein, but rather look at 
beings in their particularity. At the same time, Being is not neglected.  The central point of the two 
essays is not that Heidegger has abandoned Being in favour of particular things, but rather Being, or 
the fourfold, is manifest in such particular everyday entities as the wine jug or the bridge. Hence, to  
gain an understanding of Being one must look at beings. 
Heidegger’s  thesis  is  that,  in  the  modern  world,  'Being'  has  essentially  been  separated 
completely from 'beings' and has been abandoned in modern Western thought. By looking at beings 
in this way Heidegger is seeking to redress this balance. The relationship between the  Dao and 
world, or the Dao and the myriad of things in the Dao De Jing therefore appears to provide a good 
model for Heidegger in that the aim of Daoist thought might be considered as seeing Dao amidst 
the world. A phrase in Jonathon Star’s translation of the Dao De Jing reads, ‘Dao and the world, but 
in truth they are one and the same.  The only difference is what we call them.’207  Dao amidst the 
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world  might  subsequently  be  seen  as  parallel  to  Heidegger's  efforts  to  think  of  'Being'  amidst 
'beings'. Western philosophy’s continual misuse of the ontological difference between beings and 
'being' is a point of reference that will be referred to in a later section.
Immanence and Transcendence in Heidegger's ‘The Thing’
In order to investigate such a possible reading, this section focuses on the later Heidegger's 
short but significant essay ‘The Thing’, which explores further the notion of the sacred as associated 
with ‘gathering’, thus extending it beyond that in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’. It focuses on a 
wine jug. The wine jug clearly lacks the prominence that the ancient Greek temple would have to 
the Greek world, and such an object would not normally be considered as a 'great work of art'. In 
Heidegger's essay ‘The Thing’, however, it is the apparently ordinary wine jug that becomes the 
central focal point for the sacred.  
  As such,  ‘The Thing’ can be interpreted as  an attempt to  think through the notion of 
immanent transcendence. Heidegger's essay aims to get away from the impoverished relationship to 
'the thing', which is the loss of the sense of the sacred within the everyday. Hence, Heidegger draws 
attention to the 'nearness' of the 'wine jug' , in order to show that it is something that can easily be  
encountered within daily life and that it  might therefore easily be overlooked.  Crucially, in the 
modern Western world, Heidegger calls this the 'annihilation of the thing’,208 by which he means 
that the modern world denies the sacred within the everyday. This is because ‘the thing’ is reduced 
to simply another commodity in the flow of resources, and is therefore interpreted only in terms of 
its use and value in the world. For example, in the modern world, the wine jug might be seen as just 
another consumer product.  It has the role of holding wine as another resource standing in reserve 
that  is  waiting  to  be  consumed by people,  who in  turn  become 'human  resources',  themselves 
standing in reserve in the process of production and consumption. 
208  M. Heidegger  'The Thing'  in  Poetry, Language, Thought  Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New 
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What does it mean for Heidegger to recover this sense of the sacred within the world and to 
view 'the thing' in a non-technocratic way? While Heidegger does not want to view 'the thing' as 
merely something for use, at the same time he does not wish to view 'the thing' in the sense of a 
being  that  is  'present-at-hand'.209 He  is  not  concerned  with  cataloguing  a  series  of  objective 
properties of 'the thing', such as its colour, shape, etc., as distinct from its role within the world.  
Rather,  he  gives  'the  thing'  a  deeper  significance  as  a  'gathering',  by  which  Heidegger  means 
'thinging, the thing stays the united four, earth and sky, divinities and mortals, in the simple onefold 
of their  self-unified fourfold'.  210 Thus, through its  relationship to the fourfold,  'the thing'  gains 
greater significance than its mere ordinary use value.
However, Heidegger's treatment of the wine jug in ‘The Thing’ differs radically from Plato's 
treatment of beauty in The Symposium, in that, for Plato, a beautiful object in the world is given its 
significance through its relationship to the perfect form of beauty.  Once the ideal philosopher king 
has  gained  knowledge  of  the  true  form of  beauty,  the  particular  will  be  discarded.  For  Plato, 
dwelling upon a particular, immanent instance of something such as beauty or a wine jug leads 
away from the transcendental world of forms that, according to Plato, should be the true goal of 
contemplation. Heidegger would reject any view of the wine jug in ‘The Thing’ that would view it 
simply as a vehicle to be used as a way into a higher reality. The significance of the wine jug is not 
because it corresponds to a higher reality beyond itself. In contrast to Plato, Heidegger, is concerned 
with the immediacy of the particular wine jug. This approach to the wine jug also differs from the 
view of the church as a building in Christianity, as it is understood in the Western tradition of onto-
theology.   The church  is  here  seen as  in  the  world,  but  points  to  the  'Christian  God'  who,  as 
understood within the tradition of 'onto-theology', is beyond the world, acting as first cause of the 
world, although always remaining outside of the world. By contrast the 'thing' for Heidegger acts as 
a point bringing together the different elements of the 'world',  'gods',  'mortals',  'earth'  and 'sky'. 
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While it may be the case that each of the four-fold in Heidegger is transcendent in the sense of not 
being completely graspable, it can also be held that none of the four-fold is transcendent in the 
sense  that  the  God  of Thomas  Aquinas is  transcendent,  as  being  wholly  beyond  the  world. 
Heidegger's  approach  in  ‘The  Thing’, when  viewed  from  certain  Christian  and  particularly 
protestant perspectives, may thus appear potentially close to idolatry, in that the disclosure of the 
sacred in ‘The Thing’ is directly attached to a particular being within the world.  
In this  way, the wine jug as the 'thing'  can be thought of as an example of Heidegger's  
treatment of immanent transcendence, since it is a disclosure of the sacred within the everyday, in 
that the sense of the sacred in ‘The Thing’ is derived from a way of seeing a particular being in the 
world. Without such a relation to things, such a disclosure of the sacred would not be possible. 
Elsewhere in his writings, Heidegger gives other ‘things’ a similar status, in particular the 'bridge' in 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’.211 
 
Organic Mysticism in Heidegger and Daoism
This  presents  the  possibility  of  a  comparison  between  this  treatment  of  the  'sacred' 
Heidegger’s work and the Daoist tradition, in that for both, this sense of the sacred is based on a 
way of seeing beings in the world. As has already been stated, Heidegger's essay ‘The Thing’ can be 
interpreted as implicitly referring to the  Dao De Jing, Chapter 11. However, can the relationship 
between ‘The Thing’ and Daoism be read at a deeper level? Might the relationship which Heidegger 
wishes to cultivate towards 'the thing' be understood in a similar way to the relationship that the  
Daoist is seeking towards the world, in experiencing the Dao in the myriad of things? Both Daoism 
and Heidegger are presenting a kind of 'organic mysticism’ in so far as they are not seeking the 
discovery of a separate higher reality, but are rather concerned with gaining a particular relationship 
to the world.  Heidegger in ‘The Thing’ is attempting to gain what can be called an 'enchantment' of 
211  M. Heidegger   'Building, Dwelling  Thinking'  in Poetry, Language and Thought Translated Albert Hofstadter 
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the everyday world, 'the thing' being a kind of 'poetic revealing' which  Heidegger refers to in ‘The 
Question Concerning Technology’.212
This phraseology is a point where some resonance between Being and Dao can be felt. It 
may be that 'Being' as Seyn in ‘The Thing’ could be understood in a similar way to Dao in Chinese 
landscape painting. It is true that in ‘The Thing’, Heidegger does not refer directly to 'Being', giving 
the appearance that he has abandoned the ontology as a  central  concern.  However,  it  could be 
interpreted  that  'Being'  as  Seyn in  ‘The  Thing’ is  made  manifest  through  the  four-fold,  gods, 
mortals, earth and sky, in that Seyn gives each of the four-fold its distinction, while at the same time 
bringing them together. The sense of  Seyn can thus be seen as disclosed in each of the four-fold. 
Thus, it could be said to give the gods their divinity, mortals their mortality etc., while at the same 
time it allows the four-fold to come together and be manifest in the interplay between each of them. 
This parallels how the  Dao  in the Chinese landscape painting is present within each part of the 
landscape as well as manifest within the underlying harmony of the landscape.
 Interconnectedness, in this way, plays a profound role in both Heidegger and Daoism.  In 
‘The  Thing’,  Heidegger  states  that  it  is  not  possible  to  think  of  one  of  the  four-fold  without 
implicitly thinking of the other three.  Being, therefore, can be said to be disclosed in each one of 
the four-fold that by its very nature relates to the other, but is not reducible to any of the four-fold.  
The way that this is expressed by Heidegger offers a comparison with Zhuangzi's passage:
Does Heaven move? Does the Earth stand still? Do the sun and moon argue
about where to go? Who is Lord over all of this? Who binds and controls all?
Who doing nothing makes all this be?213 
This passage in Zhuangzi may be read as interpreting the  Dao as the unspoken harmony 
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existing between things. In the case of both Heidegger and Zhuangzi, 'Being' as  Seyn or the  Dao 
stands both disclosed and manifest in the myriad of things, but is not reducible to them.  Rather, it is 
in some sense manifest within the interplay between them.  Katrin Froese states that
 the Dao makes interconnections possible. The Dao is manifest in the
 interconnectedness between the myriad of things, while remaining un-graspable 
and can be understood as an ungraspable unity and harmony between the myriad 
of things’; ...., 'whenever we feel a sense of oneness with the universe, this is
 an experience of the Dao. And yet we human beings are but one of the ten thousand
 things; we can never fully comprehend the unity of the Dao.214
‘The Thing’ and Daoism
There is, however, a crucial difference between the interpretation of the sacred as presented 
by Heidegger in ‘The Thing’ and Zhuangzi's understanding of the Dao within ordinary entities, such 
as the ant. This difference can be observed in the nature of 'the thing'.  What is fundamental in 
Heidegger's assessment of 'the thing' is that, by its very nature, it is treated as something special and 
distinct, while the Dao in the Daoist tradition is understood in some sense as present in everything, 
including, for example, an ant.215  Zhuangzi's  Dao is therefore all-encompassing and therefore the 
aim of Zhuangzi's thought is to cultivate this ordinary everyday world as  Dao. Such a poetic and 
mystical sense of the world is expressed by Zhuangzi's Master Chi.
   
 'The vast breath of the universe, this is called Wind.
            Sometimes it is unmoving; when it moves it makes the ten thousand 
            openings resound dramatically. Have you not heard it, like a terrifying gale?
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            Mountains and forests are stormed by it, great trees, a hundred spans round 
with dips and hollows, are like noses, like mouths, like ears, like sockets,        
  like cups, like mortars, like pools, like gullies, sounding like a crashing wave,  
  a whistling arrow, a screech; sucking, shouting, barking, wailing, moaning,
             the winds ahead howling yeeh, those behind crying yooh, light breezes
             making gentle sounds, while the typhoon creates a great din. When the 
             typhoon has passed, all goes quiet again. Have you not witnessed this 
            disturbance settle down?216
Such a description of a mystical sense of natural imagery does refer to any transcendent 
power, or entity that is set outside of nature, but rather on an awareness of the mysterious within the 
ordinary.  This sense of the mystical within the ordinary for Zhuangzi may occasionally be manifest 
in particular entities such as for example in the shrine tree 217 which Zhuangzi does not refer using 
the Chinese word  shen  神 loosely meaning god or deity. This alludes to a shamanistic notion of 
sacred associated with the divine tree, to which Zhuangzi is respectful towards, however he does 
not look look in more great detail at the notion of shen.
 Heidegger, however, would not want 'the thing' to be thought of as simply equivalent to 
anything. If the wine jug that he refers to in ‘The Thing’ were to be replaced or substituted, even for 
an apparently identical jug, the sense of thing-hood would be lost.  Heidegger would,  therefore, 
hesitate to extend ‘thing-hood’ as far as Zhuangzi wishes to extend the Dao, as all encompassing. 
The ‘thing’ in Heidegger occupies a more prominent position than the rest of what is disclosed. It is 
'everyday', but stands out as a unique point.  
Hence, while there may be nothing particularly notable in the structure of the wine jug in its 
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appearance that marks it out,  Heidegger gives the wine jug as a ‘thing' a unique position in relation 
to the four-fold. Heidegger is not merely concerned with the role that the wine jug occupies within 
the world, but with the particularity of the wine jug itself. The danger Heidegger sees in the modern 
world is that 'the thing' becomes lost within the 'uniform distancesslessness' of the modern world,218 
where there is no particular sphere that is distinct as the sacred. 'The Thing', in order to resist this  
process, cannot be allowed to slip into the background along with everything else, but must stand 
out. In this regard, it would not be possible for Heidegger to read everything as a ‘thing’. Zhuangzi's 
position, in contrast to Heidegger’s, appears to suggest a world in which everything is seen as in 
some sense a 'thing', the Dao being manifest in everything. Hence, while there is a strong parallel 
between Heidegger and Daoism in the sense of organic mysticism (they both focus on the sense of 
the sacred within everyday life), the prominence that Heidegger gives to 'the thing' does not appear 
to be paralleled within Daoism.
Shintoism and the Sacred in Heidegger
 Shintoism,  particularly  Shrine  Shintoism,  however,  provides  an  alternative  model  for 
interpreting Heidegger's account of the sacred in ‘The Thing’. This may appear to be an unorthodox 
interpretation, at first. It is true that Heidegger never appears to explicitly refer to Shintoism in any 
of his writings, and he may not have had direct awareness of Shintoism. However, Benjamin D. 
Crowe has noted, with reference to Heidegger and the Greeks, 'With regard to historical realities, 
such as Greek culture, Heidegger's approach is to view them as repeatable possibilities of existence, 
as  paradigms that,  when appropriated as possibilities  for the future,  cast  a critical  light  on the 
present situation'.219   Shinto could therefore also be understood as a possible paradigm, providing a 
potential  alternative to Western modernity.  Shinto presents a pre-reflective understanding of the 
sacred.  Central  to  Shintoism  is  not  a  rationalised  theological  account  of  the  divine.   More 
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specifically, it is based on a primal notion of the sacred.
Central  to  this  notion  of  the  sacred  in  Shintoism are  the  kami.  The  word kami,  often 
translated into English as 'gods', is a difficult concept to render outside Japanese. Perhaps the notion 
of 'kami' might be held to be closer to the Indian notion of deva, although there are still differences. 
The understanding of  kami in Shintoism is radically separated from the Western notion of 'onto-
theology'.  'In  Shinto  there  is  no  absolute  deity  that  is  the  creator  and  ruler  of  all.’ 220  Even 
Amaterasu Omikami, 'the Sun Goddess, the kami who brightens the world with the virtue of the sun 
and is commonly regarded as the supreme kami of Shinto, consults the opinion of the other kami, 
calls upon them for help and at times makes concessions to them'.221 The kami are not looked to as a 
source of absolute authority, nor as the origin of all things. 
The kami in Shintoism also do not often appear as personal beings in a conventional sense. 
While it is true that there are paintings and statues of  kami in the Japanese Shinto tradition, this 
representation was done largely under the influence of Japanese Buddhism; generally, the kami are 
not represented. Lafcadio Hearn describes the presence of the  kami as 'a vibration',222 rather than 
anything concrete. Although in certain Shinto myths, such as those shown in the writings of the 
Kojike and Nihongi, the kami are represented in a more anthropomorphic form, this is only done for 
certain major  kami, such as  Amaterasu, the sun goddess and her brother  Susanoo, the storm god. 
Other kami are portrayed as more elemental beings. As John K. Nelson states, 'the practitioners of 
Shinto  hold  that  anything  we  can  see  or  sense  that  is  full  of  power,  mysterious,  marvellous, 
uncontrolled,  strange,  or  simply  beyond  our  abilities  of  comprehension  is  what  constitutes  a 
kami'.223  This means that what is essential to the kami in Shintoism is beyond human understanding 
and has the ability to inspire awe, as expressed by Robert S. Gall, who relates that the Japanese  
Shintoist philosopher Motoori Norinaga 'characterises the kami exclusively in terms of their ability 
220  S. Ono in collaboration with W. P. Woodard  Shinto:the kami Way  Tuttle Publishing Boston 2004 Page 8     
221  Ibid       
222  Lafcadio Hearn  Gleanings In Buddha Fields Kegan Paul London 1897 Page 5
223  J. K Nelson    A Year In the Life of a Shinto Shrine  University of Washington Press Seattle 1997 p.27 
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to inspire awe and wonder'.224 This sense of awe that cannot be brought into human understanding 
is, for Shintoism, what marks out the  kami from the ordinary. As Daniel M. P. Shaw states, this 
sense of awe is in some ways 'comparable to western aesthetic idea of the sublime'.225 Such an 
interpretation of the Shinto kami along western aesthetic lines may be in danger of failing to convey 
the full sense of the experience of kami. It does, however, provide a hint of the sense of the kami.  
Shintoism in effect extends what in the West is called the notion of the sublime, a stage further to 
see it as an experience of the divine. This experience can often be unsettling and can be thought of 
in Heideggerian terms as Umheimlich (un-homely/ un-canny or out of the ordinary).
This  understanding  of  kami within  Shintoism  offers  the  basis  for  a  comparison  with 
Heidegger's  understanding  of  the  'gods'  or  'divinities'  referred  to  in  ‘The Thing’.   Clearly,  the 
absence of the gods is a central concern of Heidegger's later writings, as can particularly be seen in 
'Why Poets'. The notion of 'gods' in Heidegger is less looked at and discussed. Some commentators 
on the later Heidegger give less significance to the role of the 'gods'.  Young, for instance, plays 
down the role of the 'gods' in the later Heidegger, offering the equation of the 'gods with the 'divine 
laws', or 'heritage'.226  Such a reading would present the gods in Heidegger as a poetic metaphor. 
However, in ‘The Age of the World  Picture’, Heidegger rejects anthropocentric understandings of 
the 'gods' based on 'historiographical' or 'psychological' interpretation of 'myth', as symptomatic of 
the flight  of the 'gods'  in  the modern world.   Benjamin D. Crowe states  that  'the reduction of  
religion to “culture”,  to an adornment affixed to an intrinsically unsatisfying way of life, is [a]  
central aspect of what Heidegger calls the flight of the gods'.227  This reading of 'gods' fails to see 
the otherness and mystery that Heidegger attributes to the 'gods'. Indeed, it is this mystery attached 
to the 'gods' that for Heidegger might be said to give them their significance as 'holy', standing out 
224  R. S Gall 'kami and Daimon: Cross-Cultural Reflection on What Is Divine’  in  Philosophy East and West, Voumel 
49 No.1 January 1999 : University of Hawaii p. 64
225  D. M. P. Shaw ‘Shinto and a Twenty First Century Japanese Ecological Attitude’.in Nature Space and The Sacred:: 
Edited  by S. Bergmann, P.M. Scott. M. Jansdotter Samuelsson and H. Bedford-Strohm  . Published Ashgate 2009 
p. 312
226 J. Young   Heidegger’s Later Philosophy Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002 Page 95 to 98
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of the ordinary.  
Kami, as understood by Shintoism, may thus be used to interpret Heidegger's notion of the 
gods, in that they provide a model of the disclosure of the awesome and mysterious within the 
world. Gail Stenstad notes, 'the usefulness of the Japanese notion of  kami  in understanding the 
divinities of the four-fold is that it helps us keep clear that the divinities are divinities only as they 
occur in the gathering movement of thinging'.228 Along these lines, the gods as  kami  in the later 
Heidegger can be understood as the presence of awe-inspiring mystery manifest within the world 
that stands out of the ordinary. Hence, the 'gods' in the later Heidegger are beckoning messengers of 
the 'godhead', while the 'godhead' may be equated with 'Being' as 'Seyn' mentioned previously. This 
means that the gods should be understood as the manifestation of mystery in the world, underlying 
all existence. Thus, in order to be gods, they must be beyond the understanding of mortals.
The Shinto Shrine and Heidegger
 In  Shrine  Shintoism,  the  disclosure  of  the  sacred  is  associated  with  particular  places, 
generally called jinja in Japanese and usually translated into English as 'shrine', although there are 
more specific Japanese names for the types of place associated with different  kami. This sacred 
shrine is held to be the dwelling-place of kami, such as, for example, a particular tree: 'these trees 
are believed to be the special abode of some kami',229 while Mount Fuji is held as the dwelling place 
of Konohanasakuya-hime, the goddess of blossom and symbol of a delicate earthly life. The shrine 
is both built around a natural thing and also marked off in some sense from the ordinary world,  
usually by the torii gates (the entrance gates to the shrine) or in the case of the sacred tree, by the 
shimenawa or  sacred  rope.  A wide  variety  of  different  places  can  be  regarded  as  'sacred'  in 
Shintoism,  including,  trees,  mountains,  or  waterfalls,  and  there  can  also  be  a  home shrine,  or 
kamidana - kami shelf. The sacred in the shrine is always thus in some sense attached to a particular 
228  G. Stenstad  Transformations: Thinking After Heidegger  Page 209-210. Footnote referring to page 89: University 
of Wisconsin Press Wisconsin  2006
229  S. Ono in collaboration with W. P. Woodard  Shinto:the kami Way  Tuttle Publishing Boston 2004  Page 98
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place but, at the same time, the kind of place that can be sacred is quite varied.  Hence, the Shinto 
shrine is  not merely an accident  of place,  but is  always deeply attached to a  particular natural 
setting. The central point of a Shinto shrine might be thought of as in some sense everyday and 
natural, but also unique and special. Considering this, it therefore seems very similar to the wine jug 
in Heidegger. Kasulis emphasises this point, stating that, by visiting such places in Shintoism, 'the 
person's  holographic to all  reality becomes manifest',230 meaning that  in  visiting the shrine,  the 
relationship between the individual, the kami and the underlying sense of the sacred are displayed 
and experienced. This clearly resonates with the interplay between the four-fold in Heidegger.  
 Along such lines, the shrine can be thought of as equivalent to ‘gathering’ in Heidegger. 
Shrines in Shintoism are understood as the dwelling places of the kami, as well as meeting places 
for people, which are attached to a particular natural setting.  It is not possible to truly understand 
the shrine without this natural element.  
Shrines themselves cannot be considered without some relation to the natural
beauty which traditionally has surrounded them. Shrine worship is closely 
associated with a keen sense of the beautiful - a mystic sense of nature.231. 
While  in  modern  Shinto  shrines,  it  may not  always be  possible  to  preserve  the  natural 
setting, the link with nature is still fundamental to the Shinto experience of the sacred. In this way, 
the role of nature within a Shinto shrine might be said to be similar to 'earth' and 'sky' for Heidegger. 
The shrine in Shintoism can be understood, in effect, as the point at which the four-fold meet.
In conclusion it  is  possible  to say that,  in different  ways,  Shintoism and Daoism, taken 
together, can provide a means by which Heidegger can gain an understanding of the sacred outside 
of the Western tradition. They both show an understanding of immanence and transcendence that is 
230  T. P Kasulis  Shinto The Way Home: Page 23 University of Hawai'i Press Honolulu 2004  p. 23
231   S. Ono in collaboration with W. P. Woodard  Shinto: the kami Way Tuttle Publishing Boston 2004     Page 97
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outside of the Western 'onto-theology'. Daoism, through the sense of the Dao as present within the 
myriad of things that is in a way similar to Heidegger's disclosure of Being as Seyn in the world; 
and  Shintoism,  through  the  sacred  dwelling  of  the  kami  in  the  shrine  that  is  similar  to  the 
Heideggerian notion of gathering and 'the thing'. Both in different ways provide this sense of the 
sacred in the everyday. Thus, it is possible to see how, for Heidegger, such an understandings of the 
sacred outside the Western tradition can provide the possibility of a way out of the impoverishment 
that he sees in the modern Western world.
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Chapter 6 Language and Ineffability in Daoism and Heidegger's Thought
Part 1: The Ineffability of the Dao
 
 Besides  its  immanence  and  transcendence,  another  crucial  attribute  of  the  Dao is  its 
ineffability. This is based on the first words in the opening chapter of the Dao de Jing: Dao ke dao,  
fei  chang  dao',  which  is  translated  as  'the  Dao that  can  be  expressed  is  not  the  true  Dao’232 
(Wilhelm) or, 'the way that can be walked, is not the true way’233 (Star).
The implication of this often quoted passage is that language is unable to express the Dao as 
'eternal Dao'. Hence, anything that can be referred to in language is not the true, eternal Dao. It is 
along such lines that Zhuangzi claims that, 'to be questioned about the  Dao and to give answer 
means that you don't know about the Dao'.234
  Why is it the case that any attempt to express the Dao within language automatically fails? 
The answer is that all language is based on distinctions. For example, a word such as ‘tree’ picks out 
an object that is a tree from other entities in the world that are not trees, while a concept such as 
‘goodness’ denotes something as good as opposed to things that are not good. Words only have 
meaning through distinction and, hence, are only suitable for delineating items with form in the 
world.  For  this  reason,  they  are  incapable  of  enunciating  the  eternal  Dao which  has  no  form. 
Therefore, no words can express the Dao. Along such lines, Wang Bi states that 'the Dao that can be 
spoken and the name that can be named which refer to the denoting of things and making of shapes, 
are  not  eternal.  Therefore,  [the eternal]  cannot be spoken of and named'.235 The eternal  Dao is 
therefore treated as formless, with the result that any words create the danger of reifying the Dao, 
232 Laozi The Tao Te Ching  Translated by Richard Wilhelm  Penguin Arkana London 1989   p. 27
233 Laozi The Tao Te Ching The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin  New York 2001 p. 14
234 The Book of Chuang Tzu Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana  London 1996  p. 195 
235 P. J. A. Lin A Translation of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching and Wang Pi’s Commentary Translated by  Paul Lin Centre for 
Chinese Studies University of Michigan 1977 p. 3
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thereby presenting the Dao as if it were a being. Zhuangzi emphasises, 'our words are just hot air',236 
when they attempt to understand the  Dao.  As Hans-Georg Moeller states,  'all the disputes in the 
realm of language reflect the basic pattern of diversity in the world of things and events'. 237 Hence, 
for Laozi and Zhuangzi, describing the eternal Dao in words appears problematic, in that this both 
fails to represent the Dao as it is and risks misrepresenting the Dao by referring to it as though it 
were another being in the world. 
              This, however, presents a classic problem of Daoist thought. If the Dao is beyond words, 
how is it possible to enter into any discussion of it? Consider Laozi's statement that 'one who speaks 
does not know. One who knows does not speak.'238 P'o Chu-i in the ninth century famously asked of 
such a passage in Laozi,
 those who know do not speak do; those who speak do not know. This
 is what we were told by Laozi. Should we believe that he himself was the 
one who knew?  How could it be that he wrote no less than five thousand words?239
  It would certainly appear from the Dao De Jing, Chapter 56, that silence for Laozi is considered 
more worthwhile than speech. This Daoist position appears similar to Wittgenstein's, 'whereof one 
cannot speak, one must remain silent'.240 However, Laozi, in the Dao De Jing, rather than simply 
accepting  the  Dao as  beyond words, clearly goes into  further  discussion of  the  Dao.  It  would 
therefore seem that Daoists, rather than viewing the impossibility of speaking of the  Dao as the 
final conclusion preventing the possibility of further discourses on the ineffable, take it as their 
starting point, and from there seek to gain a deeper understanding of the Dao.
236  Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu  Translated Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly Arkana  London 1996  p 12
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 This can be observed in passages in the Dao De Jing that  explicitly refer to knowing the 
Dao,  as  illustrated by the translation,  'one who knows the  Dao,  never turns from life's  calling' 
(Star).241 There is a certain ambiguity in the Chinese yu, translated by Jonathan Star as ‘knows’; it 
could appear closer to ‘possess’ or ‘have’, rather than ‘know’. The passage, however, still clearly 
implies that it is possible to gain a deep understanding of the Dao, despite the Dao being beyond 
words. It would appear inevitable that in order to convey or even gain this understanding of the 
Dao, it  is  necessary  to  use  words.  In  the  act  of  writing,  both  Laozi  and  Zhuangzi  sought  to 
undertake exactly such a project, of conveying the Dao through language. 
 Daoism as a Way into the Ineffable
Unlike  the  position  adopted  within  certain  Schools  of  Thought  in  Western  philosophy, 
particularly the analytic tradition as exemplified by Logical Positivism, simply because the  Dao 
cannot be grasped within language does not mean for the Daoists that it should be neglected or 
excluded from discourse. Rather, as Katrin Froese states, 'according to Daoist thinkers, that which 
cannot be spoken is precisely what is most worth speaking about'.242 
How is it that the Daoists can get around the problem of constructing a discourse on the Dao 
while recognising the limitations of language? As Philipe J. Ivanhoe states, 'Zhuangzi's mistrust of 
language, as a vehicle for the Dao, has led some contemporary scholars to claim that he never really 
talks about the Dao'.243  However it is important to note that Zhuangzi's views on the limitedness of 
ordinary perspectives does not mean that Zhuangzi seeks to exclude the possibility of understanding 
the Dao. Rather, Zhuangzi’s thought and Daoism in general can be said to have the aim of bringing 
people  to  the  edge of  the  ineffable  in  describing the  limitlessness  of  the  Dao.  Daoism can be 
understood as a philosophy that seeks to stand on the edge of the un-graspable.
241  Laozi The Tao Te Ching The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin NewYork2001  Verse 
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 In order to achieve such a position of understanding, Daoists such as Zhuangzi often use 
metaphorical language. This can be illustrated in Zhuangzi's story of the encounter between the 
Lord of the Yellow River and Jo, the God of the Ocean. In the account, the Lord of the Yellow River 
is highly impressed at first when, during the season of autumn floods,
 
the waters were churning so wide, looking across from one bank to the other, 
it was impossible to distinguish an ox from a horse. At this the Lord of the Yellow
River was decidedly pleased, thinking the most beautiful thing in the whole world 
belonged to him.244 
The Lord of the Yellow River, however, goes on to encounter Jo, the God of the Ocean, and 
through this encounter, the 'endless vastness', the Yellow River, can know its own 'inferiority'.  It 
now becomes possible for the Ocean God to 'discuss great principles' with the Lord of the Yellow 
River. 
       Viewed from the perspective of the Dao, said Jo of the North Ocean, things are
neither elevated nor lowly. Viewed from the particular perspective of things, 
each one considers itself as elevated and the rest as lowly.245 
The central aim of such an account is to bring about understanding of the Dao through metaphor. 
This is achieved by showing the inadequacy of ordinary perspectives, as represented by the River 
God in this story. Such ordinary perspectives remain tied to the distinctions of language. This is 
done  in  order  to  make  people  aware  of  the  Dao as  something  beyond  the  grasp  of  ordinary 
language. This experience of the ineffable is shown in Zhuangzi's statement,
244  The Book of Chuang Tzu Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana London 1996  p 137
245  Ibid 
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forget about life, forget about worrying about right and wrong. Plunge into the 
unknown and the endless and find your place there.246
 Such a passage describes a mystical experience that is outside of the ordinary, that resists 
conventional classifications such as 'right and wrong'. It should, however, not be thought of as a 
particular  esoteric  revelation,  in  that  philosophical  Daoism  does  not  claim  to  have  an 
epistemologically privileged access to the nature of the Dao. This leads to an important distinction 
between mystical revelation, that is in theory intelligible and conveyable through language, if only 
to a select few, and the kind of mysticism that thinkers such as Laozi, Zhuangzi, in addition to (as 
will be shown later), Heidegger, hold on to. What such mystical experience in Daoism constitutes, 
is an event the sage aware of, but the contents of which are beyond the grasp of intelligibility, hence 
the nature of it cannot be directly conveyed through language. Hence the Daoist sage, in seeking to 
convey a description of such an event, rather teaching a particular kind of knowledge, instead aims 
primarily to remain open to a sense of mystery. 
The following section will look at how both the Daoists and Heidegger seek to convey a 
sense of the ineffable through language in order to preserve and cultivate openness to this sense of 
mystery.
Part 2: Daoism, Heidegger and Ineffability 
Throughout his philosophical project, Heidegger always sought to distinguish Being, both as 
Sein and  Seyn,  from beings.   Therefore,  attempting to present Being for Heidegger in terms of 
attributes or properties as though it were a being will not merely fail to understand Being, but will 
inevitably  lead  people  away  from Being.  This  is  even  more  true  in  the  case  of  Seyn,  which 
Heidegger goes as far as to represent as Being with a crossing-out sign over it, to indicate that 
246  The Book of Chuang Tzu Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana  London 1996  p  137
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Being as Seyn remains outside of representation. Hence, for Heidegger, any attempt to express 'the 
Being  of  beings'  in  the  descriptive  terms  of  language  is  in  danger  of  reifying  Being  and 
misrepresenting the term by  presenting it as though it were 'a being'.  This means Heidegger would, 
for example,  radically reject a personalised understanding of the Being of beings that could be 
equated with certain interpretations of the Christian God. Heidegger does not attribute to Being 
such predicates as ‘benevolent’. Furthermore,  Seyn should not be understood impersonally, along 
Spinoza's lines, as a ‘substance’.  Such a monist account of Seyn still reifies Being by presenting it 
in this way.  Heidegger, therefore, must resist the tendency that he observes in Western languages to 
represent things spoken of in this way as substances in the world with attributes.
The Dao and Seyn
 This presents the possibility of a comparison between Heidegger's notion of Being and the 
Dao, in that both Being as  Seyn and the  Dao appear as an ineffable ground of beings that resists 
description within ordinary language. 
Such a comparison between different mystical experiences, however, is more problematic 
than it may at first seem, and has been challenged by Steven Katz, who holds that, 
the ineffability of mystical experience does not provide any point of comparison
            between mystical traditions.  Rather they function to cloak experience from 
investigation and to hold mysterious whatever ontological  commitments one has. 
As a consequence, the use of the terms ‘paradox’ and ‘ineffable’ do not provide 
data for comparability, rather they eliminate the logical possibility of the 
comparability of experience altogether.  To assume, as James, Huxley, Stace, 
and many others do, that, because [two] mystics claim that their experiences 
are paradoxical [say], they are describing like experiences, is a non sequitur.247
247  S. Katz (edited)  Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis Oxford University Press Sheldon USA 1978 pp 54-55 (a 
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According to Katz, therefore, all mystical experiences and traditions that claim to go beyond 
ordinary language and outside normal  discourse are  by definition beyond any conception.  It  is 
therefore impossible to compare different mystical traditions, since there can never be a justification 
to make sense of such a comparison.  Katz sees mystical experiences as beyond any description, 
regardless  of  which  tradition  they  are  in,  ineffability  being  here  understood as  something that 
excludes the possibility of analysis by its very own nature.  Hence, there is nothing to compare or  
analyse in different mystical experiences. All that it possible to say about mystical experiences is 
that they are ineffable. Therefore, according to Katz, the  Dao and  Seyn are both excluded from 
discourse, thereby making any comparison between Seyn and the Dao impossible.  Precisely in the 
sense  that  both  the  Dao in  Chinese  Philosophy  and  Heidegger's  understanding  of  Being  are 
ineffable,  any comparison between them is not practicable because there is nothing that can be 
compared. Thus, following Katz's position, the dialogue between Heidegger and Daoist thought is, 
in effect, already concluded before it has even begun.
This orientation rests on two fundamental assumptions: (1) That all mystical traditions are 
ineffable in the same way in relation to language; and (2), that ineffability can only be understood 
as a negative category, placing a particular experience beyond description. However, such a position 
is flawed in that it fails to acknowledge the distinctions between different kinds of ineffability. 
In response to this problem, this section will first distinguish different kinds of ineffability. 
Secondly, it will consider Heidegger's understanding of the ineffable, particularly the relationship 
between language and Being, as Seyn.  Following from this, the section will focus on Heidegger's 
conception  of  attunement  to  Being.  Finally,  any  underlying  similarity  in  this  respect  between 
Heidegger and Daoism will be analysed.
Kinds of Mysticism
useful collection of articles, especially Katz’s own on Language, Epistemology and Mysticism) 
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In relation to language,  three kinds of 'ineffability'  can be distinguished.  Katz's  position 
would appear to rest on an understanding of mystical disclosure as being ineffable in the sense of 
being completely beyond all language. Such an understanding of mysticism is basically equivalent 
to the early Wittgenstein's position, 'whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent.'248
Opposed to such an understanding of ineffability, there is the kind of ineffability that can be 
exemplified by the 'form of the good' in Plato. Plato treats the form of the good as being beyond 
ordinary understanding, as represented by the cave or even the people who first step outside the 
cave. However, Plato implies that, ultimately, the philosopher king outside the cave will be able to  
look directly into the sun. This can be read as suggesting that 'the form of the good' is ineffable in  
the sense of being beyond an ordinary understanding, but it is not, in principle, un-graspable. Such 
an understanding of the ineffable might therefore be equated with 'esoteric knowledge'. Mysticism 
based on 'esoteric knowledge' still views the ineffable as being beyond 'ordinary understanding’. 
However, through specialist knowledge, such schools of mysticism hold out the possibility of an 
enhanced human understanding, if only to an elect figure such as the enlightened Gnostic adept of 
Plato's  philosopher king.  Such knowledge can still  be conveyed through language,  even if  it  is 
radically different from how language might be used in an ordinary setting.  Through this enhanced 
human understanding (often called  gnosis) of the esoteric mystical tradition, it is possible to gain 
insight into the true nature of reality that would otherwise be hidden. For such doctrines, it is only 
due to an underlying failure of understanding on the part of the cave dwellers in Plato, or those 
under the power of the demiurge in Gnosticism, that they do not see the truth of the doctrine. Such 
positions hold that correctly functioning understanding ought to be able to comprehend the true 
nature of reality, and that this understanding can be conveyed through specialist esoteric knowledge, 
or gnosis. 
 In principle, therefore, Katz's description of the ineffable mystical experience cannot be 
248 L.. Wittgenstein  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus  Standard Publications London 2007
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applied to such an understanding of 'mystical knowledge'. Such positions at some level provide a 
doctrine, even though it may be beyond ordinary comprehension. Hence, for example, a comparison 
between Plato and Gnosticism is perfectly legitimate.
However, the kind of mystical or ineffable position in relation to language that Heidegger 
appears to be concerned with might be understood as standing between the position of complete 
silence and esoteric knowledge. As has already been discussed, for Daoist thinkers such as Laozi 
and Zhuangzi, Daoism is on the edge of the boundless, which is expressed through language, but is 
beyond language. The concept of standing on the edge of the boundless, discussed by Heidegger in 
the ‘Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and Inquirer’, appears somewhat indeterminate and 
will be clarified later on; but at this point, it should be noted that the edge of the boundless means  
standing on the edge of something that is beyond one’s grasp. In this way, it will be argued here that 
Heidegger's relationship to ineffability is in some sense similar to the Daoist position. 
This, however, raises a difficult question about the significance of language and ineffability 
in Heidegger. Along what lines is it possible to make a comparison between the role of ineffability 
in Daoism and in Heidegger? How is one to avoid a complete consigning of Being to silence and to 
avoid holding on to an esoteric doctrine. Accepting the position that either 'Being' or the Dao are 
completely beyond discourse,  or that  they can be described in terms of esoteric  doctrine or be 
completely excluded from all discourse, are for both Heideggerian and Daoist thought considered to 
be dangerous in so far as it would lead to the forgetfulness of Seyn or the Dao.  Conversely, creating 
an  esoteric  doctrine  might  lead  to  the  possibility  of  becoming  too  rigid,  thereby  reifying  and 
misrepresenting 'Being' by applying finite human understanding to the 'boundless'.
Language and Heidegger
What therefore is the role of language for Heidegger, given such a position on ineffability? 
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Language  for  the  later  Heidegger  is  clearly  a  central  concern  and has,  at  times,  been  held  to 
preclude the possibility of a comparison between Heidegger and East Asian traditions of thought, 
such  as  Daoism  or  Zen  Buddhism.  Joan  Stambaugh  states  that,  in  relation  to  Heidegger  and 
Buddhism, 'a Buddhist would never say 'language is the house of being''’.249 Stambaugh thereby 
contrasts Heidegger's apparent celebration of language with the inadequacy attributed to language 
in Zen Buddhism. This would thereby appear to distance Heidegger's position from Daoism in that 
Daoism has a similar view on the limitations of language, as shown the statement that 'the Dao that 
can be spoken of, is not the true Dao'. Such a reading appears to indicate that Heidegger and the 
Daoists are heading in opposite directions. Heidegger is seeking to listen more closely to language, 
stating that the central purpose of his lectures on The Nature of Language is that 'they are intended 
to  bring  us  face  to  face  with  a  possibility  of  undergoing  an  experience  with  language'.250 By 
contrast, Daoist thinkers, such as Laozi and Zhuangzi, in a similar way to Zen, appear to hold that 
language is inadequate for expressing the true reality of the Dao.
What, however, does 'undergoing an experience of language' really mean for Heidegger? In 
order to answer this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the nature of language and 
thinking in Heidegger's philosophy.
Poetic and Calculative Language
Central  to  Heidegger's  concern  with  language  is  his  emphasis  on  the  role  of  poetry. 
Heidegger is particularly and crucially concerned with distinguishing between 'poetic thinking' and 
'calculative thinking'. 
Vital to understanding this dichotomy in language between poetic and calculative thinking is 
the distinction that Heidegger sees between hints (Wink) and gestures (Gebärde), and the signs and 
chiffres that he sees as associated with metaphysics. This distinction which Heidegger sets out in the 
249  J. Stambaugh ‘Commentary on Takeshi Umehara’s “Heidegger and Buddhism” – Philosophy East and West 20 (3) 
1970  p. 286
250  M. Heidegger  ‘On the Way to Language’ in  The Nature of Language: Translated by Peter D. Hertz  Harper and 
Row New York  1971 p. 57
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‘Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ is quite subtle. Heidegger states that 
hints and gestures
are enigmatic. They beckon to us. They beckon away. They beckon us toward 
that from which they unexpectedly bear themselves toward us.251 
 What distinguishes hints and gestures appears therefore to be their indirectness. 'Signs and 
chiffres'  can  be  read  as  seeking  to  directly  express  something in  language,  whereas  'hints  and 
gestures' seek to point towards something. This means that hints and gestures aim to evoke thoughts 
of something without being able to say exactly what it is. Calculative thinking essentially rests on 
signs and  chiffres. Hence, it relies on fixed definitions and quantifications and depends on fixed 
references, whereas for poetic thinking, Heidegger states that 'the poet almost as soon as he has 
spoken the line about the mystery of the reserving proximity, has to descend to the phrase “foolish 
is my speech”: But, nevertheless he is speaking'.252  Expressing Being wholly within language, in 
Heidegger’s view, only offers a reification of Being, by presenting Being as though it were 'a being'. 
Words for Heidegger in poetic thought function as 'hints and gestures' to point towards something 
they cannot wholly express within language, but which Heidegger does not wish to completely 
leave silent. 
This  relation  to  silence can  be noted in  Heidegger's ‘Dialogue on Language Between a 
Japanese and Inquirer’ and can be observed in an exchange such as the following:
Inquirer: who could simply be silent of silence? 
Japanese: that would be authentic saying,
Inquirer: ….and would remain the constant prologue to the authentic dialogue
251  M. Heidegger ‘ Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in: On the Way into Language 
Translated by Peter D Hertz Harper and Row New York  1971
252 M. Heidegger  Existence and Being  Translated by Henry Regnery: University of Chicago1Chicago 949  p. 280
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 of language.253
  Both silence and language are therefore important for Heidegger. In favouring 'hints and 
gestures', Heidegger's thought is rather seeking to point towards Being, offering attunement to the 
mystery of  Seyn. Poetic language for Heidegger thus can be understood as providing a sense of 
mystery that cannot be completely expressed within language. 
Hence,  Heidegger,  in seeking to understand Being through poetic language and thought, 
cannot move to say that 'Being' is X, as calculative thinking would require. He therefore cannot 
offer 'esoteric knowledge' in the sense of a specific revelation or gnosis about Seyn. It may thus be 
the case that, while for Heidegger there will be certain thinkers who will preserve an insight into 
Being, this insight can never be directly conveyed or communicated. A central failing of 'Western 
metaphysics' for Heidegger is the attempt to represent the nature of Being in this way. Western 
metaphysics denies a space for the mysterious by seeking always to portray it in graspable notions. 
Western  metaphysics  denies  space  for  anything  that  cannot  be  represented  in  this  way.  This 
ultimately  leads,  in  Heidegger’s  view,  to  a  state  where,  as  Xianglong  Zhang  states,  'modern 
technology pursues brightness without recognising the necessity of darkness that hides the secret'.254 
The project of poetic thought in Heidegger is thus tied to this preservation and opening up to 
the sense of mystery.  Hence, as Otto Pöggeler noted, comparing the star on Heidegger’s gravestone 
with Plato’s sun, ‘the star rises alone for us out of darkness and its mysterious depths’.255 Thus, 
rather than seeking the complete illumination that Plato’s thought aimed at, Heidegger's thought can 
be understood as a guide to a sense of mystery that can never be completely illuminated, but of 
which Heidegger aims to make people aware. A star may serve as an indicator for people through 
the darkness of night, while still leaving the darkness itself unlit, so that for Heidegger, the sense of 
253 M. Heidegger ‘ Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in: On the Way into Language 
Translated by Peter D Hertz Harper and Row New York  1971  p. 53
254  Xianglong Zhang ‘The Coming Time “Between”Being and Daoist Emptiness: An Analysis of Heidegger’s Inquiring 
into the Uniqueness of the Poet via Laozi’i  in  Philosophy East and West Volume 59, Number 1, January 2009
255  O. Pöggeler ‘West-East Dialogue’  in  Heidegger and  Asian Thought Edited by Graham Parkes University of 
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mystery always remains.
It is precisely the relationship between language and silence, as opposed to logocentrism (in 
the sense of crudely privileging language), that is crucial to the poetic in Heidegger.  Attempting to 
say too much with language is, therefore, deeply dangerous for poetic language and thought.  Poetic 
language, in order to be poetic, must allow a sense of mystery for the later Heidegger. This can help 
to clarify Heidegger's claim that, 'perhaps the mystery of mysteries of thoughtful Saying conceals 
itself in the word “way”,  [Dao] only we will let these names return to what they leave unspoken'.256
 Thus,  poetic  thought  and  language,  through  preserving  this  sense  of  mystery  within 
language, points to the Dao or Seyn that is its unspoken base. As Tetsuaki Kotoh notes, ‘the echo of 
stillness is the silent logos  of the ancient origin beyond the particular features of everyday-level 
language’.257
The Nature of Poetic Thought and Ineffability in Heidegger
 The notion of poetic thinking has often been considered one of the most problematic parts  
of  Heidegger's  thought.  This  is  because,  within  the  tradition  of  analytic  philosophy,  it  appears 
natural to associate language with matters of naming and reference. To talk about 'what names leave 
unspoken', therefore, seems by its very nature unintelligible. Herman Philipse views Heidegger's 
apparent resistance to offering propositions concerning Seyn as virtually making Seyn empty as a 
category:
let it be sufficient here to observe that, if Heidegger did not assert anything, there 
is nothing to discuss either. Because to believe that p means: believing that p 
is true, we cannot even believe what Heidegger says if he does not assert anything.258  
256  M. Heidegger  ‘The Nature of Language’ On the Way into Language : Translated by Peter D. Hertz  Harper and 
Row New York 1971  p. 92 
257 T. Kotoh ‘Language and Silence’ Heidegger and  Asian Thought Edited by Graham Parkes University of Hawaii 
Press 1990   p.210      
258 H. Philipse  Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being  Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey1998  p. 302
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Such a  position,  however,  rests  on  the  view that  language  must  either  be  tied  to  fixed 
propositions  that  can  be  clearly  defined,  or  be  meaningless.  Conversely,  David  Cooper  notes, 
Heidegger's words 'expound no doctrine, but are directives'.259 Considering this, it is inappropriate 
to criticise Heidegger for failing to offer propositions about Seyn when this is not his aim. However, 
the question remains as to how Heidegger can use language in this way, as a directive or guide, 
rather than as collection of propositions. This is the objective of this section, which seeks to show 
that this is done, firstly, through offering a descriptive sense of Being as  Seyn, and to show that, 
through this descriptive sense, Heidegger strives to cultivate a particular attitude and awareness. 
 One can take as a starting point Bo Mo's distinction between three naming activities. Firstly 
through description',  by which  he means offering  a  general  outline concerning attributes  of  an 
entity, which picks it out from other objects that may surround it.  Secondly, it  may be through 
'direct  reference'  such  as  a  name.  The  third  is  through  offering  both  a  direct  reference  and 
description.260 
Bo Mo's distinctions here are concerned with the way that names can relate to the world. 
The first is the kind of name that seeks to convey a sense through a general description; hence one 
might refer to a particular house along such lines as an old stone building with a yellow door and a  
broken window. Using such a form of description it is the attributes which identify the entity from 
its  surroundings.  The second form of  designation  means directly  referring  to  something in  the 
world. Thus, one word picks out one particular thing in the world to the exclusion of everything 
else, as signifier and signified.  The third is a combination of the other two, selecting something in 
the world while conveying a general sense of it.  Heidegger’s thought may be said to be based 
around Bo Mo’s first statement in so far as he is seeking to convey a descriptive sense of Being, 
rather than attempting to delineate Being directly as a reference point. Heidegger's way of talking 
259 D.E. Cooper  The Measure of Things   Humanism, Humility and Mystery  Oxford University Press Oxford 2002 p. 
293.
260  Bo Mo Eternal Dao: Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy Ashgate Publishing Ltd London 2003  p.254. 
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about Being can thus be understood as comparable to the Daoist way of talking about the  Dao,  
which, in Cooper's words, seeks to 'evoke an attitude', rather than set out a series of propositions.  
 David Cooper, again, notes that for Heidegger, 'in thinking/saying, we call or name, but not 
in the ordinary -  and, for Heidegger,  derivative - sense of coordinating a linguistic object with 
another'.261 Heidegger is not seeking to present a metaphysical definition of Being as X. Hence, in 
the ‘Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and Inquirer’, the Japanese asks, 'why did you not 
surrender the word “Being” immediately and resolutely to the exclusive use of the language of 
metaphysics? Why did you not at once give its own name to what you were searching for, by way of 
the nature of Time, as the “sense of Being”?'262 To this the Inquirer responds, 'how is one to give a 
name to what he is still  searching for?'263 This indicates how Being, for Heidegger,  rather than 
standing as an overarching concept that might be thought comparable to the Christian God, should 
instead be thought of as a loose place holder. 'Sense of Being' may in fact be a more effective way 
of understanding what Heidegger means by Being. Hence, in some of his essays, such as ‘The 
Thing’,  Heidegger  makes  little  direct  reference  to  'Being'.   This  does  not,  however,  mean that 
Heidegger has abandoned Seyn as ontology, in so far as he still seeks to convey a sense of Being in 
such works. 
Hence, in the words of Emilo Brito, for Heidegger, 'the Most-High of Being allows itself to 
be  named  only  in  the  hymn of  the  Sacred'.264 As  it  is  only  through such a  poetic  description 
associated  with  the  hymn of  the  sacred  that  the  sense  of  Being  as  Seyn  in  Heidegger  can  be 
conveyed. Being as Seyn is not named in the ordinary sense of picking out one particular point of 
reference in the world, but is rather named more loosely, in the sense of evoking a presence.
Such a use of language in Heidegger can be perceived as similar to the use of language in 
261  D.E. Cooper  The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery: Oxford University Press 2002  pp. 293-
294 
262  M. Heidegger  ‘Dialogue Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’ in  On the Way into Language Translated by Peter D. 
Hertz   Harper and Row New York  1971 p. 20
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Laozi and Zhuangzi, in that the Daoists use language to make people aware of the  Dao. Cooper 
holds  that  such  statements,  rather  than  seeking  to  provide  a  description  of  something,  aim 'to 
“inspire” or “evoke” a way of seeing or thinking about something,'265 comparing the use of language 
to  a  cry  of  pain,  which  'does  not  self  describe,  but  is  better  construed  as  a  piece  of  pain 
behaviour'.266 Therefore, they should not be understood as propositional statements. 
An example of such non-propositional use of language is metaphor. In order to get round what 
can be said directly and what cannot be said at  all  Daoist writers often use language based on 
metaphor, such as the famous passage in the Dao De Jing
The best way to live is is to be be like water. For water benefits all things
and goes against none of them. It provides for all people and even clenses
those places a man is loath to go. In this way it is just like Dao.267
Clearly the point of such a passage is not literally to suggest the proposition that the Dao is in 
anyway ontologically equivalent to water , but rather that through the image of water the text is able 
to  convey  a  sense  of  what  it  means  to  see  and  embody  the  Dao.  This  bears  comparison  to 
Heidegger's use of the image of the clearing in the forest to convey the sense of Being. Metaphor 
thus counts more broadly within the category of poetic language.
Poetic language may lack a certain precision, but it opens up a richness and flexibility in 
language. Katrin Froese draws attention to the differences between the Chinese language and some 
Western languages, particularly Latin, in that,
            Chinese words are more fluid, and very much context dependant. The fixation
265 D.E. Cooper  The Measure of Things Humanism, Humility and Mystery Oxford University Press Oxford 2002 p. 
290. 
266 Ibid 
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on grammar, which Nietzsche rails against, is notoriously absent in the Chinese 
language. The Chinese language is metaphorical and malleable.268 
This stands against the position held by Stella Sanford that the apparent 'absence in Chinese 
of the verb 'to be' and of the abstract noun being'269 automatically distances Chinese thought from 
Heidegger.270 It might be said that in Heideggerian terms, the Chinese language does not present the 
dangers  of  reification  of  Being  that  Western  Indo-European  languages  do.  This  offers  greater 
flexibility, for example, in how the Dao appears as both a verb and a noun. This flexibility means 
that, in Katrin Froese’s words, Chinese thinkers do not have to 'make essences out of symbols.'271 
Thus, Heidegger's use of language in poetic thought appears closer to the use of Chinese by Daoist 
thinkers such as Zhuangzi and Laozi, rather than the use of language in what might be considered 
traditional  Western  philosophy.  Heidegger,  as  opposed to  being  centred  on  a  rigid  structure  of 
language based on fixed definitions that seeks to pin down concepts, focuses on a more descriptive 
and flexible understanding of words. As Otto Pöggeler states, ‘the title of the Chinese novel Chin 
p’ing mei means, depending on the context, “blossoms in a golden vase” or “beautiful women in a 
rich house.” The decisive thing for thinking is for it to be able to break through from superficial 
means to the depths in order to bring us back on to a way or to the underway’.272 
 Heidegger's thought should not, therefore, be understood, as an 'empty play on words'.273 
Heidegger's use of poetic language and thought aims at painting an impression of Being as  Seyn. 
Through creating this impression, he seeks to cultivate an attitude attuned towards Being and a way 
of relating to the world, rather than presenting a set of propositions. In this way, as Cooper notes, 
268  K. Farose  Nietzsche, Heidegger and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between   Series in Chinese Philosophy 
and Culture State University of New York New York 2006 p 60
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Heidegger 'offered a whole battery of terms to characterise the roles played by his talk about the 
mystery.'274 Given, therefore, that this is done in order to cultivate a particular mood or attitude, it is 
necessary to look in more detail at this mood of attunement.
 Attunement and Ineffability in  Heidegger and Daoism
Central to Heidegger’s later philosophy is the notion of attunement to Being. At a basic 
level, attunement can be understood as what Heidegger calls in his 'Memorial Address', 'openness 
towards  mystery'.275 In  the  address,  Heidegger  holds  that  openness  towards  mystery,  alongside 
Gelassenheit (which will be looked at in more detail later), can provide the possibility of resisting 
the complete technocratic disclosure of the modern world. Heidegger goes as far as to state that 
such attitudes can provide a 'path that will lead to a new ground and foundation'276  What, therefore, 
does it mean to stand in 'openness to mystery'? 
 David Cooper  states that  attunement  towards Being is  understood by Heidegger  as  the 
'cultivation of a certain comportment to the world and to the mysterious'.277 As such, 'openness 
towards mystery' or attunement can be understood as a particular way of relating to the world. It 
should be viewed as diametrically opposed to a technocratic and reductionist way of seeing the 
world. Julian Young notes, such a reductionist approach of seeing things as resources deprives ‘us 
of the ability to see the whatness, objectness, the itselfness of beings’.278 Openness towards the 
mystery of things can be understood as precisely the opposite of such a way of viewing things, in so 
far as it entails to always remain open to that which cannot be completely calculated in beings. To 
illustrate this by way of an example: to remain open to the mystery of the forest would therefore 
274  D.E. Cooper   The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery Oxford University Press Oxford 2002 p 
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mean remaining open to a sense of the presence of the forest that is not reducible to that which is 
calculable (e.g. its economic value as a source of cellulose).  In this way, it is both at the basis of  
poetic thought in Heidegger and in the content of that which poetic thought seeks to convey. It is 
this state of mind or mood that makes it possible to sense the disclosure of Being as Seyn. Cooper 
expresses this by saying that 'to experience the mystery and to comport oneself in a certain way 
towards it are two sides of the same coin'.279 
Thus,  openness towards mystery provides a  sense of Being as  Seyn,  without needing to 
claim any particular esoteric knowledge about Being. Tetsuaki Kotoh points out that ‘it is not logos 
but silence as “basic mood/voice” (Grundstimme) that encounters the wonder of the presencing of 
Being, being attuned (gestimmt) by the silent voice (lautlose Stimme) of Being’.  280 Such mood, 
therefore, rejects any claim to absolute knowledge, but remains open to something that is beyond 
one’s grasp.
 There  is,  therefore,  a  deep  resonance  between  the  sense  of  ineffability  and  the  use  of 
language in Heidegger and Daoism. Thus, it is possible for the Daoist notion of Dao to provide a 
model for Heidegger's understanding of Being as Seyn.
 Both Heidegger and the Daoists seek to make people aware, through language, of something 
that is beyond language and distinction. In this way, they are 'mystics' not in the sense that they set 
down a particular esoteric doctrine, but in that they are seeking to gain a kind of awareness that is 
outside of ordinary understanding and language. This awareness in both Heidegger and Daoism is 
tied to an observing and relating to the world that rejects a reductionist or technocratic way of 
interpreting things based upon calculative thinking. It thus provides a different way of discerning 
the world which, as noted by Cooper in relation to Zen Buddhism, sees that the 'experience of  
mystery  is  a  way  of  experiencing,  of  being  with,  the  ordinary  and  familiar'.281 Daoism  and 
279  D.E. Cooper  The Measure of Things: Humanism, Humility and Mystery Oxford University Press Oxford 2002  p 
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Heidegger thus both provide a way of perceiving the ordinary everyday world that allows a sense of 
mystery. It is this sense of awareness that both Heidegger and Daoist thinkers aim to achieve; a 
sense of the underlying whole that is within awareness, but beyond grasp.
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Chapter 7 Heidegger and the  Yin  and  Yang  
Part 1: Earth and World:  Yin   and Yang  
Outline of  Yin   and Yang   in Chinese Thought 
The origins of the concepts of yin and yang are ancient and difficult to trace. The dichotomy 
underlies a significant part of Chinese thought, not merely Daoism. Early in Chinese history, it was 
associated with a distinct  'yin-yang' school near the commencement of the warring-states period. 
Wing-Tsit  Chan states  that  'no aspect  of  Chinese civilisation  -  whether  metaphysics,  medicine, 
government, or art -  has escaped'282 the influence of the yin and yang.  It has become a central part 
of Daoist thought, as well as influencing elements of Confucianism, although the notions of yin and 
yang do not appear to have been directly referred to in the writings of Kongzi and Mengzi.  The yin/ 
yang dichotomy, however, has influenced Neo-Confucianism as well as Chinese martial arts and 
feng shui. The notion of such a dichotomy in Chinese thought can be traced as far back as the Yijing 
(also known as the I Ching or The Book of Changes), compiled under the Zhou dynasty (1045BCE-
256BCE), the period of Chinese history that leads on to the period of warring states, and the rise of 
a  hundred  schools  of  thought.  Under  the  Zhou  dynasty,  the  Yijing  was  used  as  a  manual  for 
divination, showing the cosmic process, while elements of it have been traditionally attributed to the 
mythical ancient Chinese sage and sovereign Fu Xi (2800BCE).283 Yin  and  yang can be seen as 
central to the system of the Yijing, where yin is represented by a broken line and yang by a solid 
line.  These  are  put  together  in  various  different  possible  combinations  of  six  lines,  where,  for 
example, six broken lines is the kun and all yin, whereas six solid lines is qian and is all yang. The 
Yijing, called by Kakuzo Okakura 'the vedas of the Chinese race',284 is an important work for both 
religious and philosophical Daoism, as well as elements of Confucianism.  
282  Wing-Tsit Chan  A  Source Book in Chinese Philosophy Compiled and translated by Wing-Tsit Chan Princeton 
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The  main  concern  here,  however,  is  with  the  Daoist  understanding  of  the  yin-yang 
dichotomy. The significance of the yin-yang in Daoist philosophy is outlined by Laozi:
Dao gives life to the one. The one gives life to the two. The two gives life to the 
three. The three give life to ten thousand things. All beings support yin and 
embrace yang and the interplay of these two forces fills the universe.
Yet only at the still point, between the breathing in and breathing out, can one
 capture these two in perfect harmony.285
This passage is difficult to interpret. However, yin and yang can be read as equivalent to 'the two' 
and as the twin manifestations of the  Dao, through the  qi energy - 'the one' - that underlies the 
myriad of things. The classic symbol of yin and yang is called the Taijitu ☯. This shows the yin as 
the dark part of the circle, while yang is the light part of the circle.   Ray Billington, referring to the 
Taijitu, notes that, 'draw a diameter anywhere across the circle and each section will include some 
Yang and some Yin',286  which indicates that there is no such thing as pure  yin or pure  yang.  In 
reference to the two sections of the circle, Richard Wilhelm comments: 
the  primal  powers  never  come  to  a  standstill;  the  cycle  of  becoming  continues  
uninterruptedly. The reason is the two primal powers there arises again and again 
a state of tension, a potential that keeps the powers in motion and causes them to
 unite, whereby they are constantly regenerated.287 
Rather  than  a  dialectic  in  the  Hegelian   sense,  where  a  binary  opposition  is  ultimately 
resolved at  a  further  stage  of  development,  the  yin and  yang dichotomy can be  regarded as  a 
285  Laozi Dao De Jing The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin New York 2001 p. 53
286  Ray Billington  East of Existentialism: The Tao of the West  Routledge London 1990  p. 197
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continual  interplay  of  opposing  forces  that  is  in  effect  (certainly  in  the  Yijing)  cyclical,  with 
continual change and interaction between yin and  yang. As Zhuangzi states, 'yin and yang reflect 
each other, oppose each other and control each other'.288 
 The  Distinction between  Yin   and Yang  
Accepting the Yijing's interpretation of yin as the receptive and yang as the active, Richard 
Wilhelm states that, in relation to the Yijing, 'the light and dark are the two primal powers …, as 
firm and yielding, or as day and night'.289 The same writer further points out that the words yin and 
yang came from ways of  talking  about  the  distinction  between the  dark  and sunny sides  of  a  
mountain.290 This  use  of  the  terms  can  still  be  seen  in  certain  Chinese  place  names,  such  as 
Luoyang, which means built on the sunny side of the river Luo. 
In Daoism,  yin and  yang can be read as the twin ways in which  Dao is, in Heideggerian 
terms, disclosed. Yin is understood as the dark, receptive force, associated with night, whereas yang 
is understood as the light active force, associated with the day time.  As Ray Billington explains, 
the Yang represents strength, as in male: activity, movement, creative power and
 rational thought;  the Yin corresponds to  the more reflective qualities of the female291:  
receptivity, stillness, complexity, intuitive wisdom rather than rational thought.292
 The yang is associated with the sun and is often symbolised by the dragon or the Duke of 
the West, whereas the  yin is associated with the moon, often symbolised by the Chinese phoenix 
(fenghuang) and the Queen Mother of the West. yin and yang are also associated with returning and 
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going out. Richard Wilhelm, when referring to this aspect of yin and yang, states that
 the light spirits (shen) are outgoing; they are active spirits, which can also enter 
upon new incarnations. The dark spirits (guei) return home; they are withdrawing
 forces and have the task of assimilating what life has yielded.293
 In such a reading, the shen spirits are perceived as yang and therefore active, going out into 
life; whereas the guei spirits are yin and are therefore thought of as receptive and returning home. 
There is a danger in this  association,  in that,  because  guei are the traditionally malevolent and 
unhappy spirits  in  China,  the  yin is  therefore conceived in  a  morally  negative way.   However, 
although  Wing-Tsit  Chan  associated  yin with  apparently  negative  qualities,  such  as  being 
destructive,294 yin and yang should not be thought of being in moral opposition, in the sense of the 
yin being evil and the yang being good. The yang may also be associated with bad qualities, such as 
anger or violence, while the yin may also be associated with positive qualities, such as gentleness.
Hence, while it is true that in some Confucian readings of yin-yang, a negative view is taken 
of yin, particularly with some Han Confucian thinkers such as Dong Zhongshu who, for example, 
took a negative view of the cult of the 'Queen Mother of the West' on the grounds of her association 
with the yin,295 this is not the understanding of yin and yang in Daoism. Indeed, to a certain extent, 
Laozi and Zhuangzi have a deep respect for virtues that would normally be associated with the yin. 
Earth and World in Heidegger
This primal strife between yin and yang resonates with Heidegger's polemos in the ‘Origin 
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University Press 1969 p. 244
295  S. E.Cahill  Transcendence Divine Passion: The Queen Mother of the West in Medieval China  Stanford University 
Press Stanford California1993 p. 21
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of the Work of Art’, where there is an interplay between 'Earth and World'. As Heidegger states, 'the  
world is self opening openness of the broad paths of simple and essential decisions in the destiny of 
a historical people. The Earth is the unforced coming forth of the continually self-closing, and in 
that way self sheltering'.296 The dichotomy in Heidegger between 'earth' and 'world' has already been 
briefly discussed in earlier sections. This chapter aims to look more closely at  the nature of it. 
Heidegger's central images of earth are those that epitomise ‘darkness and sheltering’.297 The earth 
might  therefore  be  said  in  some  sense  to  be  beyond  human  knowledge,  not  being  opened  to 
presence.  The world for Heidegger is essentially understood as anything and everything that the 
individual encounters, or may encounter.  All is part of the world: the world is presence. As such, 
the 'world', as Heidegger understands it, is transparent, ordered and structured. While the 'earth' and 
'world are in some sense opposed to each other in a primal strife, the two are deeply interrelated. 
There is a continual interplay between the 'earth' and 'world'.  Thus, 'world is grounded on earth, and 
earth rises up through world'.298 A complete separation of 'earth' and 'world' is impossible. It is the 
nature of this interplay between 'earth' and 'world' that defines the nature of them both. Although the 
earth is associated with the natural and the organic, and in some sense as beyond human knowledge, 
it should not be thought of as completely other, as opposed to the 'human'. Nor, although Heidegger 
states that 'earth shatters every attempt to penetrate it',299 should earth be thought of as equivalent to 
the Kantian un-knowable, in the sense that it is completely excluded from disclosure. As has been 
mentioned previously, a crucial aspect of the work of art for Heidegger is the setting forth of the 
earth into the world. It might therefore be said that the work of art brings the earth into human life,  
when otherwise, because of its nature as concealment, the earth would remain hidden.  By ‘setting 
296  M. Heidegger :’The Origin of the Work of Art’ in  Off the Beaten Track Page 26  Translated by Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p. 26
297  In Heidegger's works following on from the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’, he still continued to use earth as a 
category, although what exactly he designated by this category changes.  Hence, for example, in essays such as ‘The 
Thing’, Earth becomes an element of the four fold (gods, mortals, earth and sky). It is not possible here to go into a 
full discussion of how the notion of earth develops in Heidegger's thought. However, it might be said that Heidegger 
associates the earth with the organic and with concealment.
298  M. Heidegger ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in Off the Beaten Track:   Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.24
299 Ibid  p. 25
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forth’, Heidegger means to bring the earth into the world, while still allowing it to remain as the 
earth: ‘the work sets itself back, and thereby allows to come forth, is what we called the “earth”’. 300 
For example, a stone sculpture brings out structures that would normally be hidden within the rock 
into the light of day.  However, at the same time, in order for the sculpture to exist, the rock must  
retain solidity and opaqueness. In this way, the sculpture sets forth the earth through the stone. 
Without this setting forth of the earth, the work of art would be significantly diminished, since 
the setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential 
features of the work-being of the work. They belong together.301 
How does the work of art bring about this relationship to earth? Heidegger states that earth 
in the work of art is made manifest, by which he means that it is brought to un-concealment in a 
particular way that still allows it to remain non-transparent. Crucially, Heidegger states that 'on and 
in the earth, historical man found his dwelling'.302 This particular relationship between 'World' and 
'Earth' is central to Heidegger's thought, as this is what distinguishes Heidegger's position from a 
Hegelian reading of history, as a succession of 'worlds', each world being defined in terms of its 
own self-understanding. Hence, for example, Hegel would see the significance of the Greek temple 
as something that represents the Greek world's understanding of itself, putting emphasis on aspects 
of  it,  such as  a  Greek sculpture depicting the human form, with stone only acting as a  useful 
medium. Thus, to Hegel, nature or the Earth is only something that Spirit becomes alienated within, 
away from itself and thus acts as an obstacle to the spirit’s own self realisation. The central aim of 
history for Hegel is spirit's own contemplation of itself, without having to go through the mediation 
of  nature.   For  Heidegger,  the  'World',  regardless  of  its  historical,  is  always  founded  upon  a 
particular relationship with the Earth. 
300 M. Heidegger  ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in Off the Beaten Track    Translated by Julian Young and Kenneth 
Haynes Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p. 24
301 Ibid  p.26
302  Ibid  p.24
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 Concealment and Un-concealment in Heidegger
This dichotomy in ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ reflects a deeper dichotomy that Heidegger 
associates  with  the  Greek  aletheia,  meaning  un-concealment.  The  Earth  is  associated  with 
concealment and the world with un-concealment. Taking Heidegger’s metaphor of the clearing in 
the forest, the ‘World’ is essentially the clearing, whereas the Earth is essentially the depths of the 
forest.  As has been stated earlier, basic to Heidegger’s later philosophy is the understanding of 
truth, aletheia, which entails that there is both concealment and un-concealment. Critically, unlike 
what might be called a traditional Western understanding of knowledge, Heidegger does not view 
un-concealment as being in itself wholly desirable.
The dichotomy underlies much of Heidegger's later work. The distinction between 'Earth' 
and 'World' can still be said to be present within Heidegger's four-fold in the brightness of the sky 
and the darkness of the earth. It can be observed directly in Heidegger's Sojourns, where Heidegger 
discusses Apollo and Artemis: 'Apollo, the one with great and luminous gaze, the glowing one, who 
commands through splendour. Artemis, the archer, the one who finds home in the shelter of the 
wilderness---the  two of  them are  siblings.  The way of  their  presence  is  together  the  powerful 
nearness and sudden disappearance in farness'.303 In this passage, Heidegger associates Apollo with 
un-concealment, equivalent to world, while Artemis appears related to concealment and earth in the 
same text.  The two are  interlinked as  siblings,  but  set  in  opposition  to  each other.  Hence,  the 
dichotomy between concealment and un-concealment, equated with light and dark, can be seen as 
running throughout Heidegger's later work in different forms. 
           Earth and World as  Yin   and Yang  
‘Earth’ and ‘World’, as concealment and un-concealment, resonate with the  yin and  yang.  
303  M. Heidegger  Sojourns: The Journey to Greece   Translated by John Panteleimon Manoussakis  Series in 
Contemporary Continental Philosophy State University of New York Press  New York 2005  p.31
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Hence, the earth is understood as  yin (being dark and receptive), while the world is equated with 
yang (being light and active). As such, they are both inter-related and co-dependent, while at the 
same time being in a state of primal strife.  There is a further possible Daoist reading of Heidegger’s 
physis as equivalent to the qi in that they are both the energy springing through the primal strife.
 A comparison between yin and yang is hinted at by Graham Parkes, who writes in reference 
to a passage in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’: 'the yang power of “World” is unable unequivocally 
to open up the secret of the yin power of “earth”'.304  It does appear that there is a deep similarity 
between World and Earth as the twin ways in  which 'Being'  is  disclosed in  Heidegger.  This is 
particularly the case in so far as the Yijing equates kun, the pure yin hexagram, with receptive Earth, 
while  qian, pure yang, is equated with creative heaven.  This strongly resonates with Heidegger's 
Earth and World. Parkes suggests a possible alternative reading through a hypothetical student F, 
stating  that,  'I  keep  being  reminded  of  Nietzsche's  distinction  between  Apollonian  and  the 
Dionysian'.305 
While it is not possible to enter into a full discussion of the Dionysian and Apollonian here, 
it is noteworthy that in the previously mentioned passage from Sojourns, Heidegger takes Apollo as 
the representative of un-concealment, but takes Artemis, rather than Dionysus, as symbolising 
concealment.  Such representation shows that there is a degree of distance between Heidegger's 
position and Nietzsche's Apollonian/Dionysian dichotomy.  While Heidegger refers to Dionysus 
indirectly as 'the wine god' in relation to poets in ‘Why Poets?’ he never links Dionysus specifically 
to the earth. It might still be that there is a deep relationship between 'earth and world' and the 
'Apollonian and the Dionysian'. However, the way that Nietzsche thought of the Dionysian in 
Schopenhauerian terms, as a surge of undifferentiated primal energy comparable to Schopenhauer's 
'will', appears different from Heidegger's interpretation of the 'Earth' as receptive rather than active. 
The yin and yang may therefore provide a better comparison, while the association of Artemis with 
304 G. Parkes   ‘Thoughts on the Way’ in Heidegger and East Asian Philosophy Edited by Graham Parkes University of 
Hawaii Press 1990 p. 136
305 Ibid  
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the feminine and with Selene, the goddess of the moon, would appear to link Artemis directly to 
symbols associated with the yin. In this respect, therefore, while Katrin Froese states that 
'Heidegger, himself makes no explicit connection between Being and the feminine',306 the Earth can 
conceivably be equated with the feminine, at least in the sense of yin. Furthermore, by taking the 
light and dark sides of the mountain as the origin of the yin and yang, it is possible to see the 
relationship between light and shadow underlying Heidegger's aletheia. From this, a further 
proposal could be derived, that the notion of dwelling in the later Heidegger could be equated with 
the cultivation of a balance between yin and yang. Zhuangzi states, for example, 'here is a man of 
China, balanced between yin and yang, dwelling between Heaven and Earth'.307 Indeed, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this section, Heidegger's reading of the history of Western thought 
can be understood as the story of the relationship between concealment and un-concealment, 
between yin and yang; and, fundamentally, what can be read as the loss of the yin in the modern 
Western world.                                
306  K. Froese  Nieztsche, Heidegger and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between Series in Chinese Philosophy and 
Culture State University of New York Press New York 2006  p. 186
307  Zhuangzi  The Book of Chuang Tzu Translated  by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana Publishing 
London 1996   p. 192
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Part 2 Heidegger:  Yin   and Yang   and the History of Western Metaphysics 
The Nature of Heidegger's History of Western Metaphysics
Taking  this  interpretation  of  interplay  between  the  yin and  yang as 
concealment  and  un-concealment  that  underlies  Heidegger's  work,  it  is  further 
possible to apply it to a reading as a way to understand Heidegger's history of Western 
metaphysics.  Reference  has  been  made  to  Heidegger's  understanding  of  history 
previously. It is important to note here that, although Heidegger presents it as a history 
of  'metaphysics',  it  should  not  be  thought  of  simply  as  an  academic  history  of 
philosophy. For Heidegger, 'metaphysics grounds an age'.308 By this, Heidegger means 
that  'metaphysics'  has  a  fundamental  role  in  defining a  particular  point  in  history. 
Hence, while Tom Rockmore criticises Heidegger for failing to 'understand the way in 
which technology is embedded in modern social and historical contexts', 309 it can be 
said that the contemporary social  and historical context is  founded precisely upon 
modern technocratic reasoning that, for Heidegger, is founded upon the disclosure of 
modern technology.  As Iain D. Thomson states, 'by giving shape to our historical 
understanding of “what is,” metaphysics determines the most basic understanding of 
what  anything  is,  including  ourselves.'310 It  is  possible  to  read  this  history  in 
Heidegger  as  an  interplay  between  yin  and  yang or,  in  Heidegger’s  own  terms, 
concealment and un-concealment. 
While he is not merely interested in recording the history and development of 
Western metaphysics, his reading of history is tied to an evaluative judgement upon 
308 M. Heidegger  ‘The Age of World Picture’  in The Question Concerning Technology and Other  
Essays: Translated William Lovitt Harper Torch Books Harper Row New York 1977  p. 115
309 T. Rockmore:' Heidegger on Technology and Democracy' in  Technology and the Politics of  
Knowledge Edited by Andrew Feenberg and Alister Hannay   Indiana Press Bloomington 
Indianapolis  1995  p. 141
310  I. D Thomson  Heidegger On Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education:  Cambridge 
University Press Cambridge 2005 p. 55
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the nature of Western metaphysics and the Western world in general. As has been 
noted  before,  Julian  Young  borrows  Nietzsche's  phrase  'doctor  of  culture'311 to 
describe the project  of  the later  Heidegger.   However,  this  notion  of  a  'doctor  of 
culture' should not be thought of as making a judgement on the vitality of a culture in 
the Nietzschean sense,  that  is  a  culture’s  ability  to  affirm itself.  Heidegger's  deep 
concern  regarding  modern  Western  nihilism  has  already  been  mentioned. 
Notwithstanding this, Heidegger's critique of the modern Western world is different 
from Spengler's critique in the Decline of the West in the sense that Heidegger does 
not  view  the  Western  world  as  'decadent'  and  in  immediate  danger  of  collapse. 
Although Heidegger does concern himself with the prospect that the Western world 
may implode and destroy itself as illustrated by 'the atomic bomb' in ‘The Thing’, this 
is only a possibility and certainly not viewed as inevitable. Heidegger dismisses this, 
stating that 'All attempts to reckon existing reality morphologically in terms of decline 
and  loss  in  terms  of  fate,  catastrophe,  and  destruction  are  merely  technological 
behaviour'.312 Heidegger, in effect, views Western civilisation as being strong in the 
Nietzschean  sense,  in  so  far  as  it  is  still  expanding  outwards.  Hence,  'the 
Europeanisation  of  the  earth  and  man'.313  Indeed,  it  may  be  the  case  that  the 
domination of the 'Western world' in the Heideggerian sense would not be dislodged, 
even if modern China were to replace the United States of America as the dominant 
world  power,  as  its  underlying  'metaphysics'  could  still  remain  fundamentally 
unchanged. Heidegger's ultimate fear might indeed be said to be that the dominance 
of  the  'Western  world'  would  continue  un-contested.  What  is  it  in  Western 
metaphysics  that  disturbs  Heidegger?  The  challenge  he  presents  to  Western 
311 J. Young  Heidegger's Later Philosophy   Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.31
312 M. Heidegger  ‘The Turning’ in  The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays Translated 
by William Lovitt Harper and Row  New York 1977  p. 48.
313  M. Heidegger ‘A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer’  in  On the Way into  
Language  ‘: Translated by Peter D. Hertz  Harper and Row  New York 1971  p. 15 
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metaphysics, that is often called his 'destruktion', can be seen as founded upon an 
interplay between yin and yang, as concealment and un-concealment and, as will be 
explored in this section, the denial  of this interplay through the loss of the  yin in 
Western thought. The modern Western world for Heidegger lacks, in the words of 
Julian Young, the sense that 'Awesomeness lies in concealment'.314
Heidegger's History of Western Metaphysics as the Loss of Yin
This loss of  yin can be said to begin with Plato. While it is not necessary to 
enter  into  a  full  account  of  Heidegger's  reading  of  Plato's  theory  of  truth,  it  is 
important to note that Plato shifts the understanding of truth towards the Forms that he 
understands as ideas (eidos).  From the position of Plato's Republic, the world of the 
senses is regarded as an imperfect shadow of the true world of the Forms. From this, 
Heidegger proceeds to state ‘that the beingness of whatever is, is defined for Plato as 
eidos (aspect,  view) is the presupposition,  destined far in advance and long ruling 
indirectly  in  concealment,  for the world's  having to  become a picture'.315 Such an 
interpretation may appear a peculiar reading of Plato, in so far as Plato's philosophy is 
normally read as a passage away from an image towards truth. However, Heidegger 
views Plato's theory of truth as representing a crucial shift away from the pre-Socratic 
understanding of truth as  aletheia, concealment and un-concealment. As such, Plato 
can be read as retreating from the significance of concealment. For Plato, darkness is 
implicitly seen as negative, associated with the shadows on the cave that have to be 
transcended.  As  Heidegger  understands  it,  Western  metaphysics  continues  this 
underlying Platonic project. In Plato’s interpretation, the ultimate goal of philosophy 
is to attain knowledge of the Form of the Good, which Plato identifies with the sun, 
314  J. Young  Heidegger's Philosophy of Art  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2001 p. 43
315  M. Heidegger ’The Age of the World Picture’  Question Concerning Technology and Other Essay 
Translated by William Lovitt Harper and Row  New York  1977.p. 131: 
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which may be associated in  Heideggerian terms with total  un-concealment.  While 
there is a sense in Plato that the Form of the Good may remain un-graspable, from a 
Heideggerian  perspective,  it  may  be  read  as  setting  out  the  path  for  the  later 
development of Western philosophy.
Hegel can also be interpreted as further extending this dominance of the yang 
in Western thought, in so far as for Hegel,  the goal of philosophy is to gain total  
disclosure of the world, when the 'Absolute Spirit' is able to contemplate itself. As the 
Hegelian Kojève states, the goal of philosophy is to become the 'wise man', who is 
said to have 'absolute knowledge, as perfectly self-conscious'.316. Kojève contrasts the 
Hegelian notion of the “wise man” which might be said to represent extreme yang, 
with 'the Hindu thinkers, who say that man approaches satisfaction-perfection in a 
dreamless sleep,  that satisfaction-perfection is realized in the absolute night of the 
“fourth state” turiya'.317 Entering into a full and complete discussion of this aspect of 
Hindu thought cannot be undertaken. However it might be said that in Daoist terms, 
such a state would be understood as that of extreme yin. The association of sleep with 
yin will be returned to later. Kojève, however, does not enter into a serious discussion 
of  the possibility  of 'turia'  or  turiya as  a philosophical  ideal,  seeing the Platonic-
Hegelian ideal of wisdom as underlying all philosophy.
 Taking  such  a  position,  it  seems  there  is  little  room for  yin in  Kojève's 
Hegelian  ideal  of  complete  self-consciousness  in  the  sense  of  Heidegger's 
concealment. For Hegel, such an element would appear only negative as a limit to the 
Spirit's self realisation. This can be observed in Hegel's understanding of the religion 
of the Syrians and Semitic Western Asians.  Hegel speaks in a deeply negative way 
316  A. Kojève  Introduction To Reading Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit:: Assembled 
by Raymond Queneau: Edited Allan Bloom  Translated. James H Nicols, JR. Cornell University 
Press 1980  p.76
317  Ibid pp 83-84
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about the 'worship of the Universal Power of Nature' represented by 'Astarte, Cybele, 
Diana of Ephesus', associating such worship with 'sensuous intoxication, excess and 
revelry'.318 This  shows  a  marked  contrast  to  Heidegger's  reverential  tone  towards 
Artemis.   Hegel’s  assessment  is  that,  rather  than 'sheltering and concealment',  the 
worship of nature is associated with 'destruction of its consciousness on the part of the 
Spirit in striving to identify itself with Nature, and the annihilation of the Spiritual in 
general''.319 Hegel clearly sees such a position as deeply regressive; and his analysis of 
the  significance  of  nature  in  the  Greek  world  differs  radically  from  Heidegger's 
reading of ancient Greece, as fundamentally founded upon the primal strife between 
earth and world. Hegel states that, regarding 'the Diana of Ephesus (that is nature as 
the  universal  mother),  the  Cybele  and  Astarte  of  Syria  -  such  comprehensive 
conceptions remained Asiatic, and were not transmitted to Greece'.320  For Hegel, it is 
the  progressive  achievement  of  the  Greek  world  that  'begins  with  Nature,  but 
transforms it into a mere objective form of its (Spirit’s) own existence.321 This reading 
shows a clear difference from Heidegger's understanding of Greek art as setting forth 
the  earth.  In  Hegel,  the  ultimate  goal  of  history  and  the  ideal  of  progress  is  the 
complete realisation of the spirit, that might read as the  yang or unconcealment in 
Heidegger, and the complete domination over nature, which might be read as yin, or 
concealment in Heideggerian terms. 
In Heidegger’s writings, the ultimate culmination of the history of Western 
metaphysics  lies  with  Nietzsche.  Therefore,  in  this  interpretation  of  Heidegger, 
Nietzsche  would  be  read  as  the  ultimate  disclosure  of  yang.  Such  a  reading  of 
Nietzsche, however,  appears problematic, particularly given the significance of the 
318 G.W.F. Hegel Philosophy of History: Translated J.Sibree Dover: New York 1956  p. 192 
319  Ibid  pp 192 to 193
320  Ibid  p 234
321 Ibid  
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Dionysian in the early Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. It has already been hinted at that 
Dionysian in the Nietzschean sense may not correspond exactly to the  yin as it is 
understood in Daoism. For example, while Nietzsche associates the yin with darkness, 
he does not associate it with receptivity. A full discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy 
cannot be entered into, but taking Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's philosophy as a 
basis, the mature Nietzsche can be understood as the culmination of the dominance of 
the  yang  in Western philosophy. As has been previously discussed, Heidegger sees 
Nietzsche as the spokesperson for the dominant metaphysics of Western modernity; 
and  as  such,  for  Heidegger,  Nietzsche  is  the  clearest  expression  of  what  was 
previously thought out in Western metaphysics, but which was never previously made 
clear.  Heidegger  describes  Nietzsche’s  philosophy  as  ‘the  consciousness  that 
unconditionally and in every respect has become conscious of itself as that knowing 
which consists in deliberately willing the will to power’.322 Heidegger understands 
Nietzsche's philosophy as a metaphysical interpretation of everything that is, in terms 
of its ability to exert power and continually enhance its power.  As such, Nietzsche, 
for Heidegger,  'realises conditions for absolute dominion over earth'.323 Nietzsche's 
doctrine of the eternal return of the same is interpreted as this continual affirmation of 
the will to power. There is no space in such metaphysics for anything to be disclosed 
as yin, in so far as there is no position for anything to be mysterious and receptive.
Heidegger's Understanding of Technology as the Loss of Yin
The  ultimate  culmination  of  the  history  of  Western  metaphysics,  and  for 
Heidegger, the application of Nietzsche's metaphysics, is the dominance of modern 
322  M. Heidegger  ‘The Word of Nietzsche’ The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 
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technology. 
The securing of supreme and absolute self-development of all the 
capacities of mankind for absolute dominion over the entire earth is 
the secret goad that prods modern man again and again to new 
 resurgences, a goad that forces him into commitments that secure 
 for him the surety of his actions and the certainty of his aims.324
As previously noted, in Heidegger’s view, modern technology is understood as 
the reduction of the 'earth' to 'resources standing in reserve’.  Heidegger’s assessment 
is  that  modern  technology  is  based  upon  a  continual  flow  of  resources  with  no 
ultimate centre  of  subject,  transforming everything ‘into an energy source for  the 
coming to  of  the fully  realized technological  future,  with  everything in  a  waiting 
mode, on stand by ready to be parasited by the demands of technicity’.325  As such, 
this might be read as the ultimate loss of the  yin, in that the earth can no longer be 
disclosed as yin sheltering and concealing - if the earth is demanded by Gestell to be 
'orderable as standing-reserve'.326 In effect, this means that it is no longer possible for 
the  stone  to  have 'instantly  withdrawn into  the  same dull  weight  and mass  of  its 
fragments',327  if the stone is understood simply as a 'mineral deposit' yielding 'ore, ore 
to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can 
be  released  either  for  destruction  or  for  peaceful  use.'328  This  understanding  of 
324 M. Heidegger  Nietzsche Volume 4: Translated by, David Farrell Krell, Harper Collins San 
Francisco 1991  p. 99
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modern technology, in effect, sees modern technology as representing the complete 
dominance of the yang to the extent that there is no longer a possibility of dynamic 
interplay between yin and yang. In the sense that it is expressed in the ‘Origin of the 
Work of Art’, the primal strife between earth and world is no longer possible within a 
world dominated by modern technology. 
 This complete domination of modern yang in the form of modern technology 
means that it is no longer possible, as Julian Young states, to see 'awe and reverence'. 
It can be linked fundamentally with a sense of the disenchanted, in that 'if one feels 
one has plucked out the heart of another's mystery, that one has complete conceptual 
mastery  of  what  makes  her  “tick”-that  she  has  become as  Heidegger  would  say, 
completely  “calculable”-  then  she  cannot  command  awe or  even  respect'.329.  It  is 
notable here too, that Heidegger associates the feeling of the sacred precisely with 
concealment and mystery, which can be linked with yin.  This appears to run directly 
counter to the Platonic sense, and thus to elements in the Western tradition of religion 
and  philosophy that  are  based  on Plato,  that  associates  the  divine  with  light  and 
disclosure, in effect, with yang.
Heidegger's Response to Technology and the Yin
Responding to a world dominated by technology is a central concern within 
the later Heidegger's philosophical project, which could be read as an effort to reclaim 
a space for yin. Thus, Heidegger's thought could be understood as attempting to renew 
an attunement to a sense of the yin. This concern underlies Heidegger's dialogue with 
the East Asian world, linking with Heidegger's own comment on ancient Greece that 
'[t]he Asiatic element once brought to the Greeks a dark fire, a flame that their poetry 
329  J. Young  Heidegger's Philosophy of Art Cambridge University Press Cambridge Cambridge 2001 
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and  thought  reorder  with  light  and  measure'.  This  seems  to  link  directly  with 
Heidegger's speculation that 'the East could be for us another sun-rising'.330 
It appears that Heidegger sought to renew the primal interplay between the 
earth  and  world,  or  dynamic  interplay  between  yin and  yang.   Hence,  at  times, 
Heidegger can be said to emphasise essentially  yin virtues. This is illustrated in the 
example Hwa Yol Jung raises that, for Heidegger, 'thinking as pious, is receptive and 
reverential. It is a receptive response to the “call” or “voice” of Being';331  and he is 
also correct to link this with the yin principle, suggesting again Heidegger's thought as 
a  re-emphasis  on  the  importance  of  yin receptivity,  against  the  extreme  yang, 
Nietzschean, position concerning the continual optimisation of the will to power. This 
appears similar to some points in the Dao De Jing, which seeks to emphasise essential 
yin virtues: 'the highest benevolence is like water'332 or 'the best way to live is to be 
like water'333 and 'the movement of the  Dao is to return the way of the  Dao is to 
yield'.334 This might be understood as Laozi’s attempt to re-emphasise the role of yin 
against the possible excess of yang in Confucianism.  However, it might be described 
as the most direct contrast to Nietzsche's extreme yang, and his emphasis on hardness 
in  Thus Spake Zarathustra.  This can particularly be seen in the radical difference 
between Nietzsche's parable of the diamond and charcoal in Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
where Nietzsche speaks in terms of an unqualified support for hardness, 'for creators 
are  hard'  and 'oh my brothers  become hard’.335  This  can be  taken to  represent  a 
continual  enhancement  of  yang as  hardness  in  Nietzsche  that  Heidegger  would 
330  M. Heidegger Sojourns: Journey to Greece Translated by John Panteleimon Manoussakis State 
University of New York Press New York 2005  pp 26-27
331 Hwa Yol Jung ‘Heidegger's Way with Sinitic Thinking’ in Heidegger and Asian Thought  Edited by 
Graham Parkes University of Hawaii Press 1990  p. 230
332 Laozi The Tao Te Ching The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin New 
York 2001  p. 29
333  Ibid   p.21
334  Ibid p.53   
335  F. Nietzsche Thus Spake Zarathustra:: Translated by J. Hollingdale  Penguin Classics London 
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155
associate  with  will  to  power,  in  sharp  contrast  to  Laozi's  saying  that  'the  soft 
overcomes  the  hard  and  the  yielding  triumphs  over  the  rigid'336,  which  can  be 
interpreted as viewing the receptivity of the yin more positively.
Is Heidegger Pro-Yin and Anti Yang?
Yet  Heidegger's  position should  not  be thought  of  as  simply  ‘pro-yin’ and 
‘anti-yang’,  even  though  certain  readings  of  Heidegger  might  be  said  to  over-
emphasise  the  yin  aspects  of  his  thought.  Such  readings  might  seem  to  present 
Heidegger's thought as crudely technophobic, even Luddite, or perhaps, as Richard 
Rorty refers to him,  Heidegger  as an 'ascetic  priest'  in Nietzsche's  sense,337 in  the 
sense  that  a  yin-centred  reading  of  Heidegger's  philosophy  would  in  effect  see 
Heidegger as set up against any kind of human action upon nature. Such a reading of 
Heidegger  is  offered by Graham Harman:  'for  Heidegger,  technology is  a  gloomy 
drama in which invention merely strips the mystery from the world'.338  Richard Rorty 
can be said to  exemplify such a reading of Heidegger  as a pro-yin and anti-yang 
thinker when he comments that 'Heidegger's utopia is pastoral, a sparsely populated 
valley in the mountains'.339 It is significant that Rorty further associates Heidegger 
with Hinduism, stating that Heidegger is seeking to make 'contact with what he calls 
his “true self” or “Being” or “Brahma” or “Nothingness”'.340 Whether or not this is an 
accurate reading of Hindu philosophy is a point that cannot be fully discussed here, 
although it should be noted that by Brahma, Rorty means Brahman, the un-changing 
336  Laozi The Tao Te Ching The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin New 
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ground  of  existence  in  Hindu  philosophy.  It  is,  however,  clear  that  there  is  an 
underlying Schopenhauerian element in such a reading of Heidegger, in so far at it 
appears to suggest that Heidegger wishes to have a simple renunciation of the World 
in the sense of not merely rejecting modern technology, but possibly all action that 
brings order and structure to the Earth.  This would be the extreme  yin-reading of 
Heidegger's philosophy.
However, such a reading of Heidegger is deeply one-sided.  An interpretation 
along  these  lines  would  set  him  against  all  'World',  in  the  sense  that  Heidegger 
understands  it.  Heidegger  is  not  against  what  might  loosely  be  called  all  human 
activity that brings order and structure to the 'Earth'. The Greek temple can be thought 
of  as  an  example  of  this,  while  in  Heidegger's  ‘Building  Dwelling  Thinking’, 
Heidegger attributes a particularly deep significance to the role of 'building', as in his 
statement, 'the bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power” it does not just 
connect banks that are already there'.341 Such an attitude towards human construction 
appears different from a position such as Pentti Linkola's description of humans as 'a 
cancer  of  earth'.342 What  is  it  that  distinguishes  such an example of  building that 
Heidegger views as positive, from the dominance of modern technology? Crucially, 
buildings,  such  as  the  bridge  or  the  Greek  temple,  allow  the  dynamic  interplay 
between  the  Earth  and  World.  The  bridge  in  ‘Building  Dwelling  Thinking’  is 
associated with 'power', while the temple in the ‘Origin of the Work of Art’ is clearly 
an imposing structure. Thus, they are both definite examples of the power of yang in 
Heidegger’s writings. What, however, distinguishes the temple and the bridge from 
the  overwhelming  yang power  of  the  river  dam  in  the  ‘Question  Concerning 
341  M. Heidegger’ Building, Dwelling and Thinking’  Poetry Language and Thought :Translated by 
Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row NewYork1971. p. 152.
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Technology’ is that both the bridge and the temple allow their surroundings to be yin. 
It is this dynamic interplay between  yin and  yang that makes Heidegger's notion of 
gathering  possible.  Heidegger's  thought,  rather  than  the  crude  technophobic 
renunciation which Rorty attributes to him, might be thought of as drawing closer to 
Ray Billington's interpretation of the ideal of Daoist philosophy, as 'Yang and Yin in 
harmony allow for both action and reflection, avoiding the extremes of the former, 
found in the materialism of the west, and the “otherworldliness” of Buddhism and 
Vedānta with their ideals of Nirvana and Brahman'.343 While a full discussion of the 
extent  to  which  Buddhism  and  Vedānta  might  truly  be  said  to  represent 
'otherworldliness' in the sense of yin cannot be undertaken in this thesis, it has been 
hinted at that Vedānta might represent such an extreme. Perhaps a philosophy like 
Mahāyāna Buddhism is harder to categorise in this way, but that is outside the central 
question  here.  The crucial  point  is  that  Heidegger,  like  the  Daoists,  is  essentially 
seeking for balance or dynamic interplay between yin and yang. It is thus possible to 
understand  Heidegger's  distinction  of  the  ancient  Greek  techne from  modern 
technology along these lines.  Froese states that 'Greek craftsmen paid more attention 
to how the sculpture fit into their environment'344 so that the environment could show 
itself. Such activity might be said to encompass perfectly the interplay between the 
yang structure and order of the sculpture, with the yin depth and receptiveness of the 
landscape. 
Heidegger: Yin and Yang and the Modern Westernised World
What  does  it  mean  to  re-open  the  interplay  between  yin and  yang in 
Heideggerian  terms?  Heidegger  rejects  the  possibility  of  simply  abolishing 
343  R. Billington  East of Existentialism: Tao of the West Routledge London 1990  p 199
344  K. Froese   Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Daoist Thought Crossing Paths In-Between: State University 
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technology, since  'No single man, no group of men, no commission of prominent 
scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry can 
break or direct the progress of history in the atomic age'.345 Is it  possible to make 
sense of Heidegger’s apparently enigmatic phrase, 'will we see the lightening-flash of 
Being in the essence of technology?'346 This may appear to suggest that Heidegger has 
become  merely  resigned  to  the  dominance  of  technology.  Thomson  presents 
Heidegger's position as a 'gestalt switch', meaning a transformation in understanding 
so that:  'we see the promise instead of the danger when, rather than see being as 
nothing, we learn to recognise the “nihilating” of being - that is the “presencing” of 
being makes itself felt in its difference from enframing'.347 Such a position may still 
suggest that Heidegger merely wishes to have a passive acknowledgement of nihilism 
as  the  current  disclosure  of  Being,  while  holding  out  the  possibility  of  a  future 
redemption. An alternative reading of Heidegger could be that he is emphatically not 
trying to actively abolish modern technology, nor does he believe that it is possible to 
bring  about  a  new  beginning  immediately  in  the  sense  of  a  sudden  radical 
transformation that might be equated with a re-opening of the inter-play between yin 
and yang. However, his philosophy might be read as an effort to cultivate a sense of 
the yin out of the dominance of the yang within modern technology.
One interpretation of the sort of relationship with technology that Heidegger is 
seeking to reach is proposed by Hubert Dreyfus who takes 'Woodstock' as an example, 
which,  using  non-Heideggerian  terminology,  he  calls  a  'new  cultural  paradigm'. 
Fundamental to Dreyfus' reading of Woodstock is that 'technology was not smashed or 
345  M. Heidegger   Discourse on Thinking, Translated by John M. Anderson and Hans Freund Harper 
Rowe London 1996  p. 52
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denigrated but all the power of the electronic media was put to the service of music',348 
which he interprets as focusing on the concerns of 'Greek virtues such as openness, 
enjoyment of nature, dancing and Dionysian ecstasy along with a neglected Christian 
concern  with  peace  tolerance,  and  love  of  one's  neighbour  without  desire  and 
exclusivity'.349 While it is not possible to enter into a full Heideggerian discussion of 
Woodstock, Dreyfus interpretation does provide a possible model of how, within the 
context of the modern Western world and without adopting a Luddite position, it is 
possible to have a renewed sense of interplay between yin and yang. A similar claim 
might  be  made of  Dreyfus’ reading of  modern  Japan:  '  In  contemporary  Japan a 
traditional, non-technological understanding of being still exists alongside the most 
advanced high-tech production and consumption'.350 Such a society appears in clear 
contrast to 'the pastoral, a sparsely populated valley in the mountains',351 referred to by 
Rorty.  While it may not be that Dreyfus wishes to present Japan as a 'Heideggerian 
Utopia', it can be seen as an example of a society with what would by most standards 
be called a high level of technology, which may also have a sense of the yin. It is of 
course  an  open  question  as  to  what  extent  modern  Japan  may  or  may  not  be 
considered a technocratic society. However, Dreyfus' account does provide a model 
for how a society may respond in Heideggerian terms to technology.
It is possible along these lines to present a potential Heideggerian future world 
which is not, in crudely Luddite terms, simply a return to pre-industrial ways. Such a 
society might still maintain a high level of technical advancement. However, crucially, 
the society would also maintain an attunement to yin in terms of a sense of mystery 
and depth, as well as an appreciation for stillness as well as action. Such a society 
348  H. Dreyfus 'Heidegger On Technology' in The Politics of Knowledge: Edited by Andrew Feenberg 
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may preserve an understanding of science, but would reject the hubris of scientism. A 
Heideggerian society might preserve a high standard of living while abandoning the 
need for continual economic or arms races, both of which, in Heideggerian terms, 
might  be seen to  represent  the Nietzschean,  continual  enhancement  of the will  to 
power. In such a world, where the interplay between yin and yang is present, it might 
be said that technology would whither away, to a certain extent resembling Engels’ 
prediction that the 'state would whither away',352 in the sense that technology would 
not  suddenly be abolished by fiat,  but  rather  that  the technology or  technological 
artefacts, while remaining in existence, would gradually no longer be allowed to stand 
as 'Gestell', meaning a total disclosure of all that is, but would return to techne. Such a 
way  of  relating  to  beings  would  allow  for  a  sense  of  yin  as  the  receptive  and 
ungraspable, rather than simply presenting everything that is as a resource. Achieving 
such a transformation, however, is not possible through human action.  The question 
therefore remains as to what the place of human action is, in the thought of the later 
Heidegger.
352  F. Engels 'Anti-Dühring ':Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, Progress Publishers 
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Chapter 9 Heidegger:  wu wei   and Gelassenheit   
The  later  Heidegger  has  often  been  read  as  being  fatalistic,  denying  the 
possibility of human action making a radical difference to the world.  This section, 
however, will seek to show that such an interpretation is one-sided.  In order do this, 
Heidegger's  understanding of  action  will  be  considered,  particularly  his  notion  of 
Gelassenheit, through the Daoist principle of wu wei.
Part 1: Introduction to wu wei
wu wei as a principle forms the political and moral guideline for Laozi's notion 
of what can be called the 'sage king'. More generally, it might be said to provide an 
ethical principle for all Daoist thinkers as a means of relating to themselves and the 
world. A literal translation of wu wei (無爲 or in simplified Chinese 无为) would be 
'non doing' or 'without action'. It is based on the position put forward by Laozi that 
'the sage acts without action and teaches without talking',353 and it is often also 
associated with wei wu wei - action without action.  Roughly, wu wei can be defined 
as between action and non-action. Such a definition, however, appears explicitly 
contradictory, ambiguous and problematic. Qingjie Wang lists three possible classical 
interpretations of wu wei: Firstly, 'literally doing nothing'354; secondly, 'unintentional 
spontaneity';355 and, thirdly, the 'action which does not force but yields'.356 This section 
will work on the basis of accepting the latter two interpretations of wu wei, while 
rejecting the first interpretation as a one-sided misrepresentation, for reasons that will 
353  Laozi The Dao De hing  The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star  Tarcher Penguin New 
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be discussed in the following paragraphs. I seek to explain the principle of wu wei, 
first, by looking at possible misunderstandings of wu wei, then by looking at wu wei 
in its historical context as a political position; finally, I will discuss wu wei as a 
philosophical way of life.
The apparent denial of human action in wu wei has often led Daoism to appear 
as if it were celebrating a kind of passive resignation.  This is suggested by the fact 
that Daoist thinkers, such as Laozi and Zhuangzi, as well as the less well known sage 
Liezi (列子), often seem to concur in the apparent moral arbitrariness of fate and the 
inadequacy of human endeavour. Hence, Liezi states that 'long life and short, failure 
and success, high rank and low wealth and poverty, come about of themselves'.357 This 
view appears fatalistic and amoral as it can be said to reject a notion of justice based 
around moral choice, such as in Kantian ethics. 
wu wei appears anti-humanist in the sense that it denies the power of a rational 
agent  or  subject  over  outcomes  in  favour  of  what  appears  to  be  impersonal  and 
arbitrary. It should be noted that fate in Chinese thought is understood as tian ming,  
which literally means decree from heaven, associated with 'mandate from heaven' in 
the case of the emperor. However, as A.C. Graham states, 'heaven is only vaguely 
personal even for Confucians and quite impersonal for Daoists'.358 Hence, fate,  tian 
ming, for Daoist thinkers such as Liezi and to a certain extent Zhuangzi, becomes a 
metaphor for events that happen outside of anyone's control. 
In certain Western interpretations, this apparent denial of the effectiveness of 
human action and effort  has been, as J.J.  Clarke notes,  'dismissed in  the west for 
promoting a typical oriental attitude of apathetic indifference to the demands of the 
357  Liezi  The Book of  Lieh-Tzu A Classic of Tao  Translated by AC Graham   Columbia University 
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world'.359 Daoism appears to advocate resignation in the face of apparently amoral and 
impersonal fate. 
  A similar  view  of  Daoism  may  be  found  in  some  Confucian  and  Neo-
Confucian writings such as Cheng Hao's criticism of the Dao De Jing that, 'both good 
and evil in the world are both Principles of Nature'.360 Cheng Hao thereby attacks the 
Daoists  for  rejecting  the  Confucian  moral  order,  as  well  as  potentially  all  moral 
endeavour  and associates  the  Daoist  ideal  of  naturalness  with  moral  indifference. 
Such a view would suggest that the Daoist must simply accept both good and evil as 
natural, while holding a generally negative view of all human actions as all human 
action would interfere with the natural flow of events. Hence, it is implied that the 
Daoist life is based around complete resignation.
A view of Daoism as morally indifferent is also indicated by passages of the 
Dao De Jing, for example as found in Chapter 19 which states, 
'abandon holiness. Discard Cleverness and the people will 
benefit a hundredfold. Abandon the rules of “kindness”.
 Discard “righteousness”'. 361 
This could be interpreted as portraying a strongly negative Daoist view of all 
efforts based on moral virtue.
However, a passive, amoral view of wu wei as promoting a Stoic acceptance of 
fate is a one-sided misrepresentation.  An example to the contrary could be observed 
when in Japan,  under the influence of Chinese thought,  according to  Blocker and 
359  J.J Clarke  The Tao of the West: Western Transformations of Taoist Thought :Routledge London 
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Starling, Daoism was held by the government leaders to encourage 'anarchy, rebellion 
and lack of loyalty to the state',362  rather than being associated as passive resignation. 
This apparent perception of Daoist philosophy as deeply subversive on the part of a 
ruling elite indicates that a reading of Daoism and wu wei as only advocating passive 
resignation fails to see something important. Taking the position of Qingjie Wang, this 
section will hold that a literal interpretation of  wu wei as 'doing nothing', although 
widespread among its critics, ‘was not accepted by the mainstream of philosophical 
Daoism in history'.363 However, if such a literal reading of wu wei as doing nothing is 
incorrect, how, then, should wu wei be interpreted?
wu wei and the Politics of the Warring States Period in China
In order to thoroughly understand the nature of wu wei, it is necessary to look 
at  it  in the context  of the Warring States period in  Chinese history,  as well  as in 
contrast to the alternative doctrines of Confucianism and Legalism (fa jia).
The  Warring  States  period  in  Chinese  history  was  a  period  of  political 
fragmentation following the loss of the central government from the Zhou Dynasty. 
This was also the period of the Hundred Schools of Thought in Chinese philosophy. 
While not denying the concerns of Daoism with nature, it is important to recognise 
some degree of political concern within the writings of the major Daoist thinkers. Wu 
wei should  be  associated  with  the  de,  the  practical  virtue  of  Daoism  as  the 
embodiment of the  Dao in  the world,  and not  merely a resignation from politics. 
There has been a tendency to downplay the political and ethical aspects of Daoism. 
This is largely because of a general conception of Daoism as promoting a political 
362  H. G. Blocker and C. I Starling  Japanese Philosophy:  State University of New York New York 
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withdrawal, as well as certain later developments in Chinese philosophy that led to the 
development of Neo-Confucian thought, associated with thinkers such as Zhu Xi, that 
began under the Song dynasty and became the dominant system of thought in China 
under  the  Ming  and Qing  Dynasties.  Broadly  speaking,  one  could  say  that  Neo-
Confucian  thinkers  adopted  elements  of  Daoist  and  Buddhist  ontologies  and 
cosmologies, while holding a political position based on Confucian social ethics. This 
focus on Confucianism as social ethics and Daoism as ontology has led to periods of a 
practical exclusion of Daoism from political discourse.
Although it  is  not  possible  here  to  enter  into  a  full  discussion  of  the  two 
systems  of  thought,  the  following  discussion  outlines  the  social  philosophies  of 
Confucianism and Legalism in order to contrast them with Daoism, particularly in 
relation to  wu wei. The Confucian ideal of social harmony is based on a notion of 
rules (li), where a king or emperor cultivates moral virtue  (ren), often translated as 
benevolence  or  humaneness,  and  guides  his  subjects  in  doing  likewise  under  his 
leadership. For the Confucians, 'good government begins in the moral self cultivation 
of able leaders'.364 It is, then, the moral duty of the able and benevolent leader to both 
uphold the standards of their own morality and that of their subjects, while it is the 
moral  duty  of  their  subjects  to  submit  to  a  benevolent  ruler. The  moral  ideal  of 
Confucianism might  be said to  look to a  benevolent  hierarchy as a model  that  is 
upheld through a code of conduct rather than through direct force or coercion. Hence, 
for the Confucians, the political discord could be resolved through moral leadership. 
The ideal Confucian leader,  therefore,  while he may be required to punish certain 
wrong  doers  and  socially  undesirable  elements  in  order  to  uphold  the  ordered 
hierarchy of society, he would be able to inspire his subjects’ obedience through their 
364 K. L. Lai  An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2008 
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own sense of obligation. At the same time he would provide a moral example to them.
 Opposed to this is the view, for a thinker such as Han Fei Zi, that, rather than 
simply the benevolence of an educated leader, what is needed to keep order in society 
is a system of laws (fa).  Fa in Legalism can be understood as an abstract system of 
institutional rules, which is associated with the state and thereby distinct from the 
Confucian  rites/rules  (li)  associated  with  personal  moral  behaviour.  While  within 
Confucianism,  there  were  debates  about  the  moral  character  of  human  nature, 
Confucius clearly held that human beings, given the correct moral guidance of the li, 
could behave benevolently in accordance with  ren.  Han Fei Zi, in contrast to both 
mainstream Confucians  and Daoists,  took a  more  negative  view of  human nature 
which is closer to a Hobbesian idea of a war of all against all, thereby rejecting the 
capacity for acts of individuals to be benevolent in the Confucian sense of ren even 
with the correct moral training, while at the same time eschewing the desirability for 
the running of society through benevolence from the ruler. The ruler under Legalism 
must  rather  uphold,  and become the  embodiment  of,  an impersonal  system of  fa, 
while ordinary people under Legalism are held to be 'instruments of state power; they 
had two primary functions; food production on the one hand and defence and military 
expansion on the other'.365 It is thus required the subjects of the Legalist state  should 
feel deep sense of terror towards sense authority, controlling their own negative or 
destructive instincts, as well a feeling of insignificance for themselves as individuals. 
As such, Legalism is a radically anti-individualist, to the point of being a totalitarian 
philosophy.
While it is true to say that all of these schools of Chinese thought have at times 
interacted  with  and  influenced  each  other,  (for  example  Han  Fei  Zi  sought  to 
365   K. L. Lai  An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2008 
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appropriate certain aspects of Daoism) the following section will show how Daoism is 
distinguished from the  other  two schools.  Particularly  in  the  teaching  of  wu wei, 
Daoism can be seen as opposed to both Legalism and Confucianism.  Considering 
Confucianism first, Zhuangzi directly challenges the Confucian ideal of benevolence, 
stating that,
When the Dao was lost, virtue appeared; when virtue was lost, 
benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness 
appeared; when righteousness was lost, ritual appeared. Rituals 
are just frills on the hem of the Dao, and are signs of impending 
disorder.366 
The  Confucian  notions  of  benevolence  are  seen  as  both  overly  restrictive  and 
hypocritical in Daoism; while Froese notes that, for the Daoists in relation to ren and 
li,  'The problem inhered not in the ideals themselves, but in the fact that they had 
become too ritualised and therefore undermined sincerity'.367 This is true to a certain 
extent that Daoist criticism of Confucian morality is not so much directed the morality 
itself, but rather against the excessive moralising tone of the Confucians. However, 
particularly for a Daoist thinker such as Zhuangzi, objection to  ren  and li runs at a 
deeper level, precisely in so far as the Confucian  ren  and li in themselves uphold a 
hierarchical ritualised society. Being  ren in the Confucian sense means adhering to 
one's role within the hierarchy. wu wei can thus be seen as an attempt to return back to 
the  Dao from ritual, righteousness, benevolence and virtue. A.C. Graham states that 
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Daoism is 'designed to encourage spontaneity in the same way that the Confucian and 
Mohist theories are designed to encourage moral endeavour'.368 
However,  wu wei in  Daoism is  more  than  simply  a  method of  cultivating 
spontaneity. For Laozi, wu wei is associated with an ideal of a 'sage king'. This model 
of leadership contrasts with the benevolent Confucian leader. In the writings of Laozi, 
the  Daoist  sage does  not  seek to  impose a  moral  order  upon the  society  through 
benevolence  and  ritual.  The  model  of  Daoist  leadership  in  practice  is  rather,  as 
expressed in Laozi's words, that 
he guides men back to their own treasure and helps all things come 
to know the truth they have forgotten. He does all of this without a stir.369
This  means  that  instead  of  directing  people  to  act  in  a  particular  way  through 
imposing a series of moral rules, the Daoist leader should rather encourage people to 
be true to themselves.   However, Laozi still maintains a notion of an ideal society, as 
expressed in the following passage: 
Let every state be simple, like a small village with few people. 
There may be tools to speed things up ten or a hundred times, 
yet no one will care to use them. There may be boats and carriages 
yet they will remain without riders. There may be armour 
and weaponry, yet they will sit collecting dust.370
368 Liezi:The Book of  Lieh-Tzu A Classic of Tao  Translated by AC Graham . Columbia University 
Press New York  p. 118
 Mohism represents another of the schools of Chinese philosophy in the Warring States Period, 
which emphasised the importance of austerity and the significance of human endeavour rather than 
fate (Tian Ming). It is not however possible to enter into a full discussion of Mohism here.
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 Such an ideal, poses a problem in Daoism since societies such as the militaristic, 
expansionist Kingdom of Qin, or the ritualistic strongly Confucian Lu Kingdom in 
Warring States period China, at the time when the early Daoists were writing, do not 
appear to closely resemble such a utopia. The question is, therefore, how, for Daoists, 
such an ideal can be realised and indeed were such a society to be set up, how would 
it  be  able  to  resist  being  conquered  by  its  more  aggressive  and  expansionist 
neighbours. The danger is that such a Daoist ethos either slips into a default position 
of conservatism, holding out an impossible ideal of a radically different society, or 
may appear simply to parallel Confucianism in seeking to impose a set of specific 
virtues on society. The crucial question is therefore, what would distinguish the Daoist 
leader from the Confucian in practice? 
 A crucial part of wu wei as a applied in philosophy is responding to the needs 
of a particular time. Ray Billington states that it means 'acting only at the right time 
and with the minimum amount of effort'.371 In this respect, Daoism might be said not 
to be fatalist in the sense of merely accepting fate, but rather in seeking to respond to 
fate  (tian  ming),  as  events  present  themselves  in  the  current  situation,  in  an 
appropriate manner. This is essentially how, in a practical sense, Laozi's sage king 
should act. Hence, Laozi condemns the fact that 'now the rulers are filled with clever 
ideas and the lives of people are filled with hardship'.372 With the phrase 'clever ideas' 
in this passage, the writer appears to be referring to the Confucian virtues and rites 
being  imposed upon ordinary  citizens.   The sage  king  for  Laozi  differs  from the 
benevolent Confucian monarch in the sense that the sage king should be a guide for 
2001  p .80
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the people, but not seek to impose virtue upon the people. This means that the sage 
king should respond to the particular needs of the people, while at the same time 
seeking to influence them without imposing an unattainable standard of morality upon 
them.
A further point is that the sage king in Laozi should not seek to uphold an 
abstract  system  of  laws  as  would  a  Legalist  monarch.  A Daoist  criticism  of  the 
excesses and flawed nature of such a Legalist system can be observed in the following 
passage:
 Why are the people starving? - Because their grain is being eaten up by taxes. 
That's why they're starving. Why are people rebellious? - Because those 
above them meddle in their lives. That's why they're rebellious. 373
Laozi also challenges the authority of the state to institutionally terrorise its 
subjects, as would be done through the harsh sanctions of the Legalist state, declaring 
that, 
if people do not fear death why threaten them with it? But suppose 
they did fear death and this was the fate handed to lawbreakers. 
Who would dare to do the killing? There is always a Lord of Death.
 He who takes the place of the Lord of Death is like one who cuts 
with the blade of a master carpenter. Whoever cuts with the blade
of a master carpenter is sure to cut his own hands.374 
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This can be taken as a rejection of the kind of state terror associated with Legalism, 
which requires that the state institutes harsh punishments in order to keep its subjects 
in compliance. 
Wu wei in Daoism can thus be interpreted as a rejection of the destructive 
aspects of the continual  mobilisation during the Warring States  period of Chinese 
history. This is apparent in the passage of the Dao De Jing;
those who rule in accordance to the Dao do not use force against the world. 
For that which is forced is likely to return - where armies settle nature offers 
nothing but briar and thorns. After a great battle has been fought the land is 
cursed, the crops fail, the Earth lies stripped of its motherhood.375  
 Liu Xiaogan emphasises that, 'for the Daoists, it is not worthy to conquer a 
country by wars and killing'.376. This, however, should not be thought of simply as an 
opting out of politics during the Warring States period, but rather as a response to it. 
As such, it is possible to understand wu wei as a rejection of direct confrontation. It is 
along these lines that Froese interprets a passage in the Dao De Jing Chapter 3: 'thus 
the  sage  rules  by  stilling  minds  and  opening  hearts,  by  filling  bellies  and 
strengthening  bones',377 sometimes  also  translated  as  'he  weakens  their  will  and 
strengthens their bones'.378 The expression, 'weaken their will', has been thought to 
imply a kind of authoritarianism close to ancient Chinese Legalism. However, such a 
375  Laozi Dao De Jing The Definitive Edition  Translated by Jonathan Star Tarcher Penguin New York 
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reading is inconsistent with other passages already referred to from the Dao De Jing. 
Froese interprets the passage thus: 'if the Daoist ruler seeks to reduce willing, it is 
because he hopes to encourage people to find harmonious means of relating to each 
other so that the particular virtues of each other can thrive’.379  In the context of the 
Warring States period, such a reading of wu wei can be understood as applying to the 
relationships  between  states,  too.  From  the  perspective  of  the  Dao  De  Jing,  an 
approach to unifying China, such as that taken by Qin Shi Huang, based upon Legalist 
philosophy through conquest and subjugation, would seem to be too destructive and 
unable to bring long-term stability. This is exemplified in practice by the fact that, 
although Qin Shi Huang united China within his life time, his dynasty, faced with a 
popular revolt, barely outlived his death, being supplanted by the Han dynasty.
Wu Wei and Ziran 
 The ultimate ethical aim for the Daoists in acting in accordance with wu wei 
can be understood as Qingjie Wang states: 'how “I” can behave in such a way the 
other's “it-self-so-ing” will have maximum room for growth and realisation'.380 This 
means acting in such a way that both cultivates one's own spontaneity as well as that 
of others. Such a reading of wu wei in effect links with ziran. The Daoist notion of the 
free spontaneous individual,  ziran,  which has been translated literally as 'so of its 
own', is associated with 'naturalness', 'freedom',  'spontaneity', both in people and in 
beings in general. Ziran might be understood roughly as everything being able to be 
as it is. Along these lines, wu wei can be understood as allowing beings to be ziran. At 
times therefore wu wei as the cultivation of ziran might require the active limitation of 
379 K. Farose   Nietzsche, Heidegger and Daoist Thought: Crossing Paths In-Between :Series in 
Chinese Philosophy and Culture State University of New York  New York 2006  p. 104
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certain entities that damage the ziran of others. Hence,  in order to cultivate the ziran 
of a tree or a plant, it may at times be necessary to actively intervene to protect its  
growth from the appetites of animals that would wish to feed upon it. Still, however, 
while preserving ziran may require active intervention, it is by definition not possible 
to force any being to be ziran. 
This link between wu wei and the free spontaneous individual can be seen in 
Zhuangzi.  For  Zhuangzi, wu wei becomes  a  more  radical  position  than  in  Laozi. 
Zhuangzi appears less concerned with Laozi's ideal of a 'sage king' who is still  in 
some sense guiding a state; rather, he tends to look at wu wei from a more individual 
level. Thus, rather than as a model for government, he looks to wu wei as a way of life 
that affects both the way people relate to the world and to themselves.
 This practical application of wu wei on an individual level is illustrated by in 
the  story of  cook Ding's  butchering  skills  in  Zhuangzi.  It  should  be noted  that  a 
butcher in China at that time was considered as a profession of a very low social 
status. Zhuangzi, however, takes the skill of cook Ding cutting the meat as an example 
of a particular kind of intuitive awareness that 'acts without acting', in the sense that, 
'between the joints there are spaces, and the blade of a knife has no real thickness. If 
you put what has no thickness into spaces such as these, there is plenty of room, 
certainly for the knife to work through'.381  
Why does Zhuangzi focus on such an intuitive kind of awareness? It can be 
understood in Karyn Lai's terms as seeking to depict 'a knack, a know how of living 
one's life to the fullest'.382  Zhuangzi appears to associate wu wei and ziran with a kind 
of liberation. Lai further states that, 'in Zhuangzi, the reason for undoing layers of 
381 Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu   Translated by Martin Palmer with Elizabeth Breuilly Arkana 
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conventional  and  cultural  conditioning  is  that  they  are  a  hindrance  to  a  more 
spontaneous and seemingly intuitive expression of self'.383 It is along the lines of this 
awareness  and  spontaneous  expression  that  Benjamin  Schwartz  states  that  the 
'problem' for Zhuangzi's 'men of gnosis is how to avoid government'.384 The use of the 
word  'gnosis'  for  the  kind  of  intuitive  awareness  that  Zhuangzi  is  seeking  is 
problematic,  although, as will  be seen,  there is  a sense in which it  may be called 
mystical.  It is, however, correct to say that it is through this awareness and use of wu 
wei and cultivation of ziran that Zhuangzi is seeking to escape from subordination to 
convention.
Thus,  the practice of  wu wei relates to  the Daoist  cultivation of  ziran and 
naturalness.  ziran is, in principle, the aim of wu wei, which should not be thought of 
merely as fatalism, but rather as a positive cultivation of such a state. For Zhuangzi, 
when an individual or entity is  ziran, it means that it is allowed to follow its own 
course. At times this may mean limiting the course of another harmful entity. To act in 
accordance with  wu wei  means that the individual acts in a way that cultivates her 
own ziran and the ziran of whatever she comes into contact with. Hence, Zhuangzi's 
butcher cuts the meat in such a way that he does not violate the structures already 
existing within the meat; thus the ziran of the meat is preserved. The aim of wu wei as 
a way of acting in practice should therefore be understood as a state of just being and 
allowing other beings to be. 
Part 2: Gelassenheit and Daoism
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Heidegger and Fatalism
Heidegger's thought, like Daoist thought, has often been held by critics to be 
fatalist. Fatalism means in this context the rejection of the capacity of human action to 
radically alter the state of the world. Richard Wolin, for example, holds this true of 
Heidegger's thought, stating that he places us 'in impotent bondage'385  before Being.
It  is  true  that  Heidegger  rejects  the  widely  accepted  understanding  of  the 
human subject as an independent agent with the ability to radically change the state of 
the world at will through conscious choice. Such a view for Heidegger is both illusory 
and  dangerous.  He would  reject  Sartre's  position  that  the  self  as  agent  or  author 
always has the capacity  to transcend his or her own facticity.   This means as the 
subject, the individual can radically alter the conditions of life through his or her own 
affirmation of choice.   Heidegger  states:  'meanwhile  man, precisely as the one so 
threatened,  exalts  himself  to  the  posture  of  lord  of  the  earth'.386 This  means  that 
technology as a system provides the basis for the illusion that people are the masters 
of destiny, and this is the basis of humanism. As such, it appears natural in the modern 
world to associate 'technological progress' with human mastery over the world. 
However, for Heidegger humans are in reality victims of technology. This is 
because,  under  the dominance of  modern technology through enframing (Gestell), 
humans, too, are reduced to the status of 'human resources'.  As has been stated in 
previous discussions, by technology is meant the disclosure of all that is in terms of its 
value as a resource, and the continual challenging and optimisation of resources that 
Heidegger associates with the German verb Gestell.  Gestell affects at a basic level the 
way that human beings both see and relate to themselves as well as to beings in the 
385R. Wolin  The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger:: Columbia University 
Press New York 1992  p. 15 
386M. Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology: The Question Concerning Technology and  
Other Essays  Translated by William Lovitt  Harper and Row New York 1977 p. 27
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world. Technology, for Heidegger, represents the horizon of disclosure in the modern 
world and, as such, not only determines the way that beings are revealed, but also 
affects the range of possibilities for human action both towards themselves and other 
beings. This means that Heidegger doubts the possibility that human actions may have 
the  capacity  to  reach beyond technology.  As Heidegger  states:  'this  destining,  the 
coming to presence of technology gives man entry into that which of himself, he can 
neither invent nor in any way make'.387 For Heidegger, it is possible to alter superficial 
aspects of the modern world through human endeavour,  but no amount  of human 
action will alter the underlying nature of the disclosure of the world in modernity. In 
effect, any attempt to abolish the technological disclosure of beings in the modern 
world by an act of human intervention will ultimately only cause a cursory change 
and thus, in practice, still affirm technology. For Heidegger, within the framework of 
modern technology, there is the illusion of continual change and novelty, while the 
underlying  system  of  flow  remains  unaltered.  The  inherent  violation  in  modern 
technology Heidegger considers to be something structural that is not dependant on 
the action of human beings.  For example,  in the later  Heidegger,  one might have 
chosen to support Russia or America in the cold war.  However, either way, it will not 
fundamentally alter the disclosure of Being.
This  appears  problematic  for  the  fundamental  project  of  Heidegger's 
philosophy, in so far as the later Heidegger's thought can be regarded as offering a 
response to the dominance of modern technology and nihilism. Heidegger rejects the 
possibility  of  mastering  history  or  technology,  and thereby seems to  discount  the 
possibility of an immediate and simple escape from technology.  Julian Young makes 
the point that there is a sense in which, for Heidegger, 'to believe oneself the master of 
387 M. Heidegger The Question Concerning Technology The Question Concerning Technology and 
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Being would reveal, precisely, one's 'forgetfulness' of Being'.388 Does this mean that, 
for Heidegger, modern technology and nihilism must be accepted as a destiny decreed 
by Being?  At times, it does appear that Heidegger's philosophy is quietist in simply 
waiting for a possible future turning in world history. There are points in his writing 
where he talks ambiguously about a future change, such as the 'return of the gods'. In 
Why  Poets?,  such  an  event  always  appears  messianic,  appearing  to  be  set  at  an 
indefinite moment in the future, a distant possibility, and Heidegger clearly seeing it 
as beyond the capacity of mortal humans to bring it about.  Benjamin D. Crowe notes 
that Heidegger 'makes it clear that he has no intention of carrying out Nietzsche's call 
for a “new table of values”'.389  The attempt to systematically impose a new system of 
values upon the world would thus slip back into the inherently violent, technocratic 
and Nietzschean position that the later Heidegger was trying to escape from. Does this 
mean that Heidegger must in effect accept technology and Gestell as fate and decree 
from Being?
This would appear to leave Heidegger's thought in a weak position, trapped in 
the nihilistic world of Gestell disclosed by modern technology, which appears beyond 
human  alteration.  As  Heidegger  states,  'always  the  destining  of  revealing  holds 
complete  sway  over  man’.390 Heidegger  would  thereby  appear  obliged  to  accept 
technology  and  Gestell as  the  current  mode  of  revealing,  regardless  of  his  own 
concerns about disenchantment;  thus appearing to undermine the possibility of his 
own later work ever having any effect. It is along these lines that Herman Philipse 
claims  that  'Heidegger's  seemingly  “deep”  critique  of  technology  is  nothing  but 
388 J. Young  Heidegger's Philosophy of Art  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 113
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pseudo-religious quietism disguised as radical critique'.391 This, however,  is  a one-
sided  reading  of  the  dominance  of  modern  technology  for  Heidegger;  and, 
furthermore, as the following sections will show, Heidegger's philosophy should not 
simply  be  understood  as  fatalist  in  the  sense  of  holding  all  human  action  as 
completely futile. Such a reading of Heidegger ignores the central aim of a large part 
of Heidegger's later writings, which is basically concerned with how to live in the 
modern world rather than merely accepting the modern world as it is.
Introduction to Gelassenheit in Heidegger
As a response to  the modern world,  Heidegger  turns to  Gelassenheit.   He 
associates Gelassenheit with renunciation of will:  'a patient noble-mindedness would 
be a pure resting in itself of that willing, which, renouncing willing, has released itself 
to what is not will'.392 In this passage, Heidegger appears to put forward Gelassenheit 
as a rejection of a Nietzschean-style affirmation of the will. As such, Gelassenheit 
may still at first appear simply as a kind of passive resignation. Heidegger, however, 
rejects  such  an  interpretation,  stating  through  the  figure  of  the  scientist  in 
‘Conversation  on  the  Country  Path’,  that  Gelassenheit  'is  in  no  way  a  matter  of 
weakly allowing things to slide and drift along'.393  
The word Gelassenheit itself is an old German word, sometimes translated as 
“releasement” or “letting go”, and is connected with Meister Eckhart's thought, where 
it  is  understood as renouncing one's own will  in order to act with the will  of the 
godhead.  Heidegger  was  of  course  aware  of  the  relationship  of  Gelassenheit  to 
Meister Eckhart's thought.  However, he still distanced himself from it, stating that, 
391  H. Philipse Heidegger's Philosophy of Being A Critical Interpretation  Princeton University Press 
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'what  we  have  called  releasement  evidently  does  not  mean  casting  off  sinful 
selfishness and letting self-will go in favour of the divine will'.394  
What Heidegger means by Gelassenheit does not appear immediately clear in 
his  later  writings.  Firstly,  he  makes  the  bold  claim  that  Gelassenheit  has  the 
possibility, together with 'openness to mystery', to 'grant us the possibility of dwelling 
in the world in a totally different way. They promise us a new ground and foundation 
upon  which  we  can  stand  and  endure  in  the  world  of  technology  without  being 
imperilled by it'.395 What does Heidegger mean by this claim? It would appear that, by 
its very nature, Gelassenheit is still not able to transform the world, in that it rejects 
any kind of imposition of a new order upon the world. Heidegger would appear to 
remain in the position of having to wait for a turning in world history. However, while 
Gelassenheit cannot  be  equated  with  an  event  such  as  the  'return  of  the  gods', 
Heidegger states that, in Gelassenheit there is 'a higher acting concealed' that is above 
'the actions within the world and in the machinations of all mankind' while at the same 
time being 'without acting'.396 This apparent ambiguity means that while Gelassenheit 
does not involve direct action to change the world, it can for Heidegger, provide a 
deeper and more radical alteration. The rejection of 'will' that Heidegger associates 
with Gelassenheit, can in this way be understood as a radical rejection of the will to 
power in the Nietzschean sense, which Heidegger sees as at the foundation of the 
modern world.Along  these  lines,  Heidegger's  assessment  of  Gelassenheit can  be 
understood,  rather  than  simply  waiting  and  continuing  unchanged  within  the 
disclosure of modern technology, as representing the cultivation of  a particular kind 
of attitude and relation to the world. 
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 Michael. E. Zimmerman outlines such a way of acting in three points, 
[Firstly] it means not unduly interfering with things. Second, it means 
taking care of things, in the sense of making it possible for them to fulfil 
their potential. Third, letting be involves not just the ontic work of
 tending to things, but also the ontological work of keeping 
open the clearing through which they can appear'.397   
The nature of what it means to not unduly interfere and to take care of things will be 
looked  at  subsequently.  At  this  point,  though,  it  is  important  to  note  that  such a 
reading  of  Gelassenheit rejects  what  is,  for  Heidegger,  the  structural  violence  of 
modern technology. As such,  Gelassenheit, for Heidegger, represents a more radical 
alteration  than  any  course  of  action  normally  undertaken  in  the  world,  in  that  it 
represents a change not merely in a way of acting, but in a way of seeing and relating 
to the world. Hence, 'staying open' which Zimmerman associates with Gelassenheit, 
can in this way be understood as a part of Heidegger's overall system of thought, in 
the sense of staying open to an awareness of the sacred,  the ineffable  and of the 
interplay between concealment and un-concealment. 
Heidegger, Gelassenheit, Turning and wu wei
Taking this  summary as an initial  reading of  Gelassenheit,  there is  a clear 
resonance with the Daoist principle of  wu wei.  Heidegger's use of the old German 
word has been thought to be similar to  wu wei in Daoism, particularly in a passage 
where  he  describes  Gelassenheit as  'beyond  the  distinction  between  activity  and 
397 M. E. Zimmerman   Contesting Earth's Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity: University of 
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passivity',398 while Froese directly translates Heidegger's Gelassenheit as 'letting be',399 
which appears directly equivalent to 
wu wei in Daoism.  
This section will look at the Daoist model of wu wei in order to see whether 
the  Daoist  understanding  of  'actionless  action'  can  provide  a  way  to  understand 
Heidegger's position in relation to the dominance of technology; and subsequently to 
show that Heidegger's stance is  not fatalist.  Rather,  it  will  be argued that through 
Gelessenheit,  like  wu wei  in  Daoism,  Heidegger  is  seeking  to  cultivate  a  radical 
transformation, which at the same time does not involve a comprehensive imposition 
of a new order upon the world.
Taking  the  possibility  that  wu wei  in  Daoism provides  a  possible  way  to 
understand Heidegger's  Gelassenheit,  it is also possible from this to make sense of 
Heidegger's response to the dominance of modern technology, thus showing the way 
that Heidegger seeks to resist the reduction of everything to resources within the flow 
of technology.
Joan  Stambaugh  defines  Gelassenheit  as  'to  stop  doing  all  the  things  we 
constantly do',400 meaning that 'we' stop acting in such a way that affirms Gestell; 'we' 
stop acting unquestioningly within the flow of resources. Thus, Gelassenheit appears 
as a transformation of perception at a profound level, rather than a passive acceptance 
of  the world as  it  is.  In  this  respect,  Gelassenheit  can be  understood as  stepping 
outside of the technocratic framework of Gestell, where everything is viewed in terms 
of its resource value. Thus, Gelassenheit still does not entail acting in such a way as to 
398 M Heidegger  ‘Conversation on a Country Path’ in Discourse on Thinking: Translated by John M 
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directly bring about an immediate radical transformation in the modern world. What, 
however, does a non-technocratic, non-Gestell relationship to the world entail?
Gelassenheit  is  basically  what  Young  calls  the  'personal  turning',  as  the 
'turning of thought and life of the individual'.401 Following this analysis, Gelassenheit  
for Heidegger can be understood as being similar to the ideal of the Daoist  sage, 
particularly  for  Zhuangzi,  in  so  far  as  Heidegger’s  Gelassenheit presents  the 
possibility for an individual to rise out of the disclosure of Being as Gestell, meaning 
that the individual no longer sees itself, and relates to beings, as resources standing in 
reserve. This resembles the ideal of the Daoist sage when confronted with a world that 
is, from the Daoist perspective, corrupted.
Heidegger's  position appears  closer  to  Zhuangzi's  than Laozi's  in so far as 
Heidegger remains focused on the ideal of certain individuals being able to rise above 
the dominant framework of the surrounding world, as has been discussed here, rather 
than an ideal of a 'sage king' guiding the whole of society. Hence, the 'releasement' of 
the Heideggerian thinker who practises Gelassenheit resembles Zhuangzi's 'liberation 
from the need to pursue the goals set up by one's cultural tradition'.402 In Zhuangzi's 
position,  it  is  the  liberation  from  the  conformist  and  hierarchical  Confucian  or 
Legalist dominated court life and mass mobilisation of the Warring States era, while 
in Heidegger's case, it is liberation from the consumerist and reductionist nature of 
technology based on  Gestell. In both cases,  they do not seek to  enforce a  radical 
transformation of the world around them through conquest, but rather promote a deep 
personal  transformation.  Although  Schwartz  describes  Zhuangzi's  philosophy  as 
'mystic gnosis',403 in neither of the cases does it involve a direct revelation or specific 
401J. Young  Heidegger's Later Philosophy: Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002  p.89
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kind of knowledge. Rather, in both instances, it involves cultivating a particular way 
of seeing and relating to the world.  In this way, it does not involve one single radical 
'turn' once and for all, but rather the continual cultivation of this non-enframing way 
of relating to beings.
    Gelassenheit (interpreted as  wu wei) does not require a radical epochal 
turning in  the  world,  but  rather  presents  a  way for  individuals  to  live  within  the 
modern world without being entirely taken into the flow of resources; both in the 
sense of not viewing beings entirely in terms of resource value and also not relating to 
oneself as a human resource. In this way, it is possible to make sense of Heidegger's 
statement, 'we can use technical devices and yet keep ourselves so free of them, that 
we may let go of them any time'.404  The cultivation of Gelassenheit understood as wu 
wei, while accepting the continued dominance of technology and enframing of the 
current  epoch,  at  the  same time  allows  a  state  of  existence  that  is  in  itself  non-
technocratic. Thus, it becomes possible to live with the modern world without being 
completely taken into the metaphysics and disenchantment of the modern world.
Heidegger: Ziran, Dwelling and Freedom
Just as for Heidegger viewing beings in a technocratic way through Gestell, as 
resources  standing  in  reserve,  is,  by  definition,  violating  the  earth  and  world 
regardless of how one then acts, seeing everything that is, in terms of Gelassenheit in 
itself lets things be. For Heidegger, once someone has assumed Gelassenheit, beings 
in the world will in effect be allowed to be disclosed in a different, non-technocratic 
way, and, as such, one will act differently towards them. What is the essential state of 
existence that Heidegger is trying to cultivate through Gelassenheit? This state can be 
404 M. Heidegger ‘ Memorial Address’ in Discourses on Thinking    Translated by John M Anderson 
and E Hans Freund Harper and Row London 1966  p 55
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understood in terms of ziran as Zhuangzi understands it: as a state of naturalness, as 'it 
self so-ing' as Qingjie Wang interprets it.  ziran can be understood precisely as that 
which is lost for Heidegger in the 'challenging forth'405 and optimisation of resources 
standing in reserve. Hence, in the same way that Qingjie Wang sees ziran and wu wei  
as linked in Daoism, it is possible to see in Heidegger an underlying relationship of 
Gelassenheit to a state that is equivalent to ziran in Daoism. 
 The following in Heidegger's ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ exemplifies this:
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to set at peace, to remain at 
peace within the free, the preserve, the free sphere, that safeguards each
 thing in its nature. The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing
 and preserving.406 
This clearly resonates with ziran in the Daoist tradition, in so far as 'dwelling' 
in this passage is understood as existing in a state where beings are allowed to be 'set 
at peace'. This can be seen further in Heidegger's understanding of 'free', which he 
states, 'really means to spare'.407 This shows a radical break from a view of freedom as 
being  able  to  assert  one's  will,  to  one  of  leaving beings  as  they  are.  Technology 
through Gestell  denies the freedom of beings in precisely this sense.  Freedom for 
Heidegger can be associated with a state of 'just being', with naturalness, or ziran in 
Daoist terms.
Heidegger's aim to cultivate an anti-instrumentalist view of things may thus 
appear similar to Zhuangzi's story of the oak tree and the carpenter, where the tree 
405 M. Heidegger   ‘Question Concerning Technology’ in Question Concerning Technology and Other  
Essays  Translated by William Lovitt  Harper and Row  New York 1977  p. 23
406 M. Heidegger  'Building, Dwelling  Thinking' in Poetry, Language and Thought: Translated by 
Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New York 1971  p. 149
407 Ibid 
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states, 'I have perfected the art of uselessness and this has been very useful to me', 
while 'trees such as hawthorn, pear trees, orange trees, citrus trees, gourds and other 
such fruit', 'because they are useful, they suffer, and they are unable to live out the 
years heaven decrees for them’.408 In Heideggerian terms, the 'useless tree'  can be 
understood  as  the  tree  that  does  not  get  used  up  in  the  flow of  technology.  For 
Heidegger, the simple view of the tree as a supply of wood standing in reserve waiting 
to be used up in the flow of resources has already been destroyed, because the tree is 
no longer allowed to disclose itself simply as a tree. Even before it is cut down, it 
already is seen and judged merely in terms of its commodity value. It is unable to 
remain as it is. Under such circumstances, uselessness stands out against the view of 
everything in terms of use value. It is notable that Zhuangzi goes on to say that, 'this is 
the sort of uselessness that sages live by'.409 This understanding of the sage as useless 
appears similar to the Heideggerian notion of the thinker who steps outside of the 
flow of resources. In this respect, both Heidegger and Zhuangzi are trying to cultivate 
an  appreciation  of  uselessness  in  the  sense  that  they  both  oppose  the  continual 
optimisation of use value and the valuation of beings only according to their use value 
in the flow of resources in technology.
Preserving ziran in  this  way, as letting beings  be,  may therefore appear to 
prevent the Heideggerian dweller from extracting any kind of practical utility from 
beings encountered in the world. Such a view would suggest that any kind of use 
would entail violation. However, this may be a one-sided view. Graham Parkes states 
that 'Heidegger would applaud a woodworker who himself seeks and finds the perfect 
tree for the chair he has in mind, and then proceeds to fashion it with thoughtful hands 
408 Zhuangzi:The Book of Chuang Tzu: Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly Arkana 
Publishing London 1996  pp33-34
409 Ibid p 34
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to respond to the uniqueness of the wood'.410 Along these lines, in  What is Called  
Thinking? Heidegger states that 'proper use does not debase what is being used'.411 To 
a  certain  extent,  elements  of  this  have  been looked at  in  the  previous  section  on 
Heidegger and the yin and yang, although in the current discussion, it is possible to 
see further the link with Zhuangzi's butcher, also referred to previously, who cuts in 
accordance with the joints of the meat. In both cases, they hold a skill and awareness 
of that which they are acting upon, that reveals the form latent within it. The butcher 
with  his  knife  has  to  respond to  the  structure of  the  meat.  This  directly  parallels 
Heidegger's statement, 'when we hand a thing, for example, our hand must fit itself to 
the thing'.412 What distinguishes such forms of action, craft or skill from Gestell is that 
such  actions  allow,  or  even  in  some  sense  might  be  able  to  cultivate,  ziran, the 
essential  nature  of  things.  Froese  makes  the  point  that,  for  Heidegger,  'one  must 
provide an opening for other beings through one's actions'.413 At times, acting in this 
way requires more than simply and passively leaving things as they are; but, crucially, 
it never involves imposing one's own will on beings. 
Thus, the Daoist sense of 'actionless action', understood as 'acting in such a 
way that lets beings be', can be understood in Heideggerian terms as to 'act without 
enframing (Gestell)'. In both cases, in the Daoist and Heideggerian sense, this may 
involve not just a passive leaving of beings as they are, but a positive cultivation of 
beings.  However,  it  never  involves  mass  subjugation  in  the  sense  of  a  radical 
reduction of beings to resources that Heidegger associates with Gestell.
Heidegger's thought should not be taken as a direct attempt to bring about a 
410 G. Parkes  'Thoughts On the Way': Heidegger and Asian Thought  University of Hawaii Press1990
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new world disclosure, nor as simply a matter of fatalistically waiting, but rather as 
seeking to cultivate a way of relating to beings that can be understood in the sense of 
the  practice  of  Daoism.  While  Heidegger's  thought  remains  passive  on  a  world 
historical scale, it should not be thought of as passive or indifferent on a personal 
scale.
Heidegger's  philosophy  thus  offers  what  can  loosely  be  called  an  'ethical 
position' based on Gelassenheit  and dwelling, which can be understood through  wu 
wei and ziran. It is an 'ethical position' that can be understood as acting in such a way 
that 'lets things be', which, while rejecting direct wilful imposition upon the world, at 
times does involve a positive cultivation. It should be considered as 'ethical', not in the 
Kantian sense of seeking to lay down a categorical imperative that can be expressed 
as a set of commandments or fixed code of behaviour, nor even in the sense of a 
Confucian virtue of benevolence based on the rites or Christian ideal of charity. What 
Heidegger is seeking in  Gelassenheit is closer to the ancient Greek notion of  ethos 
that offers a way of seeing and relating to the world that precedes acting or not acting 
in a particular way. Heidegger sees taking this attitude as superior and praiseworthy, 
ultimately offering a richer and less inherently destructive form of life in comparison 
with simply continuing to relate to beings in a technocratic way based on  Gestell. 
Implementing  this  fundamental  change,  however,  should  influence  the  way  that 
someone acts. At times, it does require a positive cultivation; as Heidegger states, 'real 
sparing is something positive'.414 Its main aim, however, is to resist the overarching 
nature of Gestell as the reduction of all beings to resources standing in reserve. 
The problem with such a position is that, while it is not completely fatalist, it 
still  remains  deeply  focused  on  a  personal  transformation,  rather  than  seeking  to 
414  M. Heidegger  ‘Building, Dwelling Thinking’ in Poetry Language and Thought:  Translated Albert 
Hofstadter: Harper Row New York 1971  p.149
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transform the world or society. An individual could practice Gelassenheit in the sense 
outlined above, and the rest of the flow of resources would be unaffected. As such, 
Heidegger's position virtually precludes the possibility of mass action in the Marxist 
sense  to  transform  society.  However,  in  dwelling  and  Gelassenheit,  understood 
through wu wei and ziran, Heidegger does provide a radically non-technocratic way of 
relating  to  and  seeing  the  world.  In  this  respect  Heidegger's  philosophy  offers  a 
fundamental and profound transformation. Heidegger would willingly acknowledge 
that  it  is  not  an easy state  for  an individual  to  achieve within the modern world. 
However,  a  significant  part  of Heidegger's  later  writing can be read as  aiming to 
achieve this state. 
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Chapter 9 Heidegger, The East Asian World and Non-Doctrinal Religion. 
This section will examine Heidegger's philosophy of religion in the light of 
Heidegger's dialogue with the East Asian world. The central focus of the section is to 
show what a possible final understanding and conclusion of Heidegger's dialogue with 
the East Asian world could be. To achieve this, the argument will be advanced that 
East Asian thought provides a means to understand Heidegger's efforts to rethink the 
philosophy of religion, proposing that his thought should be understood as religious, 
but in a way that breaks with the Western tradition of religion as a fixed set of beliefs.  
As an  illustration  of  this,  I  will  look at  Shrine-Shinto  and Zhuangzi's  Daoism as 
examples  of  non-doctrinal  religions.  These,  it  will  be  argued,  provide  ways  to 
understand aspects of Heidegger's later religious thought.
Heidegger's Early Phenomenology of Religion
The question of religion is central to much of Heidegger's thought from an 
early stage in his work. In  The Phenomenology of Religious Life,  a lecture course 
given in 1920-21, Heidegger takes as a central project a phenomenological enquiry 
into the life of the early Christian community at the time of Paul's epistles. As such, 
the project is connected with an attempt to reclaim the primitive Christian religion in 
terms of a lived experience separated from the various doctrines, particularly those 
associated  with  Platonism  and  Neo-Platonism  that  were  later  included  within 
Christianity.  Hence,  Heidegger  in  The  Phenomenology  of  Religious  Life  was  not 
concerned with presenting early Christian belief as a metaphysical system, but rather 
as a form of life based on an eschatological anticipation of the second coming of 
Christ.   Therefore,  in  the  Phenomenology of  Religious  Life Heidegger  is  not,  for 
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example, concerned with presenting how Paul's epistles could be used to support later 
church doctrines, such as the Trinity. Thus, as Crowe states, 'since his enterprise is 
phenomenological rather than theological, Heidegger is not compelled to assent to the 
truth of such claims.'415 This means that Heidegger does not need to look at whether 
Paul's claims are valid as doctrines. Along such lines he therefore states that,
It is noticeable how little Paul alleges theoretically or dogmatically; 
even in the letter to the Romans. The situation is not the sort of 
theoretical proof. The dogma as detached content of doctrine in an 
objective, epistemological emphasis could never have been
guiding for Christian religiosity. On the contrary, the genesis 
of dogma can only be understood from out of the enactment 
of Christian life experience.416 
However, while for Heidegger, the early church may not have had the complex 
doctrines and metaphysical assertions of later Christianity, it was still a form of life 
and religious practice that could only be made sense of within certain fixed beliefs. 
Therefore, for example, although the early church would have lacked metaphysical 
speculations about the nature of the Trinity,  it  would still  have maintained certain 
defining points, such as the belief in  the Second Coming of Christ, that were thought 
to be both fundamental and unquestionable. One could not be a Pauline Christian in 
the sense that Heidegger seeks to present it and not believe in the Second Coming or 
the authority of certain scriptures. The belief in the Second Coming of Christ is what 
415  B. D. Crow Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion- Realism and Cultural Criticism Indiana 
University Press Bloomington Indianapolis 2007  p. 86
416 M. Heidegger The Phenomenology of Religious Life  Translated by Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer 
Anna Gosetti-Ferencei Indiana University Press Bloomington Indianapolis 2005  p.79
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gave early Christianity its sense as a way of life. Hence, the life-world of the early 
Christian community would still remain founded on a shared holding of fixed beliefs.
It would, therefore, seem that Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life is 
to a certain extent Kierkegaardian in its view of faith as lived experience. This reflects 
the fact it was written during the period of Heidegger’s involvement with Lutheranism 
in  the  early  1920s.  Such  an  approach  clearly  remains  strongly  indebted  to  the 
Christian understanding of what it means to be religious in so far as faith as lived 
experience is still tied to a commitment to a particular set of beliefs, although at the 
same  time  it  is  seeking  to  get  away  from  any  systematic  church  dogma  or 
metaphysics. It will be argued here that, while maintaining certain aspects of his early 
phenomenology of religion, such as the concern to separate religious practice from 
merely practical human concerns and the rejection of modernist attempts to reduce 
religious practice to sociology or psychology, in his later work he does make a crucial 
break away from this position on religion. This break is not merely superficial in that 
he moves away from explicit references to Christianity in his later writings; but, as the 
following section will seek to show, Heidegger's later thought aims to challenge the 
very notion of what it means to be religious, a notion that has been dominant within 
Christianity, while at the same time associating the holy or sacred with a sense of 
otherness  and  mystery.  What,  therefore,  does  such  a  re-thinking  of  the  nature  of 
religion entail?
Introduction to Heidegger's Later Religious Thought
Certain readings of the later Heidegger tend to over-emphasise the continuity 
between  his  early  and  later  writings.  Crowe  takes  such  a  view  on  Heidegger's 
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religious position, stating that 'the differences between early and later Heidegger on 
religion  are  not  sufficient  to  warrant  the  claim  that  his  later  work  is  a  radical 
departure'.417. Such a position implicitly holds that the later Heidegger still remained 
heavily  influenced  by  Christianity,  or  at  least  a  certain  notion  of  Christianity  as 
represented in the Phenomenology of Religious Life. 
However, at this stage, it is important to note that a crucial change occurred in 
Heidegger's thought when, in  An Introduction to Metaphysics,  he stated concerning 
biblical scriptural authority that, 'anyone who holds such faith can in a way participate 
in asking our question, but cannot really question without ceasing to be a believer'.418 
By this, Heidegger is referring to the question expressed as, 'why are there beings 
rather than nothing?”419 This means that Heidegger radically rejected any  religion 
based  on  faith  that  required  the  holding  of  certain  fixed  beliefs,  seeing  this  as 
antithetical to real philosophical questioning, particularly the question of Being. 
In this way, his later work represents a radicalisation of Heidegger's earlier 
position in  that  Heidegger's  early  Phenomenology of  Religion  sought  to  reclaim a 
notion of Christian faith as separate from later church doctrines. However, in doing 
so, Heidegger maintains a notion of faith in certain fixed beliefs as defining religious 
life.  Thus,  in  his  early  writings,  Heidegger  still  remained  attached  to  a  Christian 
notion of faith. However, in his later writings, he rejected the notion of faith itself. 
Hence, it is hard to see that the later Heidegger in any meaningful sense might be 
called  a  Christian.  It  would  appear  that  Heidegger  rejects  Christianity  along such 
lines, not because he disputes any particular belief of Christianity, but rather because 
he rejects a notion of religion based upon a fixed set of beliefs. The later Heidegger is 
417  B. D. Crowe Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion: Realism and Cultural Criticism Indiana 
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thereby  implicitly  challenging  the  definition  of  religiousness  that  is  based  on  a 
Christian notion of belief. It would appear, therefore, that Heidegger's later thought 
must not only reject Christianity, but any potentially parallel religion with a similar 
model of fixed belief or scriptural authority.
 Does such a claim mean that Heidegger has completely rejected any notion of 
religion? It appears natural in Western thought to assume that someone questioning 
Christianity  is  in  some  sense  implicitly  opposed  to  any  kind  of  religiousness. 
However, from the perspective of Heidegger's later writings, it does not appear to be 
the case that he completely rejected the importance of religion or the sacred after the 
early writings. Indeed in many of Heidegger's later writings, such as the ‘Age of the 
World Picture’, or ‘Why Poets?’, his chief concern and criticism of the modern world 
is 'loss of the gods', which, for Heidegger, is deeply tied to the dominance of modern 
technology  as  Gestell, reducing  the  earth  to  a  resource.  According  to  the  later 
Heidegger, there is an absence of the divine within the modern world.  However, he 
did not regard the loss of what, in a general sense, may be defined as the 'religious' in 
a positive light. In describing the modern world, Heidegger sought, as William Barrett 
states, to provide 'a description of the world in from which God is absent'420 This, 
however, does not amount to a Nietzschean-style affirmation of the death of God, as it 
is precisely the dominance of the technocratic modern Western world, that is based on 
the loss of the divine, that Heidegger sought to challenge. Hence, the later Heidegger 
should not be thought of as an atheistic or even non-religious thinker. 
 Crowe is therefore right in pointing out that 'Heidegger makes it clear that a 
reinvigoration and transformation of the religious heritage of Europe lies at the very 
heart'421 of  his  programme,  seeking  to  struggle  against  the  disenchantment  of 
420  W. Barrett  Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy   Anchor Books Doubleday New 
York 1962  p. 209
421 G. D. Crowe (2007) Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion   Indiana University Press 
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modernity. However, at the same time, Heidegger's later thought challenges a model 
of doctrinal religion as exemplified by medieval Catholicism, where  'the real locus of 
truth has been transferred to faith - the infallibility of the written word and to the 
doctrine of the Church'.422 The religious project of Heidegger's later thought must be 
understood as a rejection of both, of modern secularism and of traditional dogmatism.
Interpretations of Heidegger's Later Thought on Religion
Given  its  double-sided  aspect,  how  should  Heidegger's  later  thought  on 
religion be interpreted? It has been understood variously as a lapse into incoherent 
mysticism,  an  effort  to  reinstate  ancient  Greek  religion,  or  as  a  continuation  of 
Christian theology. In this section, it will be argued that such approaches to Heidegger 
are fundamentally flawed, in so far as they all fail to understand Heidegger's radical 
re-thinking of  the possibilities of  religious practice.  This  section puts  forward the 
position that in this radical re-thinking of the nature of the sacred and the religious in 
general,  Heidegger's  later  thought  fundamentally challenges the understanding and 
definition of what it means to be religious, a view that has been dominant, within 
western Christianity and possibly to a certain extent within some other religions, at 
least since the early church creeds and councils such as Nicaea. His understanding 
rests on the  idea, which it appears intuitive to hold, that any religion is by definition 
identified as a particular set of beliefs that may or may not have practices and rituals 
associated with them. Thus, adherence to religion, given such an understanding, is 
defined as acceptance of a particular set of beliefs or doctrines that may then provide 
the basis for a certain set of rituals and social practices. It is, however, the argument of 
this section that such an understanding of religion is not universally applicable and 
Bloomington Indianapolis 2007 p 100
422M. Heidegger ‘The Age of the World Picture’ in The Question Concerning Technology and Other  
Essays:  Translated by William Lovitt  Harper and Row New York 1977  p. 122
195
runs the risk of excluding religions, such as shrine-based Shintoism or certain aspects 
of  Daoism,  from  religious  discourse.  Furthermore,  this  notion  of  'non-doctrinal 
religion', the exact nature of which will be discussed subsequently, can provide a way 
to understand the work of the later Heidegger, particularly regarding the notions of 
dwelling and the sacred expressed in works such as 'The Thing'. 
Seeking to challenge Heidegger's later philosophy of religion, Philipse makes 
the claim that 'religious believers, whether polytheist,  monotheist, post monotheist, 
tend to claim that they have specific religious experiences that must be explained by 
supposing that their religious doctrine is true'.423 From this fundamentally doctrine-
centred position, Philipse continues to assert that Heidegger is offering a religious 
doctrine that is in effect 'post monotheistic' in attempting to substitute 'Being' for the 
traditional Christian notion of God. He therefore regards it as a failure in the project 
of the later Heidegger that he could not offer a fixed and justified doctrine or set of 
beliefs and, as a result, he sees Heidegger's position as entailing a kind of spiritual 
arbitrariness, thus falling foul of a basic assumption he makes about religion along the 
lines that: 
as there are many religions, one must either admit that each of them
has to be explained by supposing that the religious doctrine which 
it embraces is true. Consequently, one has to posit innumerable 
gods and supernatural beings, including Heideggerian Being.
Religious people will find this result unacceptable, because 
they claim that only their own religious doctrine is completely 
true, so that religions are mutually incompatible.424
423  H. Philipse Heidegger's Philosophy of Being  Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey 
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Philipse appears to present Heidegger as playing a religious-philosophical 
trick  in  order  to  keep  his  position  safe  from  criticism by  failing  to  present  any 
doctrines to analyse or review openly, while at the same time trying to set up what is 
in  effect  still  a  religious  doctrine  in  the  Christian  sense.  Such a  reading presents 
Heidegger's philosophy as seeking to offer a religion that is parallel to Christianity, 
but which, however, fails to assert itself in terms of a justified doctrine and thus falls  
into incoherent mysticism.
However,  Philipse  misunderstands  the  religious  project  of  the  later 
Heidegger.  It  is  incorrect  to  say  that  his  later  thought  has  such  deep  'structural 
resemblances to traditional Christian monotheism'.425 While there may still be certain 
resonances with religion, Heidegger's later thought does make a crucial break with the 
understanding of what it means to be religious that has been dominant in Christianity. 
Philipse's interpretation thereby misses the central thrust of Heidegger's later religious 
thought, which should not be understood as a failed 'creed of Being', nor as another 
attempt to set up a doctrinal religion along the lines of, for example, Catholicism or 
Lutherism.  It is rather, as it will be argued here, an attempt to rethink the nature of 
religion.
Another misrepresentation of Heidegger's later thought is that put forward 
by John Caputo, which states that Heidegger's later philosophy of religion is simply 
an effort to reinstate Greek religion, combined with an effort to remove the Judeao-
Christian  elements,  which  Caputo  refers  to  as  'its  radical  exclusion  of  everything 
Jewish and Christian'426 in order to restore, 'the myth of the Great Beginning among 
1998  p 301
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the Greeks, to which the Germans are the sole, appointed, destined heirs'.427 This view 
of  Heidegger's  work is  further  extended by Philipse  who holds  that  Heidegger  is 
generally involved in an implicitly anti-Semitic project of trying to remove the Jewish 
religious influence on the West. 
However, while it is true to say that Heidegger does break with Judaism, in 
so far as he rejects scriptural authority and strictly exclusive monotheism, the central 
thesis  of  Heidegger's  thought  is  not  so  much  to  escape  from Judaism or  Jewish 
influence, but rather to challenge the dominance of Christian doctrine together with 
modern  secularism.  Heidegger  clearly  uses  at  times  the  pre-Socratic  or  Homeric 
Greek world as an archetype and potential alternative model of life to set against the 
modern Western world. This is most clearly expressed in his ‘Origin of the Work of 
Art’ and his writings on Hölderlin, although in other works of the later Heidegger, 
such as ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and ‘The Thing’, the Greek references are far 
less explicit. Heidegger himself states ambiguously that he aims  
 to pursue more originally what the Greeks have thought, to
 see it in the  source of its reality. To see it so is in its own way 
Greek, and  yet in respect of what it sees is no longer, is 
never again, Greek.428 
The  exact  meaning  of  this  passage  is  unclear.   However,  it  can  be 
interpreted roughly as stating that, while Heidegger at times seeks to reclaim ideas, 
particularly of pre-Socratic and Homeric Greek thought, seeing such ways of thinking 
as preferable to medieval Catholicism or modern secularism, he does not simply seek 
427  Ibid  p  177
428   M. Heidegger ‘Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer :in On the Way into  
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to repeat Greek thought as it was in ancient Greece. Rather than simply seeking to 
recover ancient Greek thought, Heidegger's project might be understood as an effort 
to recover a more deeply primordial notion of the sacred that is non-doctrinal. Ancient 
Greek religion might be understood as an expression of this non-doctrinal sense of the 
sacred, but it is not the only expression of such a sense that is possible.
Robert S. Gall notes, 
with its emphasis on god and gods presencing within the 
familiar abode of man, as unfamiliar, the Heideggerian 
scheme suggests that the matter of the god and gods is less 
that of dogma and doctrine and more that of our being on the
 way, going out into the world and giving thought to 
what has been given, and thereby perhaps catching sight
 of the divine.429 
Gall's statement on Heidegger's later religious thought is correct and shows that it 
should be understood as a way of relating to the world that cultivates a sense of the 
sacred.  As  such,  it  cannot  be  expressed  in  any  fixed  doctrinal  understanding  of 
religion, and can, therefore, be taken as an example of 'non doctrinal religion'.  The 
following sections will look at Heidegger's own dialogue with the East Asian world 
and  the  dialogue  between  Heideggerian  philosophy  in  general  and  East  Asian 
traditions of religious thought, in order to clarify the notion of non-doctrinal religion, 
thereby providing an alternative understanding of the sacred.
429   R. S. Gall  Beyond Theism and Atheism: Heidegger's Significance for Religious Thinking : 
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The Nature of Non-Doctrinal Religion
What does it  mean to be religious in a non-doctrinal sense? Given that 
religion and doctrine have appeared inextricably intertwined to such an extent, for a 
large  part  of  European  and  American  history,  it  seems  difficult  to  conceive  of  a 
religion  without  this  theoretical  basis.  Thus,  being  a  Catholic  naturally  means  to 
believe in church doctrine and creeds, although tied in with the commitment to these 
doctrines may be certain practices such as the seven sacraments. Such practices are 
always seen and made sense of within the context of certain beliefs, say the Trinity, to 
the  extent  that  it  would  appear  impossible  for  someone to  be a  Catholic  and not 
believe in the Trinity. The Athanasian Creed, for example, aims to define the 'Catholic 
Faith'  and  states  explicitly  that,  'This  is  the  catholic  faith.  One  cannot  be  saved 
without believing this firmly and faithfully’.430 Throughout the course of the history of 
the development of Christian doctrine, there have been a number of major schisms, 
such as the Arian movement, often over what may appear comparatively minor points 
of  belief,  thus  reflecting  the  deep  significance  given  to  doctrine  in  defining 
Christianity. Such a notion of religious belief as central and definitive to the nature of 
religion  still  appears  central  to  certain  protestant  churches,  particularly  regarding 
notions such as the Lutheran justification through faith alone.  To a certain extent, 
Protestantism in general and Lutheranism in particular, tend to turn religion into a 
matter of personal belief, together with biblical authority.
Thus, it would seem natural to assume that adherence to a religion is by 
definition a matter of accepting a fixed set of beliefs. Indeed it makes no sense for 
someone to be both a Lutheran and a Catholic, or a Catholic and an Arian, as they 
appear to be mutually exclusive. It would appear natural to assume that one either 
430  Athanasian Creed: Text prepared by the International Consultation on English Texts (ICET) and 
the English  Language Liturgical Consultation (ELLC): Creeds, Councils and Controversies (1989) 
J. Stevenson edited. SPCK Church History 
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accepts  the  Augsburg  confession  of  faith  in  Lutheranism,  or  one  does  not.  Non-
adherence to any religious creeds would appear, by definition, to entail either atheism 
or agnosticism. A debate between religious sects would therefore seem to be a debate 
between different doctrines; and a large part of the philosophy of religion appears to 
be concerned chiefly with the nature and validity of different doctrines as an effort to 
induce true religious faith. Adherence to a particular religion would thus seem to be 
defined naturally as an exclusive commitment to a particular set of beliefs. 
However, such a definition of religion is not able to include all religions 
that have existed. It might still be argued that the English word 'religion' itself carries 
too many connotations of 'doctrine,' and, therefore, should not be applied to systems 
lacking in fixed doctrinal beliefs. It appears an almost insurmountable task to have a 
strict definition of religion that might include everything that has, at various times and 
in various places, been classed as religious. Accordingly, it goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis to lay down an all-encompassing definition of religion. It appears that, to a 
certain  extent,  the  rejection  of  the  word  'religion',  when  applied  to  non-doctrinal 
religions, is part of a way of excluding them from religious discourse, thus implying 
they are in some sense less theologically developed in their understanding of religious 
belief. Along such lines, a number of Western thinkers, such as Hegel and Voltaire, 
have held, in Hegel's words, that 'inward religion... is alien' to the 'character of the 
Chinese  people.'  431 Against  such views,  this  thesis  will  continue  to  use  the  term 
'religion' to describe non-doctrinal religions. It will seek to show that such doctrinal 
religions, rather than being less developed, represent an alternative understanding of 
what it means to be religious.
 A wide  variety  of  different  religions  are  'non-doctrinal',  in  that  being 
431 G.W.F. Hegel  The Philosophy of History   Translated  by J. Sibree  Dover Publications New York 
1956  p. 138
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committed to them cannot be defined as adhering exclusively to a fixed set of beliefs. 
Such a list of religions might include Classical Greek religion, as well as certain other 
polytheistic traditions, mainstream Hinduism and possibly elements of Judaism. The 
central focus here, however, will be on East Asian religious thought as non-doctrinal. 
What does it mean to be religious in a non-doctrinal sense? To answer this 
question,  it  is  necessary to ask what it  is  that would distinguish an adherent to a 
particular non-doctrinal religion from a non-adherent. This appears far less clear cut 
than for doctrinal religions, particularly since, as will be discussed further at a later 
stage, in certain non-doctrinal religions, adherence need not necessarily be exclusive. 
While there may be a wide variety of aspects that are definitive of different non-
doctrinal  religions,  this  section  will  look at  two  aspects  that  are  fundamental  for 
defining a  large range of non-doctrinal  religions.  These two aspects are  a  way of 
living and relating to the world, often marked out by certain rituals; and, secondly, a 
sense of the sacred which can be understood, in Robert Gall's words, as the way that 
'what is divine is shown and emerges through our words, thoughts and deeds.' 432 
The first of these involves a way of life and ritual.  This aspect appears 
naturally dominant, particularly in certain non-doctrinal religions. Gavin Flood states 
that, concerning Hinduism:
what a Hindu does is more important than what a Hindu
 believes. Hinduism is not creedal. Adherence to the Dharma is 
therefore not an acceptance of  certain beliefs, but the
 practice and performance of certain duties.433
432 R. S Gall: ‘Different Religions, Diverse Gods’ in: International Journal For Philosophy of Religion 
Volume 49 No 1 February.2001  p. 39
433 G. Flood  An Introduction to Hinduism : Cambridge University Press Cambridge 1996  p.12
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 Frits Staal expands that a Hindu 'may be a theist, pantheist, atheist, a communist and 
believe whatever he likes, but what makes him into a Hindu are the ritual practices he 
performs  and  the  rules  to  which  he  adheres.'434  Hence,  what  matters  in  defining 
Hinduism,  rather  than  any fixed  unified  beliefs,  is  how one lives  one's  life.  This 
emphasis on practice, rather than doctrine, appears common to a number of different 
religions besides Hinduism, including certain non-doctrinal, practice-based religions. 
These practices, in particular in non-doctrinal religions, can be highly prescriptive, 
such as the conservative Confucian understanding of the rites, or an Ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish (Haredi) reading of the Torah, while others, such as modern Shrine-Shintoism, 
appear more flexible.
Viewing  non-doctrinal  religion  as  simply  a  collection  of  rituals  and 
practices, however, remains only superficial. The rituals and practices within specific 
non-doctrinal religions are given sense and significance as part of a way of perceiving 
the world. This way of observing the world is not made into a systematic set of beliefs 
about the world as in doctrinal religion. It is rather a more basic way of relating to the  
world, similar to mood in the Heideggerian sense, as a way that the world is disclosed. 
This sense of the sacred as a way of relating to the world thereby provides the basis 
for the various practices associated with non-doctrinal religions.  Hence,  at  a basic 
level, it is  what would separate the way a religious adherent would see a particular 
sacred mountain, such as Fuji or Tai Shan, as manifestations of the sacred (a place to 
encounter the divine), as opposed to the merely aesthetic resorts that a tourist might 
see. Thus, as Robert Gall states, the 'reality of the divine is demonstrated through a 
variety of interrelated, integrated and mutually supportive practices.'435 Such rituals 
434 F. Staal   Rules Without Meaning, Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences  :Peter Lang Publishing 
New York 1989  p 389
435 R. S Gall: ‘Different Religions, Diverse Gods’:  International Journal For Philosophy of Religion  
Volume 49 No 1 February.2001 p. 39
203
and practices in non-doctrinal religion thereby act to preserve and cultivate the sense 
of the sacred or divine in daily living. Hence, for example, tying blue ribbons to a tree 
in Mongolian shamanism, red ribbons in Chinese folk religion or the  shimenawa in 
Japanese Shintoism all make sense because of a particular association with the sacred 
and also serve to both mark out and preserve the sense of the divine in such places. 
Such actions define a particular relationship to the world. In this way, practice and the 
experience  of  the  sacred  can  be  fundamentally  and  mutually  interconnected  with 
practice in non-doctrinal religion.
  Non-Doctrinal East Asian Religion
This section will examine shrine-based Shintoism and Daoism (focusing 
on Zhuangzi) as non-doctrinal religions. Firstly, Shrine-Shintoism will be looked at as 
a  model  for  a  communal  and  ritual  based  non-doctrinal  religion.  Following  this, 
Zhuangzi's writing will provide an ontological view of non-doctrinal religion.
Shrine-based Shintoism provides an important model of a non-doctrinal 
religion in that it combines an experience of the sacred with a set of practices and 
rituals  that do not entail,  at  least  in  traditional  forms of Shintoism, a fixed set  of 
doctrinal beliefs. It is notable that Shintoism in Japan has co-existed with Japanese 
Buddhism and has often been directly combined with Buddhism. This often entailed 
direct syncretism between Buddhism and Shintoism in medieval Japan. Even at times 
when Shintoism and Buddhism have existed separately, it has been common for both 
religious traditions to be practised by the same people.  It is reported that 'whenever 
there is a census or survey asking Japanese to check off a box describing religious 
affiliation, over ninety percent still select Shinto. Yet some seventy to eighty percent 
also check off Buddhist.’436 This apparent overlap between Shintoists and Buddhists in 
436  T. P. Kasulis Shinto: The Way Home: University of Hawaii Press  2004 p. 28
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Japan has led people with a Western understanding of religion to assume that Japanese 
culture is not serious in its commitment to religion, or else that Shintoism should not 
be truly classed as a religion. The model of non-doctrinal religion, however, provides 
a way to interpret the nature of Shintoism and presents a way to understand how it can 
be taken as a committed religion.  Sokyo Ono states that 'the strength of Shrine-Shinto 
is  in  its  emphasis  on  sensory  experience  derived  from  mystic  rites  and  natural 
phenomena rather  than  theological  discourses'.437 The  absence  of  sacred  texts  and 
doctrine  can  be  seen  as  setting  traditional  shrine  Shintoism  apart  from  later 
developments, such as 'Sect Shintoism' or 'State Shinto' as well as various Japanese 
new religions, such as Tenrikyo, that derive partly from Shintoism. It is important to 
note that these are generally later developments in Japanese religious practice, partly 
in response to Japan's contact with Christianity and, for this reason, they are more 
doctrinally centered with fixed beliefs. The main focus here, however, will remain on 
Shrine-Shintoism.
Aside  from  certain  readings  of  Shintoism,  particularly  those  of  Neo-
Confucian-influenced Edo scholars, such as Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1692) who sought 
to interpret Shinto myths and legends in the light of philosophical principles such as 
the yin and yang, shrine-based Shintoism does not appear to offer what in Western 
terms might called a systematic ontology. It may rather be thought of, in the Greek 
sense of the word ethos, as a way of seeing, acting and relating to things in the world. 
Motoori Norinaga held that this way of seeing and relating to things in the world in 
Shintoism was founded on Mono no Aware. This notion of  Mono No Aware, can be 
understood as a sensitivity towards the beauty of transitory things in the world, which 
Motoori  Norinaga contrasted with the more heavily rule-based Confucian morality 
437  S. Ono in collaboration with W. P. Woodard   Shinto The kami Way  Tuttle Publishing Boston 2004 
p.  93   
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that failed to take note of such a sense of things.438 Shigeru Matsumoto notes:
Thus we can see that mono no aware experiences involves some intuitive 
and aesthetic understanding of the heart of an object, which implies a 
certain sympathy for or even empathy toward the object. In short, 
mono no aware as Norinaga conceives it may be understood as a man's
emotional and aesthetic experience of  being aware.439
Such  a  poetic  sense  of  existence is  lost  with  cold  indifference  or  a 
preoccupation with abstraction. Crucial to Shintoism, therefore, is cultivating a sense 
of responsiveness to this immediate presence of things in the world. It is related to a 
certain feeling of awe that in Shintoism is tied to the tama, roughly translated as the 
spiritual  power  of  things.  As  Kasulis  states,  relative  to  such  experiences  of  awe, 
'Shinto spirituality is about learning to feel at home with - feeling we belong with 
them and them with us - even if we do not fully understand why'.440 This underlying 
notion of the sacred is tied to and expressed through certain rituals, such as  Misogi  
(ritual washing), offerings to shrines (such as rice, sometimes given first, because 'it is 
considered in Shinto to be the initial gift of the kami', then, 'salt, water and sake'441) 
and the Shinto wedding ceremony. The rituals of Shintoism serve as expressions of 
the underlying sense of the sacred and ethos of existence, at times being tied to certain 
particular virtues,  such as  misogi  -  purity of heart.  These further contribute to the 
notion of a community founded on a sense of the sacred. These, as will be shown 
later, relate powerfully to Heidegger's notion of religion as 'being in the world'.
438  S. Matsumoto  Motoori Noringnaga 1730-1801  Havard University Press: Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 1970  p 44
439 Ibid  p.45
440  T. P. Kasulis  Shinto: The Way Home: University of Hawaii Press  2004  p.28
441  K Nelson  A Year in the Life of a Shinto Shrine  University of Washington Press Seattle 1997  p. 49
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Zhuangzi's  thought  provides  to  a  certain  extent  a  parallel,  but  also,  in 
specific crucial respects, a contrasting notion of non-doctrinal religion to the heavily 
ritual and community-focused religion of Shrine-Shintoism. While Shintoism is not as 
prescriptive in its demands of an individual for the community as Confucianism, the 
overall focus of Shintoism is still on the life of the community, and important aspects 
of Shrine-Shintoism, including rituals such as the Kagura or sacred dance, only make 
sense as part of the community. Zhuangzi's writing is more directly focused on the 
individual life of the sage who is radically distinct from any community.
 An  additional  factor  is  that,  alongside  a  shift  in  focus  towards  the 
individual, Zhuangzi offers a more developed ontology. It is this ontology as a model 
of non-doctrinal religion that will be considered here. On first reading, Zhuangzi's 
ontological and epistemological thought may appear from a Western viewpoint an odd 
combination of perspectivism and mysticism in that Zhuangzi seeks to both affirm 
and show the limited nature of a wide variety of perspectives, while at the same time 
seeking to express a notion of the Dao. These two positions do not naturally appear 
linked together, with mysticism seeming to imply a higher insight into the nature of 
reality,  while  perspectivism would see the truth as  being  conditioned by different 
perspectives. In the latter, there are different understandings of the truth for different 
perspectives and it is impossible to say which perspective is right and which is wrong. 
Rather  than  the  ontological  insight  that  appears  naturally  to  be  associated  with 
mysticism, perspectivism seems to lead more easily to a position of relativism with 
the view that there is no absolute truth or scepticism, that the truth is unknowable. 
 Zhuangzi's mysticism has already been looked at in the previous section 
on Daoism and ineffability. However, the main focus here will be on how the notion 
of  non-doctrinal  religion  can  reconcile  the  mystical  and  religious  elements  of 
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Zhuangzi's thought with Zhuangzi's own perspectivism with regard to any absolute 
claim on truth. To do this, it is first necessary to look more closely at the nature of 
Zhuangzi's perspectivism that is shown by passages such as the following: 
                  I  Zhuangzi, dreamt that I was a butterfly, flitting around enjoying 
myself. I had no idea I was Zhuangzi. Then suddenly I woke up 
and was Zhuangzi again. But I could not tell, had I been
 Zhuangzi dreaming I was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming I was
 now Zhuangzi?442
 It  would  appear  that  Zhuangzi  offers  equal  validity  for  the  perspectives  of  the 
butterfly  in  the dream and of  himself  as  Zhuangzi.  Zhuangzi's  thought,  therefore, 
seems  to  differ  radically  from,  for  example,  Cartesian  doubt,  which  took  the 
ambiguity in different perspectives between dreaming and awake as a challenge to be 
overcome in order to establish a secure basis for knowledge.  Instead, as Hans Georg 
Moeller  states,  Zhuangzi  'does  not  take  anything  away  from the  reality  of  either 
Zhuang Zhou or  the butterfly  for  he affirms and founds their  complete  reality'.443 
There is no privileged perspective and therefore, Zhuangzi is willing to accept a wide 
variety  of  different  perspectives,  thereby  appearing  to  implicitly  limit  any  single 
perspective's  claim  on  truth.  Hence,  in  passages  such  as  'under   heaven  there  is 
nothing greater than a tip of a hair, but Mount Tai is smaller; there is no one older than 
a dead child, yet Peng Tsu died young,'444  (Mount Tai being the highest mountain in 
China and Peng Tsu being famous for his longevity).  Zhuangzi is apparently arguing 
442  Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly .Arkana 
Publishing  London 1996  p. 22
443 H. G. Moeller Daoism Explained: From the Butterfly Dream to the Fishnet Allegory Open Court 
Chicago USA 2005  p. 54
444  Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu  Translated by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Akarna 
Publishing London 1996  p.15  
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that  such  seemingly  absurd  judgments  are  possible  because  of  the  differences  in 
perspectives. Thus, claims such as 'there is nothing greater than a tip of a hair' can be 
true by taking a particular perspective. For Zhuangzi, any attempt to hold on to one 
single,  absolute  and  privileged,  perspective  is  inherently  flawed.  Karyn  Lai, 
commenting  on  an  extreme  reading  of  Zhuangzi,  states  that  it  seems  that  'the 
perspectives of a cicada, the dove, the giant bird, as those of the well-frog and sea-
turtle,  are equally valid'.445 This would be problematic for any attempt to set up a 
religion based upon fixed doctrines.
Given this strong perspectivism, certain commentators have suggested that 
Zhuangzi's thought has abandoned any notion of one single Dao underlying all things, 
the  Shen  Dao.  Along  such  lines,  Chad  Hansen  states  that  'Zhuangzi's  argument 
undermines  Shen Dao's absolute monism'.446 Such a reading of Zhuangzi seemingly 
holds  that  perspectivism  precludes  the  possibility  of  the  apparent  overarching 
understanding of the nature of reality that Shen Dao appears to entail.
However, David Cooper interprets the Dao,
as the condition for all experience - and hence for worlds as experienced. 
A perspective is itself a way in which the world is experienced or becomes
present for us and other creatures. So we might call dao 'the way that gives
all ways' or 'the origin of presence'. Recalling the Daoist predilection 
for aquatic  imagery, we might name it  the source or well-spring - even
the opening up of channels - that enables experience to flow.447  
445  K. Lai  Introduction to Chinese Philosophy Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2008  p. 155
446  C. Hansen  Tao of Tao in Chuang-Tzu' Experimental Essays on Chuang Tzu: Edited by Victor H 
Mair  University of Hawaii Press 1983  p. 47
447   D.E. Cooper Converging with Nature: A Daoist Perspective: Green Books, Dartington UK 2012
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Accepting such an interpretation of the Dao, Zhuangzi's thought should be 
read as offering a mystical/religious experience that does not entail the privileging of 
one perspective. As the Dao is understood as a condition which grants all experiences, 
it can be understood through all different experiences in different ways. Zhuangzi's 
thought, therefore, can be understood as seeking to cultivate an awareness of the Dao 
within  each  of  these  perspective,  even  though  the  Dao can  never  be  completely 
revealed within any single perspective. Hence, the Dao might be revealed in different 
ways through different  experiences,  but  it  can never  be presented as  a  systematic 
doctrine. This can be observed in passages from Zhuangzi such as the following:
             Master Chi said, 'Yen this a good point to make, but do you 
             really understand? I have lost myself, do you understand? You hear 
             the pipes of the people, but not the pipes of earth. Even if you
             hear the pipes of earth, you don't hear the pipes  of Heaven!'
             'Please explain this' said Master Yu. 
            Master Chi replied. 'The vast breath of the universe, this is called Wind.
            Sometimes it is unmoving; when it moves it makes the ten thousand 
            openings resound dramatically. Have you not heard it, like a terrifying gale?
            Mountains and forests are stormed by it, great trees, a hundred spans round 
with  dips  and hollows, are  like noses,  like mouths,  like ears,  like sockets, 
like cups, like mortars, like pools, like gullies, sounding like a crashing wave, 
a whistling arrow, a screech; sucking, shouting, barking, wailing, moaning,
             the winds ahead howling yeeh, those behind crying yooh, light breezes
             making gentle sounds, while the typhoon creates a great din. When the 
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             typhoon has passed, all goes quiet again. Have you not witnessed this 
            disturbance settle down?448
In  this  passage,  Zhuangzi  is  seeking  to  convey,  through  an  intense 
description  of  natural  phenomena  and  without  recourse  to  any  fixed  doctrine,  a 
mystical  sense  of  the  Dao as  underlying  all  experiences.  As  Hans-Georg  Moeller 
notes, 'in the midst of changes, the sage is no longer a distinct phase, but the core of 
the process of Dao'.449 However, this does not mean that the Daoist sage has a unique 
and distinctly insightful perspective that is separated from ordinary perspectives, but, 
rather,  that  the  sage  can  see  the  Dao through  the  differing  perspectives  and 
transformations of ordinary life. It is a sense that, for Zhuangzi, can easily be lost 
within the ordinary routine of life and certain practical concerns. 
This  Dao as  shen Dao - eternal  Dao - can be disclosed through a wide 
variety of 'daos' -teachings or ways -, but no single 'dao' as teaching can claim unique 
access or complete expression of the  shen-Dao.  Thus,  Zhuangzi's thought offers a 
sense  of  the  sacred  (equivalent  to  the  shen-Dao)  that,  through  his  perspectivism, 
resists any attempt to lay out a systematic doctrine. Furthermore, Zhuangzi's  shen-
Dao cannot be conveyed through a sudden revelation.  A.C Graham maintains that, 
'unlike, many mystical schools (including Zen Buddhism, which continued its cult of 
spontaneity),  Daoism  does  not  seek  an  absolute,  unique  and  final  illumination 
different in kind from other experiences'.450  The aim of Zhuangzi's thought, as with 
philosophical Daoism more widely, is to continually cultivate a sense of the Dao as a 
process underlying all things, without setting forth a fixed doctrine.
448  Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu: Translated  by Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly Arkana 
Publishing London 1996    p 51
449 H-G Moeller  Daoism Explained: From the Butterfly Dream to the Fishnet Allegory  Open Court 
Chicago USA 2005 p. 55
450  Liezi The Book of Lieh Tzu:A Classic of Tao Translated by AC Graham  Introduction by A C 
Graham  Columbia University Press New York 1990 p  8
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The Later Heidegger: Daoism and Non-Doctrinal Religion
As has  been discussed in  preceding sections,  a  central  project  of  the  later 
Heidegger's thought is the regaining and rethinking of a sense of the sacred within the 
modern  world.  It  will  be  argued  here  that  this  rethinking  of  the  sacred  can  be 
understood in terms of non-doctrinal religion as exemplified by Zhuangzi's Daoism 
and Shrine-Shintoism.   
Firstly,  Heidegger's  later  thought  clearly  focuses  on  Being  (Seyn).  The 
ontological aspects of Seyn have been looked at in preceding sections. What is crucial 
here is  the religious aspect of  Seyn,  associated with the sense of 'wonder towards 
Being'. As Young states, this is associated with the 'wonder that there is something 
rather  than  nothing,  gratitude  because,  whatever  its  darkness  (Hölderlin's  distant 
rumbles  of  thunder),  the  world  is  still,  for  those  of  us  with  eyes  to  see,  an 
extraordinarily beautiful place: not just granted to us there, but rather gifted'.451 What, 
however, does it mean to live in such a state of wonder towards Being?
It may at first seem that the later Heidegger is trying to set up a doctrine of 
Being that would represent one single creed of Being (Seyn). However, in the letter he 
wrote seeking to explain his essay, 'The Thing', Heidegger takes 'the divine world of 
the Greeks',  'prophetic Judaism' and 'the preaching of Jesus'452 as examples of this 
'presencing'453 of Being. Such examples appear incongruous for the reason that the 
iconoclastic monotheism of Jewish prophets, such as Jeremiah or Ezekiel, appears, by 
definition, to exclude the polytheistic sense of the divine expressed in a work such as 
Hesiod's Theogeny. As such, Jewish monotheism and pagan Greek polytheism appear 
mutually  contradictory.  This  means  that  any  attempt  to  combine  such  mutually 
451  J. Young  Heidegger's Later Philosophy  Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002 p  60
452  M. Heidegger  ‘The Thing: Epilogue: A Letter to a Young Student’: Poetry, Language, Thought  
Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New York 1971  p. 184
453  M. Heidegger ‘The Thing: Epilogue: A Letter to a Young Student’ Poetry, Language, Thought  
Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New York 1971  p. 184
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exclusive positions would appear to entail a radical dilution of one or both. Heidegger 
clearly  would  not  wish  'an  adornment'454 (something  which  is  merely  trivial  or 
superficial); while, furthermore, he does not appear to indicate or desire the possibility 
of a Hegelian synthesis of Judeo-Christianity with Greek paganism. How, therefore, is 
it  possible  to  understand  Heidegger's  use  of  contradictory  illustrations  within  his 
letter? 
The 'divine world of the Greeks',  'prophetic Judaism' and 'the preaching of 
Jesus', should not be understood as an exclusive set of examples, but rather as three 
easily accessible historical archetypes that provide radically differing understandings, 
all of which provide for Heidegger a legitimate disclosure of the sacred. The list of 
possible  legitimate  archetypes  or  understandings  of  the  sacred  could  indeed  be 
extended beyond this, certainly for Heidegger, it could include the poetry of Hölderlin 
and the East Asian world. It might be projected still further. Hubert Dreyfus gives the 
examples  of  the  'music  of  the  sixties',  'the  Beatles',  Bob  Dylan'  as  well  as  the 
'Woodstock  music  festival',455 as  what  might  in  Heideggerian  terms  be  called 
presencing of the sacred. Whether or not it is correct to hold that such phenomena do 
indeed represent a break from the dominant technocratic understanding of the modern 
world,  as  Hubert  Dreyfus  claims  that  they  do,  is  not  relevant  here.  What  is  of 
significance is the principle that, from a Heideggerian position, it is possible to see the 
presencing of Being (Seyn) in a wide variety of different traditions, understandings 
and practices, including many that Heidegger himself would not have anticipated. 
What  Heidegger  is  seeking,  through  these  different  understandings,  is  to 
reclaim and develop awareness of the underlying disclosure of the prescencing of 
454  B. D. Crowe  Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion: Realism and Cultural Criticism  Indiana 
University Press Bloomington Indianapolis 2007  p.  120 
455 H. L. Dreyfus’:Heidegger on Technology’ .in  The Politics of Knowledge Edited by Andrew 
Feenberg and Alastair Hannay Indiana University Press Bloomington Indianapolis  1995  p.  106
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Being within them. As such, Heidegger's thought allows for a wide variety of different 
traditions to show a legitimate expression of the sacred. For this reason, he has to 
reject any one single doctrine as having an absolute claim over the disclosure of Being 
as Seyn. Hence, Heidegger refers directly to having 'renounced the claim to a binding 
doctrine'.456 It can be inferred that, for example, Heidegger refers to the 'preaching of 
Jesus' rather than to Christianity, precisely because the word Christianity carries with 
it too many connotations of church doctrine, dogma and fixed belief.
Rather than seeking to advocate any particular set of beliefs concerning the 
divine, Heidegger's later thought is concerned with cultivating a sense of openness 
towards Being as Seyn. For Heidegger, various different traditions and practices can 
represent  an  expression  of  an  underlying  sense  of  Seyn.  What  matters  to  him  is 
primarily  to  remain  open  to  the  presencing  of  Being  underlying  such  different 
experiences of the sacred. It is this openness towards the sense of Being that makes 
Heidegger's thought distinct from a reductionist technocratic approach or a dogmatic 
position that requires a fixed adherence to one set of beliefs. 
This  openness  towards  Being  in  Heidegger  can  be  understood  through 
Zhuangzi's non-doctrinal Daoism, as has been stated previously. For Zhuangzi, there 
can be no single overarching claim of truth upon the Dao.  Rather, the Dao is manifest 
through a variety of different perspectives and transformations, each of which remains 
valid.  Each  perspective  is  in  effect  a  manifestation  of  the  Dao that  grants  the 
possibility of that perspective. Zhuangzi's sage, therefore, can provide a model for 
Heidegger's  non-doctrinal  openness  towards  the  presencing  of  Being.  It  is  this 
openness, rather than any fixed doctrine or belief, that enables the sense of wonder 
towards Being.
456  M. Heidegger  ‘The Thing: Epilogue: A Letter to a Young Student’ in Poetry, Language, Thought  
Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New York 1971  p 185 
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Heidegger - Practice and Shrine-Shintoism
Some of Heidegger's later works focus more directly on everyday practices. 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and ‘The Thing’, both exemplify this focus. In these 
two essays, Heidegger seeks to look at what appears to be a relatively routine set of 
practices, such as drinking from a wine jug in ‘The Thing’, or building a bridge in 
‘Building Dwelling Thinking’. Such practices might appear to a certain extent distinct 
from the ontological concerns that underlie Heidegger's work, in that they are directed 
as relating to beings rather than to 'Being'.
 How should such a change in concern be viewed in the context of Heidegger's 
overall philosophical project? In order to answer this question it is necessary to look 
in  more detail  at  the role of practice and ritual  in the later  Heidegger.  These two 
elements, practice and ritual, in the later Heidegger should both be understood as part 
of a relationship towards beings that Heidegger seeks to cultivate, and which he refers 
to as dwelling, Baun. 
The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans 
are on the earth, is Baun, dwelling. To be a human being means 
to be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word 
bauen, which says that man is in so far as he dwells, this word bauen 
however also means at the same time to cherish and protect,
 to preserve and care for.457
Dwelling as  Baun for Heidegger is, therefore, more than a trivial notion of 
living in a particular place. It is rather an understanding of how to live in the world,
457 M. Heidegger ‘ Building: Dwelling and Thinking’ in  Poetry, Language, Thought   Translated by 
Albert Hofstadter Harper and Row New York 1971  p. 147
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 The role of the sacred associated with the four-fold,  'earth,  sky, gods and 
mortals' in dwelling, has already been looked at in previous sections. The main focus 
here is on dwelling in the later Heidegger as religious practice.  As Crowe states, 
'what is particularly significant about this notion of mortal dwelling in the fourfold is 
that Heidegger incorporates a specifically  religious dimension of meaning into what 
appears to be a generic account of the structures of human existence as such.458 What, 
therefore, does it mean to dwell as a religious practice?
It is clear in ‘The Thing’ that crucial to dwelling is an awareness of apparently 
ordinary items, such as the wine jug, It is the neglect of such everyday things that 
Heidegger sees as a deep failure of Western modernity, in which 'man has so far given 
no more thought to the thing as a thing'.459 His concern is not, however, to present a 
purely  intellectual  and  abstract  understanding  of  things.  This  can  be  seen  in 
Heidegger's  comments on Kant's  'thing in  itself',  in which,  he states,  ‘to  Kant the 
character  of  the  ‘in  itself’ signifies  that  the  object  is  an  object  in  itself  without 
reference to a human act representing it'.460 Heidegger does not take such an abstract 
intellectual understanding of the thing as something that is objective and distinct from 
any  practical  concern.  The  focus  of  the  essay  is  instead  poetic.  Such  a  poetic 
understanding  is  contrasted  by  Heidegger  with  a  technocratic  view  of  things,  as 
resources  or  commodities. This  raises  the  question  as  to  how Heidegger  seeks  to 
cultivate such a poetic understanding of the thing.
 It may at first appear that holding such a poetic sense of the jug of wine 
means adhering to a particular set of beliefs about the jug and the world in general. 
However, this misunderstands the nature and focus of dwelling for Heidegger. For 
458  B. D.Crowe  Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion  Indiana University Press Bloomington 
Indianapolis 2007     p. 132
459 M. Heidegger ‘The Thing’ in Poetry, Language, Thought  Translated  by Albert Hofstadter Harper 
and Row New York 1971  p 177
460 Ibid 
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example,  if  someone  were  intellectually  to  believe  in  a  pantheon  of  gods,  a 
community of mortals and the sacredness of earth and sky, but continued to live as a 
consumer  within  technocratic  society,  this  person  would  not  truly  dwell  in  the 
Heideggerian sense. 
What a particular individual may or not believe is not central to the notion of 
dwelling  in  Heidegger.  Hence  in  ‘The  Thing’,  Heidegger  does  not  lay  out  the 
ontological states of the four-fold as a series of beliefs. Rather, what dwelling entails 
for  Heidegger is  conveyed  and  preserved  through  certain  practices,  such  as  the 
libation  from  a  wine  jug,  with  reference  to  which  he  states,  'in  the  gift  of  the 
outpouring that is a libation, the divinities stay in their own way, they who receive 
back the gift of giving as the gift of donation'.461  Crowe notes that, for Heidegger, 
these 'practices only make sense because of the divine'.462 However, it  is precisely 
through such practices,  rather  than any particular  revelation,  that  the sense of the 
divine  and  dwelling  in  the  four-fold  for  the  later  Heidegger  is  conveyed.  These 
practices preserve the sense of the gods, mortals, earth and sky as both distinct and 
interconnected categories. They allow in Heidegger's words, 'earth sky, divinities and 
mortals - being at one with one another.463 What it means for a mortal to dwell is to 
take part in these practices that mark out the relationship between the four-fold. The 
same difference and interconnection between the four-fold can be observed in the 
practice of bridge-building in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking,’ and could be extended 
further. Such practices cultivate the sense of the four-fold for Heidegger,  and thus 
enable dwelling to take place. In Robert S Gall's words, 'for Heidegger, individuals, 
communities and the world, show themselves to be only in the harmonizing of various 
461  M. Heidegger ‘ The Thing’ in  Poetry, Language, Thought . Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper 
and Row New York 1971 p. 173
462  B. D. Crowe Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religion  Indiana University Press Bloomington 
Indianapolis 2007   p 133
463  M. Heidegger ‘The Thing’ in Poetry, Language, Thought . Translated by Albert Hofstadter Harper 
and Row New York 1971  p  179
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forces and activities of things.464 It is precisely through everyday rituals and practices, 
such as drinking from the wine jug, that this harmonizing takes place; and, thereby, 
each part of the four-fold is allowed to come into their essence. It is through such 
practices and ways of living, rather than through any doctrine, that Heidegger sees 
dwelling taking place in the sense of preserving the four-fold.
Thus, dwelling consists of a way of life that is defined as practices and rituals 
that  are  based  on  a  sense  of  the  sacred  discussed  in  previous  sections,  aimed  at 
cultivating a sense of poetic openness towards things. However, it resists any attempt 
to express it as a systematic doctrine. As such, it constitutes non-doctrinal religion. 
Such an ethos does not bring about a new sense of the sacred, but re-attunes to a sense 
of the sacred that has been for the most part lost within the modern Western world 
These practices represent a background and foundation to daily life as, in Heidegger's 
terms,  'Being  in  the  world'.  For  Heidegger,  there  is  no  particular  need  to  be 
prescriptive in the nature of such rituals, as a wide variety of different practices are 
possible.  What matters primarily is their role in cultivating the sense of the inter-
relationship of the four-fold.  This emphasis on the importance of ritual in the later 
Heidegger  sharply  contrasts  with  Zhuangzi's  suspicion  of  ritual,  as  shown  by 
statements such as,  'rituals  are  just  frills  on the hem of the Tao, and are signs of 
impeding disorder'. 465  Zhuangzi clearly views ritual as at best superficial and at worst 
harmful. 
Shintoism,  however,  appears  to  present  a  better  model  for  understanding 
dwelling  as  a  non-doctrinal  religion,  as  it   represents  a  non-doctrinal  religion 
expressed through ritual, tied to a sense of the sacred and to what Motoori Norinaga 
464  R. S Gall  ‘Different Religions, Diverse Gods’  in  International Journal For Philosophy of  
Religion  Volume 49 No 1 Feb.2001 p. 38
465 Zhuangzi The Book of Chuang Tzu, Translated Martin Palmer and Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana 
Publishing London 1996  p. 188
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referred to as mono-no-aware, which resonates strongly with Heidegger's own  poetic 
sense of things.   It is this type of awareness and sensitivity towards certain everyday 
things, rather than any particular doctrine, that is crucial to both shrine Shintoism and 
the later Heidegger. 
As has already been noted, Heidegger rejected scriptural authority. Shintoism 
although it possesses various written collections of ancient stories, such as the Kojiki 
(Record  of  Ancient  Matters)  or  the  Kogoshui (Gleanings  from  Ancient  Stories), 
should not be understood as a text based religion. As Sokyo Ono states, 'none of these 
writings should be thought of as Holy Writ in the sense the term is used in Christianity 
or Islam'.466 He adds that 'Shinto does not possess sacred scriptures as found in other 
religions.'467 Being Shinto is  rather  about  attitude  and practice.  As Robert  S.  Gall 
states, the gods, (kami) of Shintoism are 'not beings, objects of speculation or theo-
logy but indications of the awesome forces and powers active in the world that reveal 
the significance of things'.468 
 Shintoism therefore does not, in Heidegger's sense, prevent the possibility of 
asking the question of Being. Shrine-Shintoism instead offers a poetic awareness of 
things  and respect  for  the sacred.  In Shintoism, the poetic  awareness  of things  is 
preserved and expressed through ritual and practice. These include practices involved 
in  making  offerings  at  the  shrine,  ritual  purification  through  misogi and  the 
observance of different festivals. These rituals provide both a framework for everyday 
life and the experience of the sacred. Through this framework of ritual, the sense of 
the sacred is allowed to occur, a sense that is otherwise overlooked within daily life. It 
466  S. Ono in collaboration with W. P Woodard   Shinto: The kami Way, Tuttle Publishing Boston 2004 
p.  11 
467  S. Ono in collaboration with W. P Woodard   Shinto: The kami Way, Tuttle Publishing Boston2004 
pp 9-10
468  R. S. Gall ‘ kami and Daimon: A Cross Cultural Reflection on What is Divine’ in Philosophy East  
and West  Volume 49: January 1999:p 65 of 63-74
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is precisely the preservation of this sense of things and the sacred that constitutes the 
religious  project  of  Heidegger's  essays  ‘The  Thing’  and  ‘Building  Dwelling 
Thinking’.
  Shrine-Shintoism can therefore provide a model for understanding what it 
would mean to dwell in the Heideggerian sense. Shintoism presents an ethos, a way of 
seeing the world that is expressed and preserved through practice; in the same way 
that the sense of things and the four-fold is preserved through everyday practices and 
rituals  in  Heidegger.  Shintoism can thus make clear  what dwelling in practice for 
Heidegger could be as a lived non-doctrinal religion, that is, a way of living based on 
a sense of the sacred through practice, rather than belief.
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Conclusion
 Heidegger's later thought can be understood as a search for a sense of the 
sacred  in  the  modern  world.  This  sense  of  the  sacred  can  be understood as  non-
doctrinal-religion  which  represents  a  notion  of  religious  understanding  that  is 
separated from the metaphysics of the Western tradition, and is, thus, no longer tied to 
a fixed set of beliefs, but rather provides a basis for a renewed sense of questioning 
and wonder.  As a result,  rather than offering a sudden revelation, such a religious 
position should be understood as continual openness towards the sense of the sacred. 
This means cultivating an attitude of basic wonder towards Being, while rejecting any 
one single fixed metaphysical account of the nature of existence. Elements of this 
sense of wonder towards Being can be found in both Shintoism and Daoism.
Europeanisation, Technology and Nihilism
Clearly,  Heidegger  cannot  hope  to  abolish  modern  technocratic  nihilism 
simply by cultivating such a sense of religion. On the surface, it may appear that an 
adoption of a religious sensibility might make no practical difference to the modern 
world,  while  the  Heideggerian  would  have  to  acknowledge  that  non-doctrinal 
religious traditions already seem deeply endangered by the modern world. While it 
was not possible to discuss the full effect of Europeanisation or Westernisation on the 
Far East, and while there may be areas or aspects of the Japanese or Chinese world 
which have not been completely lost, it is easy to see, at least superficially, in major 
East Asian cities such as Tokyo, Hong Kong or Beijing, there is a strong degree of 
technocratic Westernisation. The ordinary citizen of such places is more likely to go 
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out for fast food than visit a temple or shrine, while the traditional culture has been 
turned into a tourist attraction. Hence, it would be naïve to assert that the East Asian 
world exists now as a tradition that is radically separated from the West.  From a 
Heideggerian perspective, therefore, it is inaccurate to say that China or Japan stands 
outside  of  the  dominance  of  modern  technocratic  reason.  A return  to  pre-Boxer-
rebellion China or pre-Meiji-restoration Japan is  as impossible as a return to pre-
Socratic or Homeric Greece.  Thus, it may seem as though Heidegger's philosophy is 
simply another example of antiquarian romanticism, looking longingly to a distant 
and unreachable past world. Does this mean that any project to resist the dominance 
of the modern technocratic way, of relating to an existence based on Shintoism or 
philosophical Daoism, has already failed?
Clearly, Heidegger does not foresee the prospect of an easy reversal of the 
prior development of world history. A mass conversion of the Western world to either 
philosophical Daoism or Shintoism is very unlikely. Although Heidegger does present 
the  possibility  of  a  radical  change  in  world  history,  it  remains  only  a  remote 
possibility.  There is,  therefore,  no historical  guarantee of victory in the sense that 
classical Marxism would offer the cause of proletarian revolution. Heidegger would 
acknowledge that there is still a strong likelihood that the modern Westernised world 
may remain trapped in nihilism forever. How, therefore, can the cultivation of a non-
doctrinal religious sensibility act as a response to modern nihilism, if indeed it must 
remain a fringe activity excluded from the mainstream? 
In his later writings, Heidegger often hints at certain individuals who would be 
able to remain to a certain extent outside of the dominance of technocratic disclosure. 
Indeed, to a certain extent, the main project of Heidegger's later thought should be 
understood as advocating the cultivation of a sensibility towards the sacred that lies 
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outside of the prevailing technological consumerist ethos that dominates the modern 
Westernised world. 
 However,  the notion of the Shepherd of Being or Guardian as a figure in 
Heidegger's writings appears somewhat enigmatic. This state is described cryptically 
in  passages  such  as,  'the  stillest  witness  to  the  stillest  stillness,  in  which  an 
imperceptible  tug  turns  the  truth  back,  out  of  the  confusion  of  all  calculated 
correctness'.469  Such  descriptions  describe  a  way  of  living  that  is  outside  of  the 
dominance of technocratic reason. However, they leave unclear what it entails. How 
can one individual step outside of the dominance of technocratic reason? Is it possible 
to  make  sense  of  this  type  of  way of  life  through  the  principle  of  non-doctrinal 
religion? 
In Heidegger's writings, the Shepherd of Being is always portrayed as having a 
relatively solitary existence, without the intense drama and violent struggle associated 
with  figures  such  as  the  Nietschean  Űbermensch,  or  the  collective  action  of  the 
Marxist  revolutionary.  Potentially,  therefore,  the  Heideggerian  Shepherd  of  Being 
would be a figure who would not have a direct impact and may not even be noticed by 
the  modern  world.  The  challenge  for  the  Heideggerian  Shepherd  or  Guardian, 
therefore, is to resist being completely drawn into consumerist technocratic society, 
while at the same time remaining open to Seyn. This thesis has sought to show that 
this methodology of religious life through continual openness towards the sacred can 
provide a model for standing outside of the modern technocratic way of life. But what 
is the role of non-doctrinal religion in such an existence, and further from this, how 
can this way of life respond to modern nihilism?
469  M. Heidegger Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowing) Translated by Parvis Emad and 
Kenneth Maly   Indiana Press Bloomington Indianapolis 1999  p.277 or, alternatively, 'Shepherds 
live invisibly outside of the desert of the desolated earth'  M. Heidegger The End of Philosophy:  
Translated by Joan Stambaugh.: The University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1973  p. 109.
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 Zhuangzi's  Sage/  Heidegger's  Shepherd  of  Being  in  the  Modern  Westernised 
World
Zhuangzi's sage can be understood as a model for Heidegger's 'Shepherd of 
Being'  in  that  both  apply  non-doctrinal  religion  in  different  settings,  Heidegger 
responding  to  modern  technocratic  nihilism,  Zhuangzi  confronting  the  Confucian 
bureaucracy. However, despite their different contexts, both of these approaches share 
an  underlying  similarity.  In  both  cases,  the  Dao and  Being  as  Seyn are  seen  as 
obscured,  for Zhuangzi  by the hierarchical  power structure and conformity of the 
Confucian system, and for the Later Heidegger by the dominance of technocratic and 
calculative reason. Both can be considered examples of non-doctrinal religion in that, 
rather than seeking to lay down a fixed set of beliefs, they seek to cultivate an attitude 
towards the Dao or Seyn that can be manifest in a number of possible ways.  
Hence,  just  as  Zhuangzi  could  see  the  Confucian  bureaucracy  as  itself  a 
manifestation  of  the  Dao,  so,  too,  does  the  Heideggerian  perspective  see  modern 
technology ambiguously as both a destiny of Being and as an impoverishment in the 
disclosure  of  Seyn.  Such  positions  appear  problematic  for  both  the  Daoists  and 
Heidegger,  in  that,  while  both Confucian bureaucracy and modern technology are 
seen  as  obscuring  the  Dao  or  Being,  these  two  ontologies  are  taken  as  all 
encompassing, even encompassing that which appears to be opposed to them. Thus, 
both Confucianism and modern nihilism are thought to remain in relation to the Dao 
or Being, and in this way, they appear as manifestations of the Dao or Being. They 
are,  however,  both  deeply  impoverished.  The  Confucian  bureaucracy  or  modern 
technology, while they may become dominant, are both taken as only one possible 
way  that  the  world  can  be,  without  the  claim of  absolute  justification.  Zhuangzi 
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implicitly undermines the traditional Chinese notion of the mandate of the Confucian 
ruler  from heaven  (tian),  stating  that  'minor  criminals  are  locked  up,  while  great 
criminals are made into Lords and rulers'.470  In this way, the authority of the ruler for 
Zhuangzi is no longer seen as being justified and based on a mandate from heaven 
that may be corrupted or lost, but is taken as being corrupt in its foundation, with the 
ruler being compared to a criminal. The mindset of the Confucian hierarchy is scene 
as  implicit  to  the  individual  spontaneity  necessary  for  the  cultivation  of  ziran. 
Zhuangzi  indeed  extends  this  critique  from  the  Confucian  hierarchy  to  include 
technical devices, such as in the story of the gardener who states 'where you have 
machines,  then you get certain kinds of problems; where you get certain kinds of 
problems, then your heart becomes warped by these problems.'471  While Zhuangzi 
does not go on to develop a systematic ontological attack on the nature of technology 
in the way that Heidegger did in his later writings, the position voiced by the gardener 
does clearly show a concern with avoiding the technocratic mindset. The Daoist sage 
must therefore not merely step out of the conformist way of thinking induced by the 
Confucian court, but also avoid getting trapped in the technocratic mindset, induced 
by over dependence of technological devices.
 Heidegger's  thought  might  be  said  to  undermine  a  mandate  of  Western 
technocratic progress, such as the Hegelian ideal of the 'march of reason'  through 
history that ultimately culminates in modern Western rationality. Such an idolisation 
of  Western  rationality  is  referred  to  by  Heidegger  in  'A Dialogue  on  Language 
Between a Japanese and an Inquirer' as the proclamation of reason 'as goddess'.472 The 
470  Zhuangzi The Book of  Chuang Tzu  Translated  Martin Palmer with Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana 
Publishing London 1996  p. 268
471 Zhuangzi The Book of  Chuang Tzu  Translated  Martin Palmer with Elizabeth Breuilly  Arkana 
Publishing London 1996  p. 99
472 M. Heidegger  ‘A Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’: On the Way into 
Language  Translated by Peter D Hertz   Harper &Row New York  1971  p. 16 
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aim  of  Heidegger's  thought,  particularly  his  reading  of  the  history  of  Western 
philosophy,  is  in  part  to  undermine such hubris.  In  this  way,  Heidegger's  thought 
undermines the absolute legitimacy based on either divine right or human progress.
Both the Confucian ruler and the modern Western world have their absolute 
legitimacy taken away from them by the thought of Zhuangzi and Heidegger. They 
are both possible ways in which the Dao or Seyn can be disclosed. Crucially, however, 
they are not the only possible ways in which being or Dao can be disclosed. Hence, 
Zhuangzi's  sage  or  Heidegger's  Shepherd  both  remain  open  to  other  possible 
manifestations. Thus, Zhuangzi's sage may attend the court of the Confucian emperor, 
but  still  remain  open  towards  the  more  chaotic  way  of  the  mountains  in  the 
wilderness,  while the Heideggerian Shepherd of Being may still  use technological 
gadgets,  although remaining attuned  to  the  deep  mystery  of  the  forest.  Thus,  the 
disciple  of  Zhuangzi  would care less  about  attaining a  high  rank within  the  civil 
service of the Confucian state; and the truly Heideggerian Guardian should be less 
concerned with the acquisition of the latest electronic consumer device. In both cases, 
such  attainments  lose  their  significance  as  worthwhile  projects.  Such  figures  are, 
however, not required to completely detach themselves from official life at court or 
from the use of technology. What matters is that they remain open to various senses of 
the sacred that stay outside of the technocratic reason or Confucian rules. This sense 
of openness can be extended further to other manifestations of the Dao or Seyn, such 
as to the Shinto Shrine or Greek temple. It is this openness or attunement, combined 
with the undermining of the absolute foundations or legitimacy, that keeps Zhuangzi's 
sage  or  Heidegger's  Shepherd  from  being  completely  incorporated  within  the 
Confucian hierarchy or the flow of resources.  
Thus neither Zhuangzi's sage nor Heidegger's Guardian should be thought of 
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as a strict ascetic or Luddite in the sense that neither of them advocates a complete 
renunciation  of  involvement  with  the  Confucian  or  technological  world.  Such  an 
approach, therefore, differs from the practice of complete extreme non-attachment to 
the world as practised by the Jain ascetic or the Schopenhauerian renunciation of the 
will.  Zhuangzi  refers  disparagingly  to  the  emphasis  put  on  simplicity  by  the 
Mohists,473 who, while criticising the Confucian hierarchy and social order,  advocated 
a life of extreme renunciation, going as far as to hold that there should be 'no singing 
in  life,  nor  …  mourning  at  death'’.474 This  form  of  denial  Zhuangzi  held  to  be 
inhuman, stating that 'making people sad and depressed by practices that are hard to 
follow cannot be seen as the [Dao] of the sage'.475 In this way, Zhuangzi rejects all 
forms of  extreme ascetic  renunciation,  while  Heidegger  states  that  'the flight  into 
tradition, out of a combination of humility and presumption, can bring about nothing 
in itself other than self-deception and blindness to the historical moment'.476  As a true 
Heideggerian, therefore, one is not required to live away from modern society in the 
forest, just as the true Daoist is not required to live in the mountains.
  Instead of adopting such extremes of asceticism or even self-mortification, the 
Daoist sage or Heideggerian Shepherd is able to set himself free from the Confucian 
bureaucracy and from technocratic thought. They see the worlds of Confucianism or 
technology as only one possible manifestation of the Dao or Seyn, and they develop 
an openness towards a sense of the sacred that lies outside of such traditions. They are 
able to enter and live within such places without being completely absorbed by them. 
Nor should they be understood as Nietzschean Űbermenschen, laying down a new set 
473 The Mohists were a school of thought in Warring States Period China, rejecting Confucian rites and 
hierarchy- taking this view to the extreme conclusion of rejecting all ceremony and aesthetics.  
474  Zhuangzi The Book of  Chuang Tzu  Translated  Martin Palmer with Elizabeth Breuilly   Arkana 
Publishing London 1996   p. 298-299
475 Ibid  
476 M. Heidegger  'The Age of the World Picture': The Question Concerning Technology and Other  
Essays  Harper & Row: New York 1977  p. 136
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of values, while shattering the old law tables.  This is because, along the lines of non-
doctrinal religion, neither Zhuangzi's nor Heidegger's thought should be understood as 
an  alternative  set  of  rules  of  behaviour  or  creed  to  replace  the  Confucian  or 
technocratic  valuation  of  life.  Hence,  Zhuangzi  does  not  seek  to  set  out  a  rigid 
alternative set of a Daoist programme of rules of conduct to replace the Confucian 
rites (li), while Heidegger's thought should not be understood as a systematic doctrine 
of  Being  to  replace  Western  metaphysics.  In  both  cases,  such  efforts  would  be 
counter-productive in that they would be in danger of merely creating another way in 
which  Seyn or  Dao  could  be  obscured.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no  Marxist-style 
revolutionary programme or manifesto, since neither Zhuangzi nor Heidegger offers a 
systematic schedule of how to abolish the Confucian bureaucracy or technology and 
Gestell; nor do they offer a new systematic world view to replace Confucianism or 
technology. 
However,  this  apparent  lack  of  a  structured  revolutionary  programme  or 
methodical  new paradigm should not  be read as a  conservative acceptance of the 
tradition or status quo, in that, without directly seeking to implement any kind of new 
order upon the world around them, the Daoist sage and Heideggerian Shepherd are 
able  to  free  themselves.  The  non-doctrinal-religious  sage  of  Zhuangzi  or  the 
Heideggerian Shepherd can look back at the prior development of tradition, whether 
this is the development of Confucian customs or the history of Western metaphysics, 
while these critiques deprive the prior tradition of its authority and legitimacy. Thus, 
through  this  process  of  critique  and  subversion,  the  sage  or  the  Heideggerian 
Shepherd  are  thereby  able  to  set  themselves  free  from  the  weight  of  previous 
traditions. In this way, Zhuangzi and Heidegger may both, to a certain extent, be seen 
as iconoclasts in the sense of undermining traditional authority. However, there is no 
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violently iconoclastic command to 'shatter the good and the law tables of the good'.477 
This means there is no recommendation that the whole preceding world and tradition 
ought to be swept away. There is no need for any such direct iconoclasm on the part 
of Zhuangzi's sage or Heidegger's Shepherd, because they are able to view previous 
traditions  from  a  distance  that  undermines  their  authority,  but  at  the  same 
acknowledges and even respects aspects of the sacred within them. Therefore, it is 
possible for the Heideggerian Shepherd or Zhuangzi's sage to look back at a wide 
variety of aspects of preceding traditions, seeing them as manifestations of the Dao or 
Seyn.  To  illustrate  this  principle,  consider  buildings  such  as  medieval  gothic 
cathedrals.  These buildings might be seen by the Shepherd or the sage in terms of the 
presence of the sacredness and ineffability that they embody. The Shepherd or the 
sage, however, would have to reject the absolute truth claim or spiritual authority of 
medieval Catholic theology which the buildings are tied to.
Adopting  this  Heideggerian  non-doctrinal  religious  approach  towards 
technology, therefore, means not being completely absorbed into the flow of resources 
as a passive, producing and consuming human resource, while at the same time not 
cutting oneself off completely from the modern world. This approach can potentially 
also  be applied  more  broadly  at  a  more  collective  level,  in  providing a  basis  for 
nations with non-Western traditions to relate to 'the Europeanisation of the Earth and 
Man' that Heidegger referred to in the ‘Dialogue Between a Japanese and an Inquirer’. 
The non-doctrinal religious approach provides a model to which countries such as 
China or Japan can potentially relate, including Western influence without becoming 
completely  Westernised,  while  at  the  same  time  not  returning  to  a  pre-Meiji 
restoration, or Boxer-rebellion-style isolationism. This is because, when viewed from 
477  F. Nietzsche Thus Spake Zarathustra :Translated by R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin, Classics London 
1969  p. 230
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the position of non-doctrinal religion, Europeanisation or Westernisation no longer 
appear as the only and absolute models for the development of East Asian traditional 
thought,  which  may  otherwise  simply  be  dismissed  as  backward.  It  is  therefore 
possible  to  adopt  aspects  of  modern  Western  life  while  preserving  the  religious 
sensibilities associated with the Daoist sage or Shinto shrine, thus taking a step back 
from un-critical Westernisation and the idolisation of technocratic progress.
 In this way, both at an individual and collective level, through the cultivation 
of  a  non-doctrinal-religious  sensibility  based  upon  a  Heideggerian  dialogue  with 
either philosophical Daoism or Shintoism, a response can be compiled for living in 
the modern world that follows on from Heidegger's thought. The resulting response 
should be thought of as neither a passive nihilistic acceptance of modern life nor as an 
extreme ascetic or Luddite rejection of it.
A consideration raised by this work is the potential criticism it may invite from 
the standpoint of a Marxist, namely that the Heideggerian approach adopted here has 
failed to take into account social and economic relations. Indeed, it might seem that 
this  Heideggerian  non-doctrinal  religious  approach,  focused  on  the  ideal  of  the 
spiritual  cultivation  of  the  lone,  isolated  'Shepherd  of  Being',  could  lead  to  a 
somewhat elitist focus on the cultivation of a few individuals who are able to become 
attuned to Seyn or the Dao. Such an approach may thus easily appeal to a minority of 
relatively privileged intellectuals, while excluding the majority of humanity who are 
not in a position to contemplate the Dao or Seyn, and in Heideggerian terms might be 
dismissed  as  das  Man,  being  effectively  left  to  be  human  resources  standing  in 
reserve.   Hence,  in  focusing  on  the  contemplative  spiritual  cultivation  of  a  few 
isolated individuals, the Heideggerian Shepherd or Zhuangzi's sage might both appear 
disengaged from political life in the modern world. The cultivation of such a way of 
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life, focusing on inner attunement, could therefore be seen as evasive and, in the terms 
of Sartre's What is Literature?, lacking in political responsibility and commitment. 
This Marxist and Sartrean criticism, therefore, is something that needs to be 
considered and addressed in later research on this topic. Is non-doctrinal religion in 
danger of becoming simply a matter of personal indulgence?   In order to deal with 
this, it would be necessary to look more closely into the application of Heidegger's 
thought as non-doctrinal-religion in the modern world.  It  is  therefore important to 
consider further how a Heideggerian/Daoist non-doctrinal religious approach might 
be related to sociological and political thought of thinkers such as Marx and Weber. 
To  do this,  it  would  be  necessary  to  look  at  the  already  existing  body  of  work, 
particularly that of Marcuse, which has sought to deal with the relationship between 
Heidegger's thought and Marxism. This should be undertaken in order to show how 
the Heideggerian Shepherd or Daoist sage can be conceived of as socially responsible. 
 An alternative but parallel line of criticism from a Kierkegaardian point of 
view might be that the continual openness to the sacred in different ways, on which 
the ideal of the Sage's or the Guardian's non-doctrinal-religion is based, appears un-
focused. In this way, in Kierkegaardian terms, it might be taken as a continuation of 
the aesthetic stage of life where everything is understood 'equally accidentally',478 in 
that in such an understanding, everything is taken in relation to the Dao or to  Seyn. 
The sage or the guardian, therefore, is 'more likely to arrive at a multiplicity than an 
either/or'.  479  Hence, in remaining open to a multiplicity of different ways in which 
the sacred can be disclosed,  the Heideggerian Shepherd or Daoist sage appears to 
avoid the Kierkegaardian notion of faith which demands an answer regarding that 
478 S. Kierkegaard Either/Or A Fragment of Life: Edited by Victor Eremita: Translated and abridged by 
Alastair Hannay .Penguin London1992  p. 552
479 Ibid p.485
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which  is  'absolutely  either  yes  or  no'.480 They  therefore  appear  to  lack  the  single 
direction which Kierkegaard held be to be necessary for 'infinite passion';481 and they 
also appear incapable of, in Kierkegaard's terms, 'purity of heart',482  which he defines 
as willing 'one thing'.483 Hence, they appear to lack a structure to their life, and rather 
seem to drift through the world. 
Is  the  Heideggerian/Daoist  model  for  non-doctrinal  religion  in  danger  of 
appearing weak and unfocused? In order to look at and deal with this potential source 
of criticism, it would be necessary to further compare and contrast the Daoist Sage/ 
Heideggerian Shepherd with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith as models of religiosity in 
order to further clarify the nature of non-doctrinal-religion and to defend the model of 
religion based on openness towards the sacred against the directly focused model of 
Kierkegaard's leap of faith.
480  S. Kierkegaard Concluding Unscientific Postscript To Philosophical Fragments Volume 1  Edited 
and Translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong  Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey 
1992  p. 326
481  Ibid  
482  S. Kierkegaard: 'Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits'  in The Essential Kierkegaard : Edited 
and Translated by Howard Hong and Edna Hong: Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey 
2000  p. 271
483 Ibid   
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